Trotman v. State

DANNY TROTMAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2331

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2016

January 15, 2019

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 115236022

UNREPORTED

Woodward, C.J.,^** Meredith, Davis, Arrie W., ^*** (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Meredith, J.

^**Woodward, C.J., participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; he participated in the adoption of this opinion as a specially assigned member of this Court.

^***Davis, Arrie W., J., did not participate in the adoption of this opinion. See, Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 1-403(b)

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

At the conclusion of a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, correctional officer Danny Trotman, appellant, was convicted of second degree assault upon a prisoner and misconduct in office. For the assault, Trotman was sentenced to ninety days that were suspended in favor of eighteen months of probation plus 200 hours of community service; for misconduct in office, he was sentenced to sixty days that also were suspended in favor of a concurrent eighteen months of probation.

Challenging his convictions, Trotman presents four questions that we have reordered chronologically, as follows:

1. Did the court err in denying the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds?

2. Did the court abuse its discretion in striking for cause all veniremen who could not climb 25 stairs [to the floor on which the assigned jury room was located]?

3. Did the court abuse its discretion in denying appellant the right to watch [a] video in open court, thereby burdening both the right to be present and the right to counsel?

4. Did the court err in its instructions to the jury (both the original charge and during deliberations) regarding the elements of the crime of assault?

Because we perceive no reversible error, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 2014, Sergeant Danny Trotman was working at the Central Booking facility of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS") in Baltimore. That afternoon, he and other correctional officers responded to the mental health unit to assist in moving certain prisoners, including Eric Wise. Duringthe ensuing altercation, Trotman and another correctional officer struck Wise, who sustained a broken jaw that required surgery. At Trotman's trial, the primary issue was whether Trotman's use of force was justified.

A surveillance video that captured most of the altercation was played for the jury. The video, which does not include audio, shows Wise in the doorway of a cell after the door is remotely opened. As Wise conversed with Sergeant Brett Thomas, eight other correctional officers, including Trotman, stood in the hallway. Approximately thirty seconds into their verbal exchange, Thomas suddenly threw an "uppercut" punch to Wise's jaw. Then Thomas, Trotman, and other officers entered Wise's cell, where the altercation continued out of camera view. After approximately ten seconds, several officers dragged a struggling Wise out of the cell. As the officers attempted to force Wise to the ground, Trotman struck Wise. Wise was then placed face down on the floor, naked and prone, with his hands handcuffed behind his back. At that point, Thomas stood over Wise and delivered another blow to his head.

The State alleged that Sergeant Trotman's closed-fist punch was unjustified, amounting to second degree assault, conspiracy to assault, and misconduct in office. In support of that prosecution theory, DPSCS Detective-Sergeant Christian Boodhoo testified that, when Trotman struck Wise while the prisoner was already restrained and in the physical custody of other correctional officers, Trotman violated DPSCS policy requiring use of the minimum force necessary in subduing a combative prisoner.

Sergeant Trotman contended that he merely slapped Wise, and did so in a justified effort to control the combative prisoner. Although Trotman did not testify, his defensecounsel elicited testimony from Lieutenant David Gilmore, another correctional officer at the scene, who testified that "there's a portion of [the altercation] that is missing" from the video, "when Mr. Wise comes running out. He actually stops and you can see he's urinating on himself and then he gets up and runs toward the exit, and that's when Sergeant Trotman comes around and strikes and slaps him" with an open hand. In addition, Trotman presented expert opinion testimony of a private contractor with expertise in defensive tactics used by Maryland correctional officers. The expert opined that Trotman's use of force, as seen in the video, was reasonable and consistent with institutional training in the use of the minimum force necessary to gain control of a combative prisoner.

The jury found Trotman guilty of second degree assault and misconduct in office, but acquitted him of conspiring with other correctional officers to commit the assault. We shall provide additional facts in our discussion of the issues raised by Trotman.

DISCUSSION

I. Speedy Trial

Trotman contends that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, and points to a series of seven postponements that delayed his trial for 479 days after he was charged in district court. Based on the following examination of the record, we recalculate the relevant delay period and agree with the trial court's conclusion that, although this delay was of constitutional dimension, Trotman was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

A. Standards Governing Review of a Speedy Trial Challenge

Maryland courts have

consistently applied the four factor balancing test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972),] to address allegations that a defendant's right to a speedy trial, as provided by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, has been violated. In Barker, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated, and instead adopted "a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2191-92. The Court identified four factors to be used in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. None of these factors are "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant."

State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 687-88 (2008) (some citations omitted). See also Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89-90, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1290 (2009) (reaffirming the analytical framework established by Barker).

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, "we make our own independent constitutional analysis." Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220 (2002). In other words, "[w]e perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a [circuit] court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 221. We remain mindful that appellate review of a speedy trial challenge "should be practical, not illusionary, realistic, not theoretical, and tightly prescribed, not reaching beyond the peculiar facts of the particular case." Peters v. State, 224 Md. App. 306, 359 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingBrown v. State, 153 Md. App. 544, 556 (2003), and State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415 (1990)), cert. denied, 445 Md. 127 (2015).

B. Speedy Trial Record

Before trial, Trotman moved to dismiss the charges against him on speedy trial grounds. The record pertinent to that motion and to this appellate speedy trial challenge is set forth in the following time line, with postponements shown in bold type.

December 2, 2014 INCIDENT

August 1, 2015 STATEMENT OF CHARGES FILED IN DISTRICT COURT

August 15, 2015 SUMMONS ISSUED by district court on first degree assault and related charges.

August 25, 2015 TRANSFER TO CIRCUIT COURT + FIRST APPEARANCE

Defense counsel entered his appearance on behalf of co-defendants Trotman and Thomas.

August 31, 2015 OMNIBUS MOTIONS + SPEEDY TRIAL DEMAND Trial was scheduled for October 27, 2015.

October 27, 2015 FIRST POSTPONEMENT - 62 DAYS - LATE DISCOVERY FROM STATE + CONSENT + POTENTIAL CONFLICT IN JOINT REPRESENTATION OF CO-DEFENDANTS

Because the State had just provided discovery to defense counsel, trial was continued, with the express consent of defense counsel. During a hearing, the court and prosecutor raised concerns about defense counsel's representation of both co-defendants. The court advised the two defendants that there were "great difficulties in having one attorney represent two people whose interests now seem to be the same, but as time goes on, . . . may be different." This possibility prompted the court to caution the defendants that, if they continued to be represented by the same lawyer, they "may be compromising [their] ability to present [an]individual defense," and that if they later changed their minds, they "may be derailing the entire case and extending the length of time this case takes to develop." Trial was continued to December 28, 2015, and the court "encourage[d]" Trotman and his co-defendant "to find individual representation before then."

December 28, 2015 SECOND POSTPONEMENT - 70 DAYS - STATE REQUEST - PROSECUTOR UNAVAILABLE + CONSENT

The State asked for a postponement, and

...