Tucker v. Ford Motor Co.

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MICHAEL TUCKER, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 4:22-cv-00430-AGF

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

March 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This putative class action is before the Court on Defendant Ford Motor Company's motion to strike Plaintiff's class allegations. (Doc. No. 38). In his complaint, Plaintiff describes two putative classes, including a “Declaratory Relief Class”, which includes all “persons and entities in the state of Missouri who purchased a model year 2011-2018 Ford Focus for their own use and not for resale,” and a “Manifestation Class”, comprised of all of those “persons and entities” whose putative class vehicles actually had a “subframe or undercarriage that exhibited rust corrosion.” (Doc. No. 22). Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for declaratory relief on behalf of himself and the putative Declaratory Relief Class in Count IV of his petition, as well as three causes of action on behalf of the Manifestation Class: (i) a violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) (Count I); (ii) the breach of express and implied warranty (Count II) and (iii) unjust enrichment (Count III). Id. Defendant now brings a motion to strike Plaintiff's putative classes from his petition. (Doc. No. 38). The Court heard oral argument on the motion on January 20, 2023, and the parties filed supplemental briefing thereafter. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike with be granted in part and denied in part.

Factual Background

Plaintiff first filed this action in Missouri state court on February 1, 2019, alleging that a defect in his 2018 Ford Focus caused excessive corrosion. (Doc. No. 38 at 7). At that time Plaintiff asserted only individual claims against Ford Motor Company and Bommarito Ford, Inc., the dealership which sold him his vehicle. Id. Over the next three years Plaintiff and the then-defendants engaged in written discovery. Id. Through this discovery Defendant produced 2018 Ford Focus corrosion requirements, test procedures for the corrosion test on the 2018 Ford Focus, the vehicle corrosion Design Verification Plan and Report for the 2018 Ford Focus, and any corrosion-related complaints or recalls involving the 2018 Ford Focus. Id. Plaintiff also took Defendant's corporate deposition on topics including Defendant's testing and complaints related to the 2018 Ford Focus. Id. After this discovery, on March 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a third amended petition against Ford Motor Company only. Id. This petition included claims on behalf of putative classes. Id. Defendant then removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1446, and 1453(b). Id.

In his third amended petition, Plaintiff asserts that he purchased a new 2018 Ford Focus on August 29, 2018. (Doc. No. 22 at 3). One month later, Plaintiff noticed extensive salt, corrosion, and rust on the lower engine bay. Id. Though Plaintiff brought the car back to the dealership for repair, all attempts at repairing the vehicle were unsuccessful. Id. Eventually, as part of a settlement with the dealership, the dealership replaced Plaintiff's vehicle with a newer Ford Ranger. Id. At oral argument, Plaintiff confirmed the sale took place in November, 2021. The dealership is not named as a defendant in the third amended petition.

Legal Standard

The parties dispute the appropriate time at which to consider the sufficiency of Plaintiff's class allegations. Defendant asserts that the Court may evaluate the sufficiency of class allegations prior to discovery. (Doc. No. 38 at 9-10). In response, Plaintiff argues that a motion to strike is premature and that Defendant cannot meet its burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Doc. No. 40 at 2-3). The Court must therefore determine the proper legal standard by which to evaluate the case.

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that his proposed class satisfies all requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and one of the subsections of Rule 23(b) on a motion to certify the class. See Johannessohn v. Polaris Industries Inc., 9 F.4th 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Hale v. Emerson Elec. Co., 942 F.3d 401, 403 (8th Cir. 2019)). However, a defendant need not wait until a plaintiff files a motion to certify to attack the sufficiency of a proposed class: the Eighth Circuit has determined that defendants may test a plaintiff's class allegations prior to discovery and a motion for class certification on either a motion to strike or a motion to dismiss. See Donelson v Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., 999 F.3d 1080, 1091 (8th Cir. 2021). Bringing a motion to strike, however, shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant, and the more strenuous standard applied to motions to strike portions of a plaintiff's pleadings is then applied when considering the class allegations. Id.

Defendant brings this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; under Rule 23(d)(1)(D), courts may require a plaintiff amend their pleadings to “eliminate” allegations about “absent persons.” This rule is intended to ease case management and encourage the fair and efficient coordination of the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d)(1)(D) advisory committee note to 1966 amendment, subdivision (d). However, courts consider motions to strike a plaintiff's class allegations brought under this rule by the standards articulated in Rule 12(f). See Donelson, 999 F.3d at 1091 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)).

Under Rule 12(f), the Court may strike any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material from a party's filings. The Court enjoys “liberal discretion” in determining whether to strike a party's pleadings. BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Court may strike portions of a party's pleadings when those portions lack a sufficient legal basis of support. See Donelson, 999 F.3d at 1092 (citing BJC Health Sys., 478 F.3d at 916-918). Such a remedy is a “drastic” measure considered both “extreme” and “disfavored,” however. Id. at 1091-92 (internal citations omitted). Many courts in the Eastern District of Missouri therefore express a preference for dismissing the insufficient portions of a plaintiff's pleadings with leave to amend. See, e.g., Turkan v. Wal-Mart Stores East I, LP, Case No. 4:22-CV-00645-JAR, 2022 WL 2663741, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 11, 2022) (acknowledging that Rule 12(f) permits striking redundant claims, but dismissing without prejudice, rather than striking, one of the plaintiff's duplicative counts in his complaint).

Courts are particularly hesitant to strike a plaintiff's class allegations prior to discovery on the issue and a class certification hearing. See, e.g., Nobles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 10-04175-CV-C-NKL, 2012 WL 4090347, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Mo. Sep. 17, 2012) (collecting cases) (examining a motion to dismiss a plaintiff's class allegations prior to discovery and explaining that courts approach such motions with “a great deal of skepticism”). Nothing in Rule 23 forbids a court from striking class allegations at this early stage of the proceedings; indeed, the rule mandates that the Court examine the issue of class certification at an “early practicable time.” Donelson, 999 F.3d at 1092 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(A)).^[1]See also McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 687 F.3d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 2012) (dismissing class allegations for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23 on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). Striking class claims that are insufficient on the face of the plaintiff's complaint is appropriate because such claims are “impertinent” material under Rule 12(f) and requiring the defendant to spend time and money to address such claims constitutes prejudice. Donelson, 999 F.3d at 1092. Nevertheless, striking class allegations remains a “rare remedy.” Huskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 1350-51 (E.D. Mo. 2020) (collecting cases and quoting Doyel v. McDonald's Corp., No. 4:08-CV-1198-CAS, 2009 WL 350627, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2009)). Courts therefore apply a particularly stringent standard to motions to strike a plaintiff's class allegations. See Barker v. Nestle Purina PetCare Company, 601 F.Supp.3d 464, 473 (E.D. Mo. 2022) (denying a motion to strike class allegations pending further discovery on the issue, despite “serious doubts” about the plaintiff's ability to satisfy Rule 23 at that later stage).

Courts are to evaluate a motion to strike class allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true. See Doyel, 2009 WL 350627, at *6. The Court must deny the motion when a more rigorous application of the facts is required to fully evaluate the plaintiff's claims. Id. At this stage, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff with the understanding that the plaintiff may modify the class allegations after discovery on the issue. See Anglin v. Edgewell Personal Care Co., Case No 4:18-CV-00639-NCC, 2018 WL 6434424, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2008). See also, St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax, Inc., Case No. 4:15CV517 RLW, 2015 WL 9451046, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2015) (internal citations omitted) (noting that overbreadth is not a per se ground for dismissal of class allegations because the plaintiff may later shrink the allegations to eliminate the concern). If there is a “chance” that the allegations will satisfy Rule 23 after discovery, the parties must be afforded the opportunity to conduct such discovery and present documentary evidence on the issue. Nobels, 2012 WL 4090347, at *2. In contrast, the Court will grant...