Trindade v. Grove Servs.

PAULO TRINDADE, Plaintiff, v. GROVE SERVICES, INC. and VICTOR SPIVAK, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-10717-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

September 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Paulo Trindade (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against his former employer Grove Services, Inc. (“Grove”) and its President and Treasurer, Victor Spivak (“Spivak, ” and with Grove “Defendants”), alleging breach of contract and violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act (the “MWA”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148-50, in connection with commissions due to him under his employment contract. [ECF No. 42 (“Am. Compl.”)]. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims arising from his 2013, 2014, and 2016 commission payments. [ECF Nos 91]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is DENIED.^[1]

I.BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.^[2]

On or around September 24, 2010, Plaintiff contracted with Grove to serve as its Sales Director for Latin America (the “Agreement”). [ECF No. 96 ¶ 1]. Under the Agreement, Plaintiff was to receive a $130, 000 base salary, a discretionary bonus, and an annual commission equal to 15% of his “Net Profits.” [Id. ¶ 2; ECF No. 94-1 at 3]. Plaintiff's “Net Profits” were calculated by totaling his gross sales and then deducting certain costs and expenses from that amount, including a “proportionate amount of the overhead, costs and expenses of the Company's Atlanta Office and a proportionate amount of the overhead, costs and expenses of the Company reasonably apportioned to the Company's Atlanta Office . . . .” [ECF No. 94-1 at 3]. The Agreement also provided that “[n]o amendment or alteration of the terms of [the Agreement] shall be valid unless made in a writing signed by each of the parties. . . .” [Id. at 8].

In 2013, Plaintiff received his base salary, a $50, 000 discretionary bonus, and $48, 511.37 in commission. [ECF No. 96 ¶ 3]. In 2014, Plaintiff received his base salary, a $47, 500 discretionary bonus, and $47, 647.46 in commission. [Id. ¶ 4]. He did not object to his 2013 and 2014 commissions when they were paid. [Id. ¶¶ 3-4]. In 2016, Plaintiff received his base salary and a commission. [Id. ¶ 5]. The parties dispute the amount of his commission, with Defendants asserting that it was $146, 000 and Plaintiff claiming that it was only $139, 779. [Id.]. Plaintiff does not know if he objected to his 2016 commission payment when it was paid, but Defendants say that he did not. [ECF No. 96-4 (“Plf. Dep.”) at 104; ECF No. 96 ¶ 5].

During his deposition, Plaintiff was questioned about his 2013, 2014, and 2016 commissions. See generally [Plf. Dep.]. When asked how much more commission^[3] he should have received in 2013, Plaintiff testified that he did not have access to Grove's expense details for 2013 and could not speculate on the underpayment amounts without that information. [Id. at 101]. He testified similarly regarding his 2014 commission. [Id. at 103 (“I cannot make that statement without going through the detailed expenses of 2014.”)]. Finally, when asked how much more he thought he should have been paid in 2016, Plaintiff said “[w]e have retained a specialist to review all of this and other costs and proper allocation so we can calculate that number, ” but that he did “not have an exact value.” [Id. at 152]. Later in his deposition, Plaintiff clarified that his 2014 and 2016 commissions were improperly reduced by the amount that Grove contributed to his retirement account, and that he was owed at least several thousand dollars as a result. [Id. at 163-64].

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on July 24, 2020, which alleges that Grove underpaid his commissions from 2013 to 2016. [Am. Compl.]. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 7, 2020, [ECF No. 46], which the Court granted in part and denied in part, [ECF No. 89]. Pursuant to the Court's dismissal order, the remaining claims are: (1) violations of the MWA against both defendants (Count I), [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-26], and (2) breach of contract against Grove only (Count II), [id. ¶¶ 27-31]. Plaintiff's breach of contract claim challenges the commissions paid in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, while his MWA claim seeks damages only for underpaid commissions in 2015 and 2016. [Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 30].

On December 9, 2020, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims arising from the 2013, 2014, and 2016 underpayments.^[4] [ECF No. 91]. Plaintiff opposed on December 30, 2020, [ECF No. 95], and Defendants filed a reply on January 13, 2021, [ECF No. 97].

II.LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party can show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A]n issue is ‘genuine' if it ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'” Robinson v. Cook, 863 F.Supp.2d 49, 60 (D. Mass. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)). “A fact is material if its resolution might affect the outcome of the case under the controlling law.” Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, “[a] genuine issue exists as to such a fact if there is evidence from which a reasonable trier could decide the fact either way.” Id. (citation omitted). By invoking summary judgment, “the moving party in effect declares that the evidence is insufficient to support the nonmoving party's case.” United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).

“To succeed in showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, ” the moving party must “‘affirmatively produce evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim,' or, using ‘evidentiary materials already on file . . . demonstrate that the non-moving party will be unable to carry its burden of persuasion at trial.'” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 777 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000)). Conversely, “[t]o defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a trial-worthy issue by presenting enough competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party.” ATC Realty, LLC v. Town of Kingston, N.H., 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, the nonmoving party must set forth specific, material evidence showing that there is “a genuine disagreement as to some material fact.” Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor Neck, 960 F.2d at 204 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).

In reviewing the record, the Court “must take the evidence in the light most flattering to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Cochran, 328 F.3d at 6 (citation omitted). The First Circuit has noted that this review “is favorable to the nonmoving party, but it does not give him a free pass to trial.” Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). “The factual conflicts upon which he relies must be both genuine and material[, ]” Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395, 397 (1st Cir. 2012), and the Court may discount “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Cochran, 328 F.3d at 6 (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).

III.DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that demonstrates that his commissions were underpaid in 2013, 2014, or 2016. [ECF No. 92 at 4-5].

A. Breach of Contract Claim Against Grove

Plaintiff alleges that Grove breached the Agreement by underpaying his commissions in 2013, 2014, and 2016. In Massachusetts, “[t]o prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was an agreement between the parties; the agreement was supported by consideration; the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform his or her part of the contract; the defendant committed a breach of the contract; and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result.” Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 24, 39 (Mass. 2016) (citing Singarella v. Boston, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Mass. 1961)). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot succeed on this claim if he is unable to prove that he has been damaged by Grove's breach. Haven Real Est. Grp., LLC v. Bell Atl. Mobile of Massachusetts Corp., Ltd., 236 F.Supp.3d 454, 464 (D. Mass. 2017) (granting summary judgment on breach of contract claim when there was no evidence that plaintiff suffered any damages).

Grove argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the damages issue because (1) Spivak testified in his deposition that he believed Plaintiff was paid what he was owed in 2013 2014, and 2016; (2) Plaintiff was unable to testify to the exact amount of commission he should have been paid in 2013, 2014, or 2016, including whether he should have been paid more than what he received; and (3) Grove's decision to make payments to Plaintiff's retirement account is not material where Plaintiff had immediate access to those funds. [ECF No. 92 at 6-7, 9-10]. Plaintiff counters that the record clearly shows that he was underpaid in 2013, 2014, and 2016 because (1) Grove impermissibly reduced his annual commission payment by the amount it contributed to his retirement account; and (2...