Trumpetto v. LMW Healthcare, Inc.

ELAINE C. TRUMPETTO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LMW HEALTHCARE, INC., et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 18-683 WES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

March 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs in this action seek damages over alleged medical malpractice resulting in the death of John A. Trumpetto ("the decedent"), who sought medical care at Westerly Hospital in Rhode Island and then died several days later in New York. Defendant Emergency Medicine Physicians of Washington County, LLC ("Defendant EMP" or "Defendant") filed a Motion for Application of New York Law ("Def. EMP Mot."), ECF No. 24, requesting that this Court apply New York law, instead of Rhode Island law, to the measure of damages. The other Defendant in this action, Defendant LMW Healthcare, Inc., has not signed onto Defendant EMP's Motion.

Due to Elaine C. Trumpetto's recent passing, Plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Substitute and Amend Complaint, ECF No. 31, seeking to substitute "Brynna C. Trumpetto, as Executrix of the Estate of Elaine C. Trumpetto" for "Elaine C. Trumpetto, individually" and "Brynna C. and Jared R. Trumpetto, as Co- Executors of the Estate of John A. Trumpetto" for "Elaine C. Trumpetto, as Executrix of the Estate of John A. Trumpetto" and to accordingly amend the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 6. Only Defendant EMP filed an Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute and Amend Complaint, ECF No. 32.

For the following reasons, Defendant EMP's Motion for Application of New York Law, ECF No. 24, is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute and Amend Complaint, ECF No. 31, is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Elaine C. Trumpetto, Jared R. Trumpetto, and Brynna C. Trumpetto are immediate family members of the late John A. Trumpetto¹ - Elaine was John's wife, and Jared and Brynna are their children. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6. During the time period at issue, John and Elaine owned a home in New York, and a second home in Connecticut near the border with Rhode Island. Pls.' Opp'n 2-3, ECF No. 26. The relevant facts are as follows. On Friday, September 2, 2016, John and his family left New York and drove to their second home in Connecticut. Id. at 4. On Sunday, September 4, John began feeling poorly while at a beach in Rhode Island and apparently had symptoms of a heart attack. Id. John and his daughter drove to the Westerly Hospital in Westerly, Rhode Island that afternoon to go to the emergencyroom. Id. at 4-5; Am. Compl. ¶ 9. John was assigned to two emergency room providers - Kacia Toussaint, P.A. and Keith Hilliker, M.D. Pls.' Opp'n 5; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-13. Plaintiffs allege that despite his symptoms and need to be "admitted to the hospital for a comprehensive work-up of his coronary vessels[,]" John was discharged two hours after he arrived. Pls.' Opp'n 5-6; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 14. John continued to feel unwell, and then on either Monday, September 5 or Tuesday, September 6, John and his family drove back to New York. Pls.' Opp'n 6. John passed away on Wednesday, September 7. Id.; Am. Compl. ¶ 15-16.

At the time these events occurred, Westerly Hospital was owned and operated by LMW Healthcare, Inc., which was organized as a corporation in Rhode Island. Pls.' Opp'n 4 (citing Articles of Organization, ECF No. 26-3). As a functioning hospital, Westerly Hospital was licensed and regulated by the Rhode Island Department of Health's Center for Health Facilities Regulation. Id. at 4-5 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17-1 et seq., and R23-17-HOSP § 2.1). The emergency room providers were not direct employees of Westerly Hospital, as they were employed by Defendant EMP. Id. at 5. Defendant EMP was also organized as a business in Rhode Island. Id. (citation omitted). During this time period, both providers were licensed by the Rhode Island Department of Health. Id.

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on December 17, 2018, ECF No. 1, and amended on March 20, 2019. Plaintiffs allege two causes of action under Rhode Island's Wrongful Death Act: a personal injury "survival action" under R.I.G.L. §§ 9-1-6 and 9-1-7, and a "wrongful death action" under the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act, R.I.G.L. § 10-7-1. Pls.' Opp'n 7; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-28, 33-38. Plaintiffs "seek damages available under the Wrongful Death Act, including John's pre-death pain and suffering under R.I.G.L. § 10-7-5, pecuniary damages under R.I.G.L. § 10-7-1.1 and 10-7-2, loss of spousal consortium under R.I.G.L. § 10-7-1.2(a), and loss of parental society under R.I.G.L. § 10-7-1.2(b)." Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

While the parties agree that Rhode Island law governs the standard of care for the medical treatment Mr. Trumpetto received, they dispute which state law governs the measure of damages because they dispute whether the "injury" occurred in Rhode Island or in New York.² Pls.' Opp'n 8-9; Def. EMP Reply 2, ECF No. 27. Rhode Island allows family members of a deceasedperson to recover damages in wrongful death cases for the loss of consortium and loss of society. See R.I. Gen Laws § 10-7-1.2. New York does not. See Gonzalez v. New York City Housing Authority, 572 N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (N.Y. 1991) (noting that New York has "steadfastly restricted recovery to 'pecuniary injuries,' or injuries measurable by money, and denied recovery for grief, loss of society, affection, conjugal fellowship and consortium" (citation omitted)); Liff v. Schildkrout, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (N.Y. 1980).

A court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law principles of the forum in which the court sits. Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Inst., 967 F.3d 27, 41 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). Rhode Island follows the "interest-weighing approach" outlined in Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (R.I. 1968). The Woodward approach requires determination of which state "bears the most significant relationship to the event and the parties[.]" Goei v. Cbiz, Inc, No. CV 18-263-JJM-PAS, 2020 WL 5803220, at *4 (D.R.I. Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting Taylor v. Mass. Flora Realty Inc., 840 A.2d 1126, 1128 (R.I. 2004)). The court must weigh a set of four factors to be considered in tort cases, and five policy considerations to be considered in all cases:

Tort case-specific factors:

1. The place where the injury occurred,

2. The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

3. The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and,

4. The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties occurred,

See Taylor, 840 A.2d at 1128;

General policy considerations:

1. Predictability of results;

2. Maintenance of interstate and international order;

3. Simplification of the judicial task;

4. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and,

5. Application of the better rule of law.

See Woodward, 243 A.2d at 923.

The "most important factor [in a tort case] is the location where the injury occurred[,]" though the other three tort-specific factors "should also be considered . . . ." Taylor, 840 A.2d at 1128 (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Tort Factors

While the decedent's injury "occurred" in New York, a comprehensive analysis of the tort factors and policy considerations relevant here demonstrates that Rhode Island law must apply to the measure of damages.

With respect to the first tort factor, New York is the place where the injury occurred. "[The] place of the wrong is 'considered to be the place where the last[] event necessary tomake the actor liable occurred.'" Goei, 2020 WL 5803220, at *5 (quoting Dodson v. Ford Motor Co., No. C.A. PC 96-1331, 2006 WL 2642199, at *3 (R.I. Super. Sept. 5, 2006)). In Goei, a suit over accounting malpractice, this Court determined that because the Plaintiffs were living overseas and the Defendant was practicing in Rhode Island at the time he committed the alleged malpractice, "the center of [the] relationship is Rhode Island." Id. Similarly, in Dodson, the plaintiff brought a products liability suit seeking damages for personal injuries incurred from a defectively designed and manufactured Ford vehicle. 2006 WL 2642199, at *1. The vehicle caught fire in Rhode Island, resulting in the death of the plaintiff's mother. Id. In deciding to apply Rhode Island law, the Superior Court of Rhode Island stated that because the "last event necessary to make Ford liable is the fire[,] . . . Rhode Island's punitive damages law should apply unless Ford can demonstrate that Michigan [where the vehicle was manufactured] has a more significant interest than Rhode Island in the application of its punitive damages law." Id. at *3.

Mr. Trumpetto's death in New York was the "last event" that could render Defendants potentially liable under the Wrongful Death Act. See Pls.' Opp'n 6. Plaintiffs' argument that the "genesis" of the injury was in Rhode Island, see Pls.' Opp'n 11, is of no avail as to this factor, but is relevant to the others.

With respect to the second tort factor, Rhode Island is the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred. The medical treatment Mr. Trumpetto received, and therefore, the "genesis" of the injury, only occurred in Rhode Island. See Pls.' Opp'n 4; Mem. Supp. Def. EMP Mot. 2, ECF No. 24-1.

The third tort factor provides no additional clarity, as there is no common place where all parties are domiciled, incorporated, or have their principal places of business. Plaintiffs all reside in New York, as did the deceased. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6. All Defendants, including Defendant EMP, are organized and operate in Rhode Island. Pls.' Opp'n 4-5 (citations omitted), Exs. 2-3. Plaintiffs note that Defendant EMP specifically is a domestic limited liability company that "conducted its business only . . . in Westerly, Rhode Island", a fact that Defendants do not dispute. Pls.' Opp'n 12.

As to the fourth and final tort factor, Rhode Island is the place where the relationship between the parties occurred. Defendant argues that, as to this factor, "there is a...