Trini Atun El Bey v. Cnty. of Wayne

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TRINI ATUN EL BEY, Trustee of the IERE ATUN BEY TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF WAYNE, WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER, WAYNE COUNTY REGISTER OF DEEDS, WAYNE COUNTY EXECUTIVE, WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF, and WAYNE PROBATE JUDGE FREDDIE BURTON, JR., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 361586

Court of Appeals of Michigan

May 25, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 21-005175-CZ

Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and O'BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this matter involving a property tax delinquency, plaintiff proceeding in propria persona, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In April 2021, plaintiff filed the complaint giving rise to this action. Plaintiff alleged therein that he made three money-order payments to defendant Wayne County Treasurer, all of which included the statement, "Full Satisfaction of Claim." A fourth money order, also made out to the Wayne County Treasurer, was notated, "Under Duress." The complaint characterized these payments as "offers to contract." Plaintiff claimed that, because of the notations, "payment disputes" (referring to owed property taxes) for 2016, 2017, 2019, and 2020 should have been discharged under MCL 440.3311 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), MCL 440.1102 et seq. Plaintiff sought $12,000 in compensatory damages and $56 million in punitive damages for "breach of contract, fraud, pain and suffering, undue enrichment, harassment, emotional distress and dishonor."

In lieu of answering the complaint, defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that dismissal was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (7), (8), and (10). As relevant to this appeal defendants argued that they were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff responded to the motion by asserting, in relevant part, that jurisdiction was proper under Michigan's 1850 Constitution. Plaintiff also filed a competing motion for summary disposition, seeking judgment in his favor under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10).

At a hearing in front of the trial court, the court agreed with defendants on all grounds and granted summary disposition in their favor. As relevant to this appeal, the court found that summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(4) because the Michigan Tax Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich. 459, 466; 760 N.W.2d 217 (2008). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is proper when "[t]he court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." "In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), it is proper to consider the pleadings and any affidavits or other documentary evidence submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact." Toaz v Dep't of Treasury, 280 Mich.App. 457, 459; 760 N.W.2d 325 (2008). "[T]his Court must determine whether the affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence, demonstrate . . . [a lack of] subject matter jurisdiction." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

"Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to act and authority to hear and determine a case." Forest Hills Coop v City of Ann Arbor, 305 Mich.App. 572, 617; 854 N.W.2d 172 (2014). Under MCL 600.605, "[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the trial courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state." (Emphasis added.) The jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal is set forth in MCL 205.731. That provision states that the Tax Tribunal has "exclusive and original jurisdiction" over all of the following:

(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state.

(b) A proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state.

(c) Mediation of a proceeding described in subdivision (a) or (b) before the tribunal.

(d) Certification of a mediator in a tax dispute described in subdivision (c).

(e) Any other proceeding provided by law. [MCL 205.731.]

Accordingly, the question we must address in this appeal is whether plaintiff's complaint is of the kind that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. If so, then the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction. See MCL 600.605.

"The Tax Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hold statutes invalid or to consider constitutional matters; only the circuit court may do so." In re Petition of Wayne Co Treasurer for Foreclosure, 286 Mich.App. 108, 112; 777 N.W.2d 507 (2009). Accordingly, "if a challenge to a tax assessment rests solely on an argument that the tax assessment was made under authority of an illegal statute, the circuit court would have jurisdiction over the matter." Id. "But merely phrasing a claim in constitutional terms will not divest the Tax Tribunal of its exclusive jurisdiction." Id.

Before turning to the substantive analysis, we recognize that, at all times, plaintiff has been proceeding in propria persona. As a general rule, we allow leniency to such litigants. See Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520; 92 S.Ct. 594; 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Hein v Hein, 337 Mich.App. 109, 115; 972 N.W.2d 337 (2021). That leniency is not without limitation, however. See Bachor v City of Detroit, 49 Mich.App. 507, 512; 212 N.W.2d 302 (1973). With these principles in mind, we turn to the plaintiff's complaint and argument.

While plaintiff's complaint makes vague assertions that the challenged assessments violated "various constitutional provisions," he never challenges the constitutional validity of the authorizing statute, i.e., the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. Moreover, even under the most generous reading of plaintiff's complaint, he fails to identify which, if any, of his constitutional rights were violated. Consequently, despite alluding to "various constitutional provisions" in his complaint, we do not read plaintiff's complaint as raising any type of constitutional claim. Rather, the crux of plaintiff's claim as stated in his complaint-and developed in subsequent pleadings-is that his partial payments sufficed as an accord and satisfaction under the UCC, such that his partial payments extinguished the remainder of the tax liability and satisfied plaintiff's tax burden for the year in question. Plaintiff's complaint also states that he "filed a complaint with the Michigan Consumer Protection Agency," but he does not elaborate any further. However, reading plaintiff's complaint leniently and in conjunction with his other filings, we interpret this statement in his complaint as alluding to a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Act by classifying the attempt to collect delinquent property taxes as a debt requiring a written contact.

Having reviewed plaintiff's complaint, and keeping in mind that, at all times, plaintiff has been proceeding in propria persona, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of plaintiff's claim is that he seeks a "redetermination" of the taxes he owes by requesting that his tax liability be extinguished. Under these circumstances, plaintiff's challenge is nothing more than a direct challenge to the tax assessment. Plaintiff's complaint, therefore, is squarely within the Tax Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction as a "proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied under the property tax laws of this state." MCL 205.731(b). It follows that, as a matter of law, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the substance of plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, we conclude that summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(4).^[1]

On appeal, plaintiff cites Const 1850, art 18, § 2 and "A.P.A. of 1946" as "the proper jurisdiction," but he never develops an argument for how these authorities granted the trial court subject-matter jurisdiction. While we are sympathetic to the fact that appellant is proceeding in propria persona, there is no amount of leniency with which we could read plaintiff's brief on appeal as sufficiently presenting the issue for review. As our Supreme Court has recognized:

It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. [Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich. 232, 243; 577 N.W.2d 100 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to explain why the authorities he cites in his brief vest jurisdiction in the trial court, we deem plaintiff's argument abandoned.^[2]

The remainder of plaintiff's arguments on appeal are perfunctory and, at best, difficult to follow. Plaintiff's main contention seems to be that the trial court erred by failing to consider plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and plaintiff's evidence, as opposed to (allegedly) accepting as evidence statements made by defense coun...