Troxel v. State

875 N.W.2d 302

Jedidiah Dean TROXEL, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A15–1294.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 17, 2016.

Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Alan G. Rogalla, Pennington County Attorney, Thief River Falls, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

On November 5, 2013, a Pennington County jury found appellant Jedidiah Dean Troxel guilty of three counts of first-degree murder while committing first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn.Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(2), 609.342, subd. 1(c), 1(d), 1(e)(i) (2014). Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Troxel to life in prison without the possibility of release. Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a). Troxel did not pursue a direct appeal. Instead, he filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he is entitled to relief based on three alleged errors committed by the district court: the exclusion of alternative-perpetrator evidence; the denial of a lesser-included-offense instruction on second-degree intentional murder; and the denial of Troxel's motion to remove the trial judge for an appearance of partiality. The postconviction court denied relief on all grounds,¹ and Troxel appealed. For the reasons addressed below, we affirm.

I.

Shortly before noon, on Sunday, August 26, 2012, a fisherman found the body of T.K. near Smiley Bridge, about six miles from Thief River Falls. The victim had 37 stab wounds, primarily to her chest and neck, and one incision wound across her neck. The victim also had sustained blunt-force trauma to her head and face, abrasions to her neck and shoulders, bruises on her left hand and right arm, bruises on her inner thighs, and an abrasion on her upper-inner right thigh next to her external genitalia. The victim bled to death from her injuries.

The victim attended a party at the home of a friend, B.M., on the night before and the morning of the murder. Troxel was present at this party. Some attendees of the party, including the victim, played a game that involved removing clothing. During the game, the victim removed her shirt and bra. The victim also grabbed and rubbed Troxel's leg and B.M.'s leg. Troxel told police that the victim rubbed his butt, tried to rub or grab his crotch, and expressed her desire to perform oral sex on him.

The party began to break up around 6:00 a.m. on August 25, 2012. As the party was ending, one witness saw Troxel putting on and lacing black boots. When another witness left the party around 6:00 a.m., she saw the victim outside talking with Troxel, while the victim was standing next to the driver's side of Troxel's car. Troxel told police that he left the party around 6:00 a.m. and drove home alone. He also said that the victim left about five minutes before he left. Troxel denied that the victim ever entered his car, denied that the victim spoke to him outside his car after the party ended, and denied having sex with the victim. Troxel also denied wearing his black boots on both the night before and the morning of the murder. Instead, according to Troxel, he wore red tennis shoes and left his black boots at home.

On August 25, 2012, at about 7:10 a.m., a local resident saw a car parked on a gravel road near Smiley Bridge. The resident, who had 15 years of experience doing body work on cars, thought the vehicle was a Mitsubishi Eclipse. Troxel's car was a 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse. The victim's body was found near Smiley Bridge shortly before noon on August 26, 2012.

Police investigators recovered semen from vaginal and cervical swabs taken from the victim's body. The semen from the vaginal swab contained a single-source DNA profile that matched Troxel. The semen from the cervical swab contained a mixture of DNA. The predominant DNA profile matched Troxel, although the victim's husband could not be excluded as a contributor to a minor DNA profile.

Police also recovered blood on Troxel's shirt and in Troxel's car on the driver-side door handle and on the gear shift. The blood on Troxel's shirt and on the gear shift contained a single-source DNA profile that matched the victim's DNA. The blood on the door handle contained a mixture of DNA from which 99.7% of the world's population could be excluded, but the victim's DNA could not be excluded. Police also found the victim's fingerprint on the exterior passenger window of Troxel's car.

In addition, police found footwear impressions in the mud next to the victim's body. The brand logo in one impression was similar to that on a pair of black boots, with damp mud on them, that investigators found in Troxel's bedroom. A surveillance camera at a liquor store recorded Troxel wearing black boots on the night before the murder. And a witness saw Troxel wearing black boots on the morning of the murder.

A Pennington County grand jury indicted Troxel on three counts of first-degree murder while committing a first-degree criminal sexual assault. Troxel sought a for-cause removal of the judge presiding over his trial because the judge was negotiating to become a prosecutor in a neighboring county. The Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial District denied this motion. Troxel then petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition, seeking removal of the trial judge. The petition was denied. In re Troxel, No. A13–1965, Order (Minn.App. filed Oct. 25, 2013). Troxel did not file a petition for review with this court.

Before trial, Troxel also moved to introduce alternative-perpetrator evidence pertaining to M.W., who sent the victim sexually explicit text messages on the morning of the murder. The district court denied this motion. Before closing arguments, Troxel sought a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder, arguing that a rational basis existed to acquit Troxel of the first-degree murder charge because the sexual activity between Troxel and the victim was consensual. The district court declined to give this instruction.

The jury found Troxel guilty of the three counts of first-degree murder, and the district court sentenced Troxel to life in prison without the possibility of release. Troxel did not file a direct appeal. Rather, Troxel filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging that (1) the district court erroneously denied his request to introduce alternative-perpetrator evidence; (2) the district court erroneously denied his request for a lesser-included-offense instruction on second-degree intentional murder; and (3) the trial judge was disqualified for an appearance of partiality under Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11(A). The postconviction court denied relief on each ground. This appeal followed.

II.

We first address whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Troxel's motion to introduce alternative-perpetrator evidence. A district court's denial of a motion to introduce alternative-perpetrator evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn.2010).

The due process clauses of both the Minnesota Constitution and the United States Constitution guarantee a defendant's right to a fair opportunity to defend against criminal charges. U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; Minn. Const. art. 1 § 6 ; Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d at 226 ; State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 15–16 (Minn.2004). This constitutional guarantee includes the right to present evidence that a third party (an "alternative perpetrator") committed the crime for which the defendant was charged. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d at 226 ; Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 15–16. A foundational requirement for the admission of alternative-perpetrator evidence is that such evidence must "inherently connect[ ] an alternative perpetrator to the commission of the charged crime regardless of the strength of the State's case." Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d at 226 ; see Huff v. State, 698 N.W.2d 430, 436 (Minn.2005). This requirement "avoids the use of bare suspicion and safeguards the [alleged alternative perpetrator] from indiscriminate use of past differences with the deceased." Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 16 (quoting State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 280 (Minn.2003) ). If the defendant satisfies this foundational requirement, the district court may, consistent with evidentiary rules, "admit ‘evidence of a motive of the third person to commit the crime, threats by the third person, or other miscellaneous facts' tending to prove the third party committed the crime." Huff, 698 N.W.2d at 436 (quoting State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn.1977) ).

We apply the harmless-error test to the erroneous exclusion of alternative-perpetrator evidence. State v. Vance, 714 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn.2006). A conviction will stand despite erroneously excluded evidence when the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 353 (Minn.2012) ; State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994). An error is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" when, assuming the potential damage of the excluded evidence were fully realized, a reasonable jury "would have reached the same verdict." Post, 512 N.W.2d at 102. Conversely, if "there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted, then the erroneous exclusion of the evidence is prejudicial." Id.

Troxel filed an offer of proof regarding an alleged alternative perpetrator, M.W. This proffer consisted of two types of evidence: sexually explicit text messages² between M.W. and the victim sent early on the morning of the murder and M.W.'s statements to police on the day after the murder. In a police interview, M.W. admitted that he had been texting with the victim during the morning of August 25, 2012. The victim had asked M.W. to pick her up at a friend's home, where she had been attending a party. M.W. arrived at the home around 3:45 a.m. After M.W. arrived, the victim texted...