Tuggle v. State

380 So.3d 991

JaTryan Martel TUGGLE a/k/a JaTyran Tuggle a/k/a Jaytran Tuggle, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2022-KA-00118-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

02/27/2024

FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH, JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: BRANDON ISAAC DORSEY

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER

BEFORE CARLTON, P J., WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. JaTryan Tuggle was tried and convicted of capital murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery in the Forrest County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without eligibility for parole for this life sentence. He was also sentenced to serve twenty years¹ in MDOC’s custody for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, which was ordered to run consecutively to the life sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On July 20, 2019, Tuggle drove his black Dodge Avenger from Jackson to Hattiesburg, Mississippi, with three passengers: Christopher Tyce, Eric Williams, and Stephon Hart. After arriving in Hattiesburg, the four men stopped at Steelman Grocery. Tyce, Williams, and Hart entered the store carrying guns and wearing face coverings while Tuggle remained outside in his vehicle, which was still running. While in the store, Tyce fired multiple shots which resulted in the death of the store’s co-owner, Lisa Nguyen. Williams jumped over the counter and grabbed the cash register while Hart stood at the door as the lookout. After they robbed the store, Tyce, Williams, and Hart jumped back in Tuggle’s vehicle and he drove them back to Jackson.

¶3. On September 8, 2020, a Forrest County Grand Jury returned a four-count indictment against multiple defendants in which Tuggle was charged in Count I with capital murder pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 2017) and in Count IV with conspiracy to commit armed robbery pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-1-1 (Rev. 2014) and 97-3-79 (Rev. 2014).² After a three-day trial, a jury found Tuggle guilty of both Count I and Count IV of the indictment. A sentencing order was signed on November 17, 2021. On December 1, 2021, Tuggle filed a "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative a New Trial and For a Reasonable Bail Pending Appeal and Other Relief." Although a written order was never entered, the trial court denied Tuggle’s motion in open court on December 22, 2021, and Tuggle filed his notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶4. Tuggle essentially raises three assignments of error on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred by permitting the Forrest County Deputy Coroner Lisa Klem to testify "as to the manner and cause of [Nguyen’s] death." Secondly, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting Exhibit S-106 at trial. Third, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict or JNOV because that the State allegedly presented insufficient evidence to convict him of capital murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.³

I. Did the trial court err by permitting Forrest County, Mississippi Deputy Coroner Lisa Klem to testify as to the manner and cause of Nguyen’s death?

¶5. Because Klem is not a pathologist and did not perform an autopsy on Nguyen, Tuggle maintains that Klem was not qualified to offer any testimony as to the cause and manner of Nguyen’s death. He further argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was somehow violated by allowing Klem to testify to the cause and manner of death. As will be discussed below, Klem conducted her own investigation and formed her own opinions that were given in court, subject to cross-examination. No autopsy report was offered into evidence.

¶6. This Court addressed a similar issue in Parks v. State, 235 So. 3d 111, 117-18 (¶¶21-23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), and found as follows:

We begin by emphasizing that although it is the State’s burden to prove that "death resulted from a criminal agency," "[i]t is well established … that proof of the cause of death in homicide cases may be by lay testimony." Neal v. State, 386 So. 2d 718, 719-20 (Miss.1980). As our Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he criminal agency or cause of death is usually shown by witnesses who saw the homicide, or by circumstances sufficient to establish the crime to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis." Gibson v. State, 503 So. 2d 230, 233 (Miss. 1987) (quoting King v. State, 251 Miss. 161, 176, 168 So. 2d 637, 643 (1964)). In such cases, neither an autopsy nor expert medical opinion is necessary. Id. The evidence concerning the circumstances of the death in this case was, like many homicide cases, sufficient to establish the cause of death without expert testimony. Parks admitted that he shot Tarver, and Tarver was found dead at the scene with significant blood loss from obvious bullet wounds in his arm and torso.

Nonetheless, Parks timely objected to Evans's testimony concerning the manner and cause of death. Evans was appointed deputy medical examiner by the county coroner. She is not a medical doctor but has an associate's degree in medical laboratory technology, has completed forty hours of training in basic death investigation, and is required to complete twenty-four hours of continuing education each year. Parks argues that her opinion as to the manner and cause of death was improper expert testimony that should have been excluded under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 [113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469] (1993), which our Supreme Court adopted in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31 (Miss. 2003). In response, both during trial and on appeal, the State has agreed that Evans was not tendered or qualified as an expert. Thus, the issue really boils down to whether Evans's testimony was permissible lay opinion testimony. See M.R.E. 701; Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 707, 710 (Miss. 1996).

Evans testified on direct examination that her opinions as to the manner and cause of death were based on her own observations of Tarver's body at the scene and during the autopsy. We review the trial court’s decision to admit such lay opinion testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Davis v. State, 904 So. 2d 1212, 1215 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). And although we question whether such non-expert testimony as to the cause of death is truly "helpful" to the trier of fact, M.R.E. 701(b), in a previous case this Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a coroner to give similar opinion testimony that a homicide victim died of a gunshot wound. See Tillis v. State, 176 So. 3d 37, 47-48 (¶¶22-26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014); see also Neal, 386 So. 2d at 720 (pre-Rules case holding that a trial court did not err by allowing a funeral director/embalmer to testify "that he assumed (but did not positively know) that [the victim] died from the gunshot wound"). Given our ruling in Tillis, we hold that the trial judge in this case did not abuse his discretion by overruling Parks’s objection to the State's question to Evans.

(Emphasis added).

¶7. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-61-57 (Rev. 2018), each county coroner elected after 1987, who is not a medical doctor, has been required to complete specialized training in death investigations in order to hold that office. Upon completion of "Death Investigation Training School" provided by the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory and the State Medical Examiner, the coroner is recognized as the county medical examiner investigator (CMEI). Id. The same statute requires a deputy coroner to undergo the same training in order to become a deputy CMEL CMEIs and deputy CMEIs are required to complete subsequent testing on the subject material by the State Medical Examiner at least once every four years. Id. They are further required each year to receive at least twenty-four hours of continuing education as prescribed and certified by the State Medical Examiner or will be disqualified from holding the office of CMEI or Deputy CMEL Id.

¶8. As a deputy CMEI, Klem was required to complete her portion of the certificate of death within seventy-two hours of her assuming jurisdiction over the death investigation. Her portion of the certificate would include the decedent’s name, the date and time of death, and the cause of death. The statute further provides that decisions shall be made in consultation with investigating law enforcement officials and/or the State Medical Examiner. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-61-63(2) (Rev. 2018).

¶9. In Parks, the deputy CMEI’s testimony was offered and admitted as a lay opinion, MRE 701, and was affirmed on appeal.⁴ In the present case, Klem was tendered as an expert in death investigations. She advised the court that her training included watching autopsies at the state crime lab, completing forty-hours of school courses, and completing twenty-four hours of continued education credits each year. In additional to the statutory training requirements, Klem testified that she is a licensed practical nurse. She had been previously accepted as an expert in death investigations. After conducting a voir dire examination of Klem, Tuggle’s attorney objected to Klem being accepted as an expert in the field of pathology. The State responded that she was not tendered as an expert in pathology. The trial court then accepted Klem as an expert in death investigation.

¶10. On direct and cross-examination, Klem described the steps she took in her investigation. She met with law enforcement and was given a report of what happened. She observed Nguyen’s body at the hospital and determined that she did have a gunshot wound. She reviewed her medical records. Based on her observation of the body and her review of the medical records and information from law enforcement, Klem...