Tucker v. City of Burlington

679 F.Supp.3d 127

Denise TUCKER, Administratrix of the Estate of James L. Long, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders,Gurbir S. Grewal, John Does 1-6, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-12946

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

Signed June 29, 2023

William J. Fox, Daniel J. Devlin, Michael Thomas Van Der Veen, Van Der Veen, O'Neill, Hartshorn & Levin, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Daniel Gee, Malamut and Associates, LLC, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION

Joseph H. Rodriguez, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court are three separate motions seeking summary judgment by defendants City of Philadelphia (the "City"), Burlington County Board of Chosen Freeholders (the "County"), Gurbir S. Grewal¹, and John Does 1-6.² The Court has considered the written submissions of the parties as well as the arguments advanced at the hearing on May 10, 2023. The record of that hearing is incorporated herein. For the reasons stated on the record as well as those set forth below, summary judgment will be granted as to each defendant.

I. Background

The underlying facts of this case are remarkable and largely undisputed. Plaintiff Denise Tucker stands in the shoes of James L. Long, as the administratrix of his estate. Long's death is unrelated to the facts of this case. In simple terms, Plaintiff alleges negligence and violations of Long's civil rights which occurred when Long was detained pursuant to a bench warrant. The bench warrant was issued when Long failed to appear for a criminal prosecution hearing in the Burlington County Superior Court. Plaintiff challenges the validity of the warrant on the basis that he was never served with an order to appear. Leaving that issue aside, what happens next is a failure of the administration of justice.

On June 10, 2016, the State of New Jersey, Burlington County, issued a warrant for Long's arrest for alleged drug related violations of New Jersey State Law. That same day, Long was arrested at his home in Philadelphia by the Philadelphia Police Department. Long was extradited to Burlington County New Jersey, processed, and then released without a set date for his arraignment. Shortly thereafter, Burlington County issued a Notice to Appear for his arraignment, scheduled for July 18, 2016. The envelope of the notice was machine stamped July 9, but the post mark stamp indicated July 11. The envelope was returned to Burlington County on July 17, 2016 with a stamp indicating "Return to Sender. Attempted-Not Know. Unable to Forward." Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ c [Dkt. No. 88].

Long, who claims he never received notice, did not appear for the July 18, 2016, hearing and a bench warrant was issued by a Superior Court judge. Long eventually was arraigned and the matter was set for trial. The trial resulted in an acquittal in September 2016. The bench warrant was never rescinded.

Fast forward two years to November 2018— Long is the victim of a robbery in Philadelphia and called the police to make a report. During the interview, the Philadelphia Police enter Long's name in the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") System and discover the Burlington County Superior Court bench warrant. The responding Philadelphia Police Officer called the Burlington County Sheriff and confirmed that the warrant was active. As a result, Long is taken into custody and remains there for twenty-three days. During this time, Long claims he told multiple people multiple times that he answered to the warrant and was successful at trial. Getting nowhere with his protestations, Long waived his challenge to extradition and was picked up by the Burlington County Sheriff.

Once in front of a different New Jersey Superior Court Judge in Burlington County, Long again protested his current incarceration and explained the series of events resulting in his acquittal. The judge, in the middle of the hearing, left the bench and consulted relevant court records which confirmed Long's story. Long was immediately released.

There is one other wrinkle to Long's plight. Almost one year after his acquittal, Long applied for and was granted an Order of Expungement as it related to those charges. Pl. Ex. C. Plaintiff argues that the issuance of the expungement order should have addressed the bench warrant.³ N.J.S.A. § 2C:52-1 provides:

Definition of Expungement.

a. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, expungement shall mean the extraction, sealing, impounding, or isolation of all records on file within any court, detention or correctional facility, law enforcement or criminal justice agency concerning a person's detection, apprehension, arrest, detention, trial or disposition of an offense within the criminal justice system.

b. Expunged records shall include complaints, warrants, arrests, commitments, processing records, fingerprints, photographs, index cards, "rap sheets" and judicial docket records.

N.J.S.A.§ 2C:52-1.

The amended complaint pleads four counts against all defendants. The counts are styled as follows: Count I- Search and Seizure; Count II- 5^th and 14^th Amendments Due Process; Count III- "State law claims"- intentional tort; and Count IV- NJ Civil Rights and Constitutional Violations.

Plaintiff offers no opposition to the City's motion as to Counts III and IV; summary judgment will be granted as to those Counts. As for the remaining counts against the City, Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the City of Philadelphia engaged in a pattern and practice and/or had a policy or custom of ignoring incarnated persons' complaints about wrongful arrests. Plaintiff's claims against the County and Grewal, include due process and Monell violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2(c), and general negligence claims.

II. Standard of Review

"Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). Thus, the Court will enter summary judgment in favor of a movant who shows that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and supports the showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A).

An issue is "genuine" if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994). Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "A nonmoving party may not 'rest upon mere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statements . . . .' " Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. That is, the movant can support the assertion that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed by showing that "an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the [alleged dispute of] fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff has elected to name only the state, county and municipal entities in her complaint. The genesis of the events preceding Long's erroneous detention span several years and involve various disparate actors, none of whom are parties to this lawsuit.

A. Claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJCRA

...