Troy F. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

TROY F., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-362-DB

United States District Court, W.D. New York

May 25, 2023

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DON D BUSH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Troy F. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), that denied his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.^[1] See ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c), and the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned in accordance with a standing order (see ECF No. 27).

Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See ECF Nos 18, 19. Plaintiff also filed a reply brief. See ECF No. 26. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 18) is DENIED, and the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on August 28 2015, alleging disability beginning August 23, 2011, (the disability onset date), due to: “(1) blindness in right eye; (2) status post lumbar fusion; (3) chronic low back pain; (4) learning disability; (5) depression; (6) anxiety; (7) heart problems; and (8) status post heart stent placement.” Transcript (“Tr.”) 6162, 137-53, 196. Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on March 4, 2016 (Tr. 85-100), after which he requested an administrative hearing (Tr. 102-03). On February 14, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Susan G. Smith (“ALJ Smith”) conducted a video hearing from Alexandria, Virginia. Tr. 19. Plaintiff appeared and testified from Buffalo, New York, and was represented by Lewis L. Schwartz, (“Mr. Schwartz”) an attorney. Id. Michael C. Dorsey, an impartial vocational expert, also appeared and testified. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Schwartz amended Plaintiff's alleged onset date to September 30, 2012. Tr. 39.

On August 20, 2018, ALJ Smith issued a partially favorable decision, finding Plaintiff disabled beginning March 10, 2018, but denying benefits for the closed period from September 30, 2012 through March 10, 2018. Tr. 30. On November 25, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for further review (Tr. 1-6), making ALJ Smith's August 20, 2018 decision the “final decision” of the Commissioner subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Thereafter, on December 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Case No. 1:19-cv-01719-FPG. Prior to the filing of any briefs, the parties stipulated to remand the case for further administrative proceedings, and a Stipulation and Order for Remand was issued on March 16, 2020 (Tr. 1585-86), with a judgment issued on March 18, 2020 (Tr. 1587).

The Appeals Council then issued a Remand Order on July 1, 2020, vacating ALJ Smith's August 20, 2018 decision. Tr. 1590-94. The Appeals Council ordered the Administrative Law Judge on remand to:

• Further evaluate the claimant's mental impairments in accordance with the special technique described in 20 CFR 404.1520a and 416.920a, documenting application of the technique in the decision by providing specific findings and appropriate rationale for each of the functional areas described in 20 CFR 404.1520a(c) and 416.920a(c).

• Give further consideration to the nontreating source opinion from Margaret Desmarais, FNP, pursuant to the provisions of 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927, and explain the weight given to such opinion evidence.

• If warranted, give further consideration to the claimant's maximum residual functional capacity and provide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations (20 CFR 404.1545 and 416.945 and Social Security Ruling 85-16 and 96-8p).

• If warranted by the expanded record, obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the claimant's occupational base (Social Security Rulings 83-12 and 83-14). The hypothetical questions should reflect the specific capacity/limitations established by the record as a whole. The Administrative Law Judge will ask the vocational expert to identify examples of appropriate jobs and to state the incidence of such jobs in the national economy (20 CFR 404.1566 and 416.966). Further, before relying on the vocational expert evidence the Administrative Law Judge will identify and resolve any conflicts between the occupational evidence provided by the vocational expert and information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and its companion publication, the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (Social Security Ruling 00-4p).

Subsequently, on December 2, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Bryce Baird (“the ALJ”) conducted a telephonic hearing.^[2] Plaintiff appeared and testified via telephone and was again represented by Mr. Schwartz. Tr. 1492. Also appearing and testifying telephonically were Gerald P. Koocher, an impartial medical expert, and Joseph Young, an impartial vocational expert. Id.

On December 22, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled for the closed period from September 30, 2012 through March 10, 2018. Tr. 1489-1509. Plaintiff thereafter commenced the present lawsuit.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. District Court Review

“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)) (other citation omitted). The Act holds that the Commissioner's decision is “conclusive” if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). It is not the Court's function to “determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1990).

II. The Sequential Evaluation Process

An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Parker v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments meeting the durational requirements, the analysis concludes with a finding of “not disabled.” If the claimant does, the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement, the claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1509. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity, which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e)-(f).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits him or her to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. Id. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy” in light of his or her age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's claim for benefits under the process described above and made the following findings in his December 22, 2020 decision:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2012.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 30, 2012, the amended alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments degenerative disc disease, coronary artery disease status-post stent placement, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), personality disorder with intermittent explosive disorder, and depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

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