Trump v. Clinton

599 F.Supp.3d 1247

Donald J. TRUMP, Plaintiff,

v.Hillary R. CLINTON, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 22-CV-14102-MIDDLEBROOKS

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed April 6, 2022

Jamie Alan Sasson, Peter David Ticktin, Ticktin Law Group PA, Deerfield Beach, FL, Alina Habba, Pro Hac Vice, Michael T. Madaio, Pro Hac Vice, Habba Madaio & Associates LLP, Bedminster, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Anthony Erickson-Pogorzelski, US Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant United States of America 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Donald M. Middlebrooks, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff Donald J. Trump's Motion to Disqualify Judge Middlebrooks, filed on April 4, 2022. (DE 21). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's Motion is denied.

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on March 24, 2022, alleging that "the Defendants, blinded by political ambition, orchestrated a malicious conspiracy to disseminate patently false and injurious information about Donald J. Trump and his campaign, all in the hopes of destroying his life, his political career and rigging the 2016 Presidential Election in favor of Hillary Clinton." (DE 1 at ¶ 9).¹ In this Motion, Plaintiff argues that I should disqualify myself from presiding over this case because I was nominated to the federal bench by former President Bill Clinton, the spouse of Defendant Hillary Clinton. (DE 21 at ¶ 3). According to Plaintiff, the very fact of my appointment by Bill Clinton "amounts to prejudice so virulent or pervasive as to constitute bias against a party." (Id. at ¶ 6). Plaintiff also urges that disqualification is necessary because he "is unaware of the exact extent of the relationship between" me and Defendant Hillary Clinton. (Id. ).

The judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, provides that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The importance of this statute cannot be understated. It ensures that litigants in federal court receive impartial treatment and plays an important role in upholding the public's trust in the judiciary. But a district judge "is as much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as he is obliged to when it is." In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. , 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988) ; see also In re Union Leader Corp. , 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir. 1961).² This is because "[i]n the real world, recusal motions are sometimes driven more by litigation strategies than by ethical concerns."³ In re Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. , 85 F.3d 1353, 1360 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Cargill, Inc. , 66 F.3d 1256, 1262–63 (1st Cir. 1995) ). "We subscribe to the view that motions to recuse should not ‘be viewed as an additional arrow in the quiver of advocates in the face of [anticipated] adverse rulings.’ " Id. at 1360 (quoting TV Commc'n Network, Inc. v. ESPN, Inc. , 767 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (D. Colo. 1991) ).

It is true that I was appointed to the bench by former President Bill Clinton. Although former President Clinton is not a party to this lawsuit, I will give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and equate the interests of the Clintons for the sake of analysis here. The law is well settled that appointment to the bench by a litigant, without more, will not "create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that [the judge's] ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence [would be] impaired." In re Executive Office of the President , 215 F.3d 25, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Code of Conduct for United States Judges Canon 24 cmt., reprinting in 2 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, ch. 1 at 1-2, 1-3); see also Straw v. United States , 4 F.4th 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ("There is no support whatsoever for the contention that a judge can be disqualified based simply on the identity of the President who appointed him."); MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc. , 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Nor should one charge that a judge is not impartial solely because an attorney is embroiled in a controversy with the administration that appointed the judge. Judges generally have political backgrounds to one degree or another but must be presumed, absent more, to be impartial.").

Given this precedent, I am not disqualified from presiding, nor should I recuse on the basis of any appearance of partiality. The three cases Plaintiff cites in his Motion compel no different conclusion, and indeed do not appear to support his arguments.⁴ To warrant recusal, something more must be involved than solely my appointment to the bench twenty-five years ago by the spouse of a litigant now before me. And the conclusory assertions in Plaintiff's Motion do not supply any conceivable, additional grounds. I have never met or spoken with Bill or Hillary Clinton. Other than my appointment by Bill Clinton, I do not now have nor have I ever had any relationship with the Clintons.⁵ "Recusal cannot be based on unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation." United States v. Cerceda , 188 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, I have considered whether the nature of this lawsuit—acutely politically charged as it is—might provide some additional cause to question my qualification to preside, but I see no impediment there either. Every federal judge is appointed by a president who is affiliated with a major political party, and therefore every federal judge could theoretically be viewed as beholden, to some extent or another. As judges, we must all transcend politics.

When I became a federal judge, I took an oath to "faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all duties ... under the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 453. I have done so for the last twenty-five years, and this case will be no different.

As such, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion (DE 21) is DENIED.

1 On this general premise, the Complaint asserts claims for RICO violations, predicated on the theft of trade secrets and obstruction of justice (Count I); injurious falsehood (Count III); malicious prosecution (Count V); violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Count VII); theft of trade secrets (Count VIII); and violations of the Stored Communications Act (Count IX). The Complaint also contains counts for various conspiracy charges and theories of agency and vicarious liability. (Counts II, IV, VI, and X–XVI).

2 While there is no longer a "duty to sit" doctrine and § 455(a) requires that doubts be resolved in favor of recusal, judges are still obligated to recuse...