Triple K Wealth, LLC v. City of Eastpointe Med. Marihuana Facility Application Comm.

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TRIPLE K WEALTH, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF EASTPOINTE MEDICAL MARIHUANA FACILITY APPLICATION COMMITTEE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 361599

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 20, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2022-001009-AW

Before: O'Brien, P.J., and Murray and Letica, JJ.

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff submitted to defendant a permit application to operate a medical marijuana provisioning center in Eastpointe. Defendant was tasked with reviewing permit applications, but denied plaintiff's application and refused to consider it on the merits, concluding that it was incomplete. Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling defendant to review plaintiff's permit application on the merits. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff appeals that denial as of right. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's motion for a writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves the implementation, under the Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing Act (MMFLA), MCL 333.27101 et seq., of Eastpointe's medical marijuana facilities licensing ordinances. The essential facts are undisputed. This dispute arose after defendant denied plaintiff's permit application to operate a medical marijuana provisioning center in Eastpointe because plaintiff's permit application failed to include the correct filing fee for its site-plan application (which was required to be submitted as part of the larger permit application). This, in defendant's opinion, rendered plaintiff's entire permit application materially incomplete.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive and mandamus relief asserting that defendant unlawfully determined that plaintiff's permit application was materially incomplete and precluded from further consideration due to the missing site-plan-application fee. According to plaintiff, the missing fee was not a material defect but an easily-remedied clerical defect. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant's conclusion of incompleteness was contrary to the plain language of the applicable ordinances. Accordingly, plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant from continuing to evaluate other permit applications or awarding any permits without first considering plaintiff's "properly submitted and complete" permit application. Plaintiff also requested a writ of mandamus ordering defendant to accept plaintiff's permit application as complete and offer an opportunity for plaintiff to incorporate the missing payment information.

The trial court issued an opinion and order denying plaintiff's requests for injunctive and mandamus relief. The trial court reasoned in relevant part that, pursuant to Eastpointe's ordinances, plaintiff's application was not considered "complete" unless all fees were paid. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, plaintiff only challenges the trial court's denial of its request for a writ of mandamus. "A trial court's decision whether to issue a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Lansing Sch Educ Ass'n v Lansing Sch Dist Bd of Educ, 293 Mich.App. 506, 513; 810 N.W.2d 95 (2011). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Bay City v Bay County Treasurer, 292 Mich.App. 156, 164; 807 N.W.2d 892 (2011). "But whether [a party] had a clear legal duty to perform and whether [the other party] had a clear legal right to the performance of that duty, thereby satisfying the first two steps in the test for assessing the propriety of a writ of mandamus, are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo." Lansing Sch Educ Ass'n, 293 Mich.App. at 513. Any underlying issue of statutory interpretation, including the interpretation of local ordinances, is also reviewed de novo. Bonner v Brighton, 495 Mich. 209, 221-222; 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that its permit application was materially incomplete due to the missing fee. We conclude that, because the site-plan-application fee did not factor into a site-plan application's "completeness" under the applicable ordinances, defendant and the trial court erred by concluding that the missing fee rendered plaintiff's permit application incomplete. We further conclude that plaintiff was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling defendant to review plaintiff's completed permit application on the merits.

[T]he issuance of a writ of mandamus is proper only where (1) the party seeking the writ has a clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought, (2) the defendant has the clear legal duty to perform the act requested, (3) the act is ministerial and involves no exercise of discretion or judgment, and (4) no other remedy exists, legal or equitable, that might achieve the same result. [Morales v Parole Bd, 260 Mich.App. 29, 41; 676 N.W.2d 221 (2003).]

"A clear legal duty, like a clear legal right, is one that is inferable as a matter of law from uncontroverted facts regardless of the difficulty of the legal question to be decided." Hayes v Parole Bd, 312 Mich.App. 774, 782; 886 N.W.2d 725 (2015). "A ministerial act is one in which the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment." Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich.App. 37, 42; 890 N.W.2d 882 (2016).

Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-258 establishes the existence of Medical Marihuana Overlay Districts "to provide opportunities for the development of certain medical marihuana facilities that have been granted a permit by the city and have been granted a state license pursuant to the MMFLA." To secure such a permit, an applicant must submit to the city clerk various information, planning documents, and fees, including, as relevant here, a site-plan application. Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a).^[1] "A site plan of the location, building and the permitted property must be submitted for review and approval by the planning commission, in conformance with Article V of the city's Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 50." Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a)(3)(J). Pursuant to Article V of the city's Zoning Ordinance, "Site plans shall be forwarded to the planner, engineer and city department heads and checked for completeness and no plans will be processed unless they are complete and unless all fees are paid in accordance with the schedule of fees adopted by the city council." Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-42(a). Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(e) provides when and under what circumstances permit applications will be reviewed, stating:

A committee [referring to defendant], consisting of the city manager or designee, the director of public safety, and the building official or economic development manager, shall approve or deny the permit application within 90 days of receipt of the completed application and fees. . . . The city has no obligation to process or approve any incomplete permit application; and any times provided under this article shall not begin to run until the city receives a complete application, as determined by the committee. A determination of a complete application shall not prohibit the city from requiring supplemental information.

Finally, as to site-plan applications which must be submitted as part of a permit application, Eastpointe Ordinance §10-230(a)(3)(J) provides, "An application for site plan approval . . . that is materially incomplete or would result in a violation of state or local law shall be denied."

The trial court held that defendant was required by Eastpointe Ordinance §10-230(a)(3)(J) to deny plaintiff's entire permit application because the site-plan application was "materially incomplete." To reach this conclusion, the trial court relied on Eastpointe Ordinance §10-230(a)(3)(J)'s statement that a site plan application must be submitted "in conformance with Article V of the city's Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 50," and Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-42(a)'s statement that "no plans will be processed unless they are complete and unless all fees are paid in accordance with the schedule of fees adopted by the city council." The trial court reasoned that the language in these ordinances "unambiguously requires the payment of site plan application fees," and that any application that did not include such fees was materially incomplete-and thus "shall be denied" pursuant to Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a)(3)(J)-because "a site plan application will not be processed if the fee was not paid." In other words, the trial court reasoned that plaintiff was required to submit a completed site-plan application as part of its completed permit application, and because the missing fee rendered plaintiff's site-plan application materially incomplete, plaintiff's entire permit application was likewise materially incomplete.

We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of the pertinent ordinances, specifically its conclusion that the missing fee rendered plaintiff's site-plan application incomplete. "Municipal ordinances are interpreted and reviewed in the same manner as statutes." Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc v Allegan Co, 316 Mich.App. 122, 136; 892 N.W.2d 33 (2016). As this Court has explained:

In reviewing questions of statutory interpretation, we must discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. To do so, we begin by examining the most reliable evidence of that intent, the language of the statute itself. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted. [Farris v McKaig, 324 Mich.App. 349, 353; 920 N.W.2d 377 (2018) (quotation

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