Trustees of Health and Hospitals v. Mcad

839 N.E.2d 861

TRUSTEES OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, INC. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & others.¹

No. 04-P-1036.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 13, 2005.

Decided December 23, 2005.

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Steven Locke, Boston, for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

Kelly M. Bonnevie, Newton, (Marc L. Breakstone, Boston, with her), for Veronica Higginbottom & others.

Christine M. Hayes for the plaintiff.

Present: LAURENCE, DUFFLY, & KATZMANN, JJ.

KATZMANN, J.

Five female, African-American employees (complainants) of the Trustees of Health and Hospitals of the City of Boston, Inc. (THH), filed an employment discrimination claim with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), alleging that they were subjected to differential treatment during their terminations as part of an organized layoff, in violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4. The hearing officer and the MCAD found that THH discriminated against the complainants because of their race and sex and awarded damages for emotional distress. A Superior Court judge vacated the award, concluding that the MCAD had applied an improper legal standard, and granted THH's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The complainants appeal from that ruling. They also appeal from the MCAD's decision to vacate the hearing officer's award of prejudgment interest against THH. We conclude that the hearing officer and the MCAD were correct in determining that the complainants had suffered discrimination, and were entitled to damages for emotional distress. We thus reverse the Superior Court judge's decision, and we reinstate the MCAD's order on those claims. Additionally, we reinstate the hearing officer's award of prejudgment interest to the complainants.

Facts. We relate the relevant facts as found by the hearing officer. In July, 1994, in response to funding cutbacks, THH laid off five African-American women — Gloria Coney, Belinda Chambers, Veronica Higginbottom, Marlene Hinds, and Betty Smith — from its Healthy Baby/Healthy Child Program. Each of these women was a full-time employee at THH's Hyde Park office. At least one of them was a management-level employee.

During these same layoffs, THH also laid off Christopher Navin, a Caucasian man who worked in the Healthy Baby/Healthy Child Program at the Hyde Park location, as well as at a Boston location, and at times, from his home. He was a permanent part-time employee who was responsible for reviewing and making recommendations concerning the Healthy Baby/Healthy Child Program's organizational structure. Navin's layoff and the layoffs of the complainants were strikingly different in their execution.

Marjorie Perkins, the program director of the Healthy Baby/Healthy Child Program, was in charge of the layoffs. She learned on or before June 30, 1994, that there would have to be layoffs in the program. After Perkins chose the employees who were going to be laid off, she requested assistance from THH's management in carrying out the layoffs. The director of labor relations, Teri McNamara, was sent to assist her. On numerous occasions, Perkins and McNamara discussed the manner in which the layoffs were to be conducted.

Coney and Hinds were laid off on July 19, 1994, when Perkins and McNamara called them into Perkins's office and informed them that they were being laid off effective immediately, and that they should collect their belongings and leave within thirty minutes. In full view of their coworkers and Hinds's daughters (who happened to be at the office), McNamara and two other employees monitored Coney and Hinds as they packed their things. The monitoring was such that Hinds's daughters thought their mother was being observed to prevent stealing. Perkins and one of the employees examined Coney's belongings as she packed, including an inspection of her lunch bag. She was told that the monitoring was to ensure she did not take anything issued by THH. Coney refrained from using the restroom because she felt she would be watched. She asked for special permission to return the following day to collect the rest of her things. She was allowed to do so, again under the supervision of an employee. Coney did not have an opportunity to say goodbye to her coworkers, some of whom cried and asked if she was being arrested.

Higginbottom, Chambers, and Smith were not at work on July 19. On July 20, they were summoned to Perkins's office, informed that they were being laid off effective immediately, and sent to pack their belongings. They were monitored in a fashion similar to the scrutiny Hinds and Coney had endured. Notably, Smith did not have an opportunity to collect all her belongings and left photographs and certificates in the office. In addition, McNamara pulled papers out of Chambers's hands as Chambers packed and "order[ed] Chambers around." Chambers's officemate cried as Chambers packed. McNamara also refused to allow Chambers to contact her clients to tell them she would not make her appointments that day. Finally, after several requests, McNamara permitted Chambers to take the telephone numbers of some of her clients home to contact them later.

These layoff procedures stand in stark contrast to the treatment Navin received upon his termination. Navin was given a month's advance notice of his layoff. He was allowed to come to the office at his convenience to receive his termination notice. After being told that a particular employee whom he knew from another job was to give him his notice, he requested that it be a different employee, and his request was granted. Navin was not monitored as he cleaned out his desk and he was permitted to walk around the building freely to say goodbye to his coworkers. A week later, he returned to the office, but was asked to leave because there had been allegations of discrimination concerning the layoffs.

Within two weeks following the layoffs, THH Commissioner Lawrence Dwyer apologized to the complainants at a union meeting, stating that the treatment they received would not be repeated during his tenure. Dwyer also offered Chambers and Higginbottom another job. They rejected this offer. The complainants thereafter filed their complaint with the MCAD. Their theory of liability was not that THH discriminated in its choice of whom to lay off, but rather in the manner in which it executed the layoff.

At the hearing, McNamara testified that she and Perkins had decided on the layoff procedures because they were concerned for their safety and to prevent vandalism and theft at the office, especially with regard to confidential patient files. The hearing officer concluded that these reasons were merely a pretext for THH's actions.² He found that the complainants suffered emotional harm as victims of discrimination, and awarded them damages based on these injuries.³ The MCAD affirmed this award. THH subsequently appealed the decision to the Superior Court via G.L. c. 30A; THH's motion for judgment on the pleadings was allowed.

Standard of review. We generally review an agency's interpretation of law de novo. See, e.g., Hogan v. Labor Relations Commn., 430 Mass. 611, 613, 722 N.E.2d 446 (2000). However, we grant deference to the interpretations administrative agencies make of the statutory scheme that they administer. Somerset Importers, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commn., 28 Mass.App.Ct. 381, 385, 551 N.E.2d 545 (1990). See Heublein, Inc. v. Capital Distrib. Co., 434 Mass. 698, 705, 751 N.E.2d 410 (2001). Further, "[w]e will affirm a decision and order of the MCAD unless the findings and conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an error of law." Salem v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 627, 640-641, 693 N.E.2d 1026 (1998).

Discrimination claims under G.L. c. 151B. The complainants' discrimination claims are based on alleged violations of G.L. c. 151B, § 4, as amended by St.1965, c. 397, § 4, which, in relevant part, makes it unlawful "[f]or an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the race [or] sex . . . of any individual to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification." Specifically, the complainants assert that THH discriminated against them in the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" by its degrading differential treatment of them during their layoffs, which they claim was due to the fact that they are African-American women.

Claims of discrimination under G.L. c. 151B are usually evaluated using a three-stage test.⁴ See Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 440-441, 646 N.E.2d 111 (1995) (Blare). Applying this test, the hearing officer found in favor of the complainants and the MCAD affirmed the decision. The Superior Court judge, however, concluded that the MCAD erred in the application of the first stage of this test. To survive this first stage, the complainants were required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Blare, 419 Mass. at 441, 646 N.E.2d 111. See Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 665 n. 22, 729 N.E.2d 1068 (2000) (discriminatory failure to hire); Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 420-421, 780 N.E.2d 1255 (2003) (discriminatory termination). The specific elements of the first stage are flexible and may be altered to fit the factual needs of the kind of discrimination allegedly at work in a given case. See Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 41-45, 825 N.E.2d 522 (2005). In the circumstances of this case, the elements we consider are (1) whether they were members of a protected class; (2) whether they suffered an adverse action with respect to a term,...