Troogstad v. City of Chi.

576 F.Supp.3d 578

Scott TROOGSTAD et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The CITY OF CHICAGO and Governor Jay Robert Pritzker, Defendants.

No. 21 C 5600

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed December 21, 2021

Jonathan D. Lubin, Attorney at Law, Skokie, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Michael A. Warner, Jr., William R. Pokorny, Franczek Radelet PC, Celia Meza, City of Chicago Law Department, Erin Kathryn Walsh, Richard Jason Patterson, Franczek P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant City of Chicago.

Hal Dworkin, Mary Alice Johnston, Office of Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Jay Robert Pritzker.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John Z. Lee, United States District Judge

Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker and the City of Chicago ("City") (collectively "Defendants") enacted policies requiring certain healthcare workers and public employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by the end of 2021 or be subject to disciplinary action and termination. Plaintiffs, comprising over 100 employees in the City's Fire, Water, and Transportation Departments, claim that these policies violate their substantive due process, procedural due process, and free exercise rights under the United States Constitution, as well as Illinois law. As such, they seek a preliminary injunction against the policies. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the factual record of this case from its previous written opinion denying Plaintiffs’ petition for a temporary restraining order. See Mem. Op. Order, Troogstad v. City of Chi. , 571 F.Supp.3d 901, 905–07 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2021) (" TRO Order"), ECF No. 35. A brief summary of the more salient facts follows.

With the Delta variant of COVID-19 spiking across the country, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed Executive Order 2021-22 ("EO 2021-22") on September 3, 2021. EO 2021-22 requires all healthcare workers—defined as persons who work in "health services, medical treatment or nursing, or rehabilitative or preventive care"—in the state to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or submit to weekly COVID-19 testing. Def. Gov. J.B. Pritzker's Resp. Opp'n Pls.’ Pet. TRO ("Def. J.B. Pritzker's Resp. TRO"), Ex. A (EO 2021-22) § 2(a)(i), ECF No. 14. EO 2021-22 contains a religious exemption to the vaccination requirement for covered persons whose "sincerely held religious belief[s], practice[s], or observance[s]" conflict with being vaccinated. Id.

After Governor Pritzker's order, the City followed with its own mandatory vaccination policy ("City Vaccination Policy"), which requires all City employees to be fully vaccinated (or have an approved exemption) by December 31, 2021 as a "condition of employment." Def. City of Chicago's Resp. Pls.’ Emergency Pet. TRO ("Def. City's Resp. TRO"), Ex. B1 (City Vaccination Policy) §§ II–IV, ECF No. 18.¹ Like EO 2021-22, the City Vaccination Policy contains a religious exemption protecting those with "a sincerely held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and relation to religious beliefs" that conflict with COVID-19 vaccination. See Def. City's Resp. TRO, Ex. B4, City of Chicago COVID-19 Vaccine Religious Exemption Request Form ("City Religious Exemption Form"). Exemption requests are considered on an individual basis and require the applicant to fill out a form stating the reason for the exemption and the principle of their religion that conflicts with being vaccinated, and including the signature of a religious leader. See id.

Plaintiffs are City employees, who contend that EO 2021-22 and the City Vaccination Policy violate their rights to bodily autonomy as protected by the constitutional doctrines of substantive due process, procedural due process, and free exercise of religion. They also assert that these policies infringe upon their right of conscience as protected by the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act ("HCRCA"), 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1 et seq. Upon filing this suit, Plaintiffs petitioned the Court for a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the policies. See Pls.’ Mot. TRO ("TRO Mot."), ECF No. 4. The Court denied that petition in an oral ruling, see Hr'g Tr., Troogstad , No. 21 C 5600 (Oct. 29, 2021), ECF No. 31, which subsequently was memorialized in a written order. See TRO Order.

Plaintiffs then informed the Court that they wished to proceed with their motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Governor Pritzker and the City from enforcing EO 2021-22 or the City Vaccination Policy. Accordingly, the Court provided Plaintiffs with an opportunity to supplement the factual record with witnesses and additional evidence. The Court also granted Plaintiffs leave to engage in limited discovery of Defendants’ factual contentions.

In the end, Plaintiffs stated that they did not need discovery and would not be presenting any witnesses, but requested an opportunity to file a supplemental brief to support their preliminary injunction motion. The Court agreed and set a schedule for the submission of supplemental briefs. Now, relying on the factual record before it, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Legal Standard

As the Seventh Circuit has stated, a preliminary injunction is "an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." Orr v. Shicker , 953 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of Am., Inc. , 549 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 2008) ). And to obtain such drastic relief, the party seeking the relief—here, the Plaintiffs—carries the burden of persuasion by a clear showing. See Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997).

To succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff has the burden to show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; and (3) that the balance of the equities and the public interest favors emergency relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A) ; see Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).

The Court then weighs these factors in what the Seventh Circuit has called a "sliding scale" approach. That is, "[t]he more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor." Valencia v. City of Springfield , 883 F.3d 959, 966 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). And "[w]here appropriate, this balancing process should also encompass any effects that granting or denying the preliminary injunction would have on nonparties (something courts have termed the ‘public interest’)." Id.

Analysis

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first factor—"likelihood of success on the merits"—requires the plaintiff to make a "strong showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits" of her claim; a mere "possibility of success is not enough" to warrant emergency relief. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker , 973 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2020). This showing "does not mean proof by a preponderance," but requires the plaintiff to provide facts and legal theories supporting "the key elements of its case." Id. at 763. The Court will address each of Plaintiffs’ claims in turn.

A. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiffs first allege that EO 2021-22 and the City Vaccination Policy violate substantive due process. A substantive due process claim requires the plaintiff to "allege that the government violated a fundamental right or liberty." Campos v. Cook Cnty. , 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2019). The violation must also be "arbitrary or irrational," because "substantive due process protects against only the most egregious and outrageous government action." Id.

According to Plaintiffs, the vaccine policies offend their fundamental right to bodily autonomy. In support, they cite numerous Supreme Court cases holding that individuals have a fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, see, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health , 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) ; Washington v. Harper , 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990), and argue that, because a right to decline vaccinations is a fundamental constitutional right, the Court should apply strict scrutiny when evaluating the policies.

1. Whether a Fundamental Right Exists

In its ruling on Plaintiffs’ TRO motion, the Court discussed its views on this issue at length, see TRO Order at 907–11, and sees no reason to alter its reasoning now. As previously noted, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University , 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021), forecloses Plaintiffs’ claim that requiring vaccination against COVID-19 encroaches upon a fundamental right. In Klaassen , a group of Indiana University students challenged the university's vaccination, masking, and testing requirements on similar grounds. Id. at 593. The students, like Plaintiffs here, argued that the university's mandate violated their right to bodily autonomy; the Seventh Circuit disagreed. Citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts , 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905), the unanimous panel held that "plaintiffs lack such a right" when it comes to COVID-19 vaccination requirements. Klaassen , 7 F.4th at 593. As a result, the court endorsed Jacobson ’s rational basis standard of review for challenges to COVID-19 vaccine mandates under substantive due process. See id. ; see also Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. , 549 F.Supp.3d 836, 867-68 (N.D. Ind. 2021).

Klaassen controls here. And because there is no fundamental constitutional right at stake when people are required to be vaccinated during a pandemic, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge to COVID-19 vaccination policies receives rational basis review. Other courts in this district² and across the country³ agree. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief does not raise any...