Trimble v. Montgomery Pulmonary Consultants, P.A.

587 F.Supp.3d 1135

Lakesha TRIMBLE, Plaintiff,

v.MONTGOMERY PULMONARY CONSULTANTS, P.A., Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:21-CV-93-WKW

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed February 24, 2022

Anthony David Michel, Joshua Aaron Wrady, Courtney Brooks Crampton, Wrady Michel & King, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

John Alec Henig, Jr., Shannon Lynn Holliday, Copeland Franco Screws & Gill PA, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. Keith Watkins, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In March 2013, Plaintiff Lakesha Trimble ("Trimble"), an African American woman, began working for Montgomery Pulmonary Consultants, P.A. ("Defendant" or "MPC"), as a medical assistant. Trimble maintained this position for over six years until her employment was allegedly terminated in December 2019. Following the end of her employment, Trimble sued Defendant. She brings the following four claims: (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e – 2000e-17 (Count 1); (2) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count 2); (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count 3); and (4) retaliation in violation of § 1981 (Count 4).

Before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment in which Defendant argues that a state agency's decision in an unemployment compensation hearing collaterally estops Trimble from arguing that she was terminated.¹ (Doc. # 7.) The motion has been fully briefed. (See Docs. # 14 & 15.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is due to be denied.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court views the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez , 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for the motion." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have a trial burden of production can assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party "cannot produce admissible evidence to support" a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee note ("Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials .... [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.").

If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc. , 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).

III. BACKGROUND²

In March 2013, Defendant hired Trimble to work as a medical assistant. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13.) At the end of her employment, Trimble worked as a medical assistant for Dr. William Saliski ("Saliski"). Trimble received positive performance reviews from her employer throughout her employment and believes she was the highest paid medical assistant at MPC. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 16.) Trimble was never formally promoted from her medical assistant position during the course of her employment at MPC.

In July 2019, Defendant hired Ms. Julie Paul ("Paul"), a white woman, as the practice administrator. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 18.) Soon after starting her employment, Paul created a new job position titled clinical coordinator. In August 2019, Defendant selected Kristen Mosheim ("Mosheim"), a white woman employed at MPC, to fill the clinical coordinator position, without opening the position to all employees. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 20.) Defendant did not permit any African American employees, including Trimble, to apply. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 21.)

In late August 2019, Trimble spoke with Paul about the decision to hire Mosheim. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 24.) Trimble shared that the decision to promote Mosheim without considering African American employees was discriminatory. Paul stated that she did not "want to hear that in this office on the floor," that the doctors had her "back 100%," and that Trimble could just "deal with it." (Doc. # 1, ¶ 27.) Trimble next shared her concerns with Saliski that Paul's decision was discriminatorily based on race. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 29.)

Over the following months, Trimble repeatedly shared with Saliski her concerns that Paul's decision was discriminatory and that Paul and Mosheim were subjecting her to retaliatory hostility for voicing her concerns. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 30.) Defendant did not subsequently take any investigatory or remedial action. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 32.)

In November 2019, Trimble received an annual performance review and bonus from Paul. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 33.) Trimble's bonus had been reduced by a third of the amount she received the previous year, despite her having received another positive performance review. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 34.) Trimble was told by Paul that it was because of their "differences." (Doc. # 1, ¶ 35.) Trimble asked to clarify if it was because of the concerns she raised about the hiring process for the clinical coordinator position, and Paul replied that it was, and that Trimble should have been fired. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 36–37.)

Later in November 2019, Paul, at a staff meeting, announced that Trimble had resigned and would be leaving MPC. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 38.) At that time, Trimble informed Paul that she had not resigned or been terminated. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 40.) Again, on December 10, 2019, Paul called Trimble into her office and instructed her to tender her resignation, threatening to withhold Trimble's last paycheck if she did not comply. Paul reiterated that her actions were motivated by their "personal differences." (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 41–42.) Trimble refused and told Paul that she did not intend to leave the company. That same day, Trimble contacted Saliski informing him about the situation. Saliski spoke with her in-person about Paul's decision. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 44–45.)

On December 26, 2019, Paul presented Trimble with a typed-out resignation letter and instructed her to sign it. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 46.) Trimble, once again, refused and told Paul that she was not resigning her employment with Defendant. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 47.) Later that day, Paul sent Mosheim to collect Trimble's work keys and informed her that her last day would be December 27, 2019. Trimble alleges that Defendant terminated her on December 27, 2019. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 49.) Trimble believes that her mistreatment, and ultimate termination, were motivated by her race and in retaliation for her good faith opposition to conduct made unlawful by Title VII and § 1981. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 50–51.)

Trimble applied for unemployment compensation, which Defendant opposed. After a hearing, the Alabama Department of Labor ("ADOL") denied unemployment benefits on the basis that "the claimant left work to seek other employment," in other words, that Trimble "voluntarily quit without good cause connected with work." (Doc. # 1, 1; Doc. # 7-1); see also Ala. Code § 25-4-78(2) (providing that an individual who resigns employment "without good cause connected with such work" is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Trimble is collaterally estopped from relitigating whether she was terminated by Defendant because that issue was decided in the prior ADOL unemployment benefits hearing. Specifically, Defendant contends that the hearing officer determined that "[t]he preponderance of evidence shows that the claimant left work to seek other employment." (Doc. # 7-1, at 2.) Whether Defendant terminated Trimble is relevant for all four of her claims brought pursuant to Title VII (Count 1 and Count 3) and § 1981 (Count 2 and Count 4). Trimble, of course, disagrees and asserts that ADOL's findings "have no preclusive effect on Plaintiff's Title VII and § 1981 claims" and that Defendants have not proven the elements of collateral estoppel. (Doc. # 14, at 5–6.) For the reasons to follow, Defendant has not established all of the necessary elements to invoke collateral estoppel as to Trimble's § 1981 claims, and the ADOL's findings have no preclusive effect on Trimble's Title VII claims.

A. Section 1981 Claims (Counts 2 and 4)

When a state agency, like the ADOL, acts in a judicial capacity to " ‘resolve[ ] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, ... federal courts must give the agency's fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.’ " Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott , 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (quoting Utah Constr. & Mining Co. , 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). This preclusive effect, or collateral estoppel, "applies even where the agency's fact-finding is not reviewed by a state court." Quinn v. Monroe Cnty. , 330 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the ADOL hearing officer acted in a judicial capacity when it determined that Trimble voluntarily quit her job. However, the parties disagree as to whether the ADOL's findings...