Turn of River Fire Dep't, Inc. v. City of Stamford

159 Conn.App. 708

123 A.3d 909

TURN OF RIVER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC., et al.

v.CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

City of Stamford et al.

v.Turn of River Fire Department, Inc., et al.

Nos. 36468

36465.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 9, 2015.

Decided Sept. 15, 2015.

Mark J. Kovack, Westport, for the appellants (plaintiffs in the first case, defendants in the second case Long Ridge Fire Department, Inc., et al.).

Michael S. Toma, assistant corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Dana B. Lee, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellees (defendants in the first case, plaintiffs in the second case).

LAVINE, PRESCOTT and PELLEGRINO, Js.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

Prior to 2012, six fire departments served the city of Stamford: the Fire and Rescue Department, which the city maintained and operated, and five independently governed and autonomous volunteer fire departments. Each department provided exclusive firefighting services within its assigned fire service district. In 2012, Stamford's voters amended the city's charter to organize the six departments into one department, the Stamford Fire Department, and place it under the direction of the newly created position of fire chief. The plaintiffs Long Ridge Fire Company, Inc. (Long Ridge), one of the volunteer departments, and its chief, Stuart Teitelbaum, subsequently brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, the city of Stamford (city), Antonio Conte, the fire chief, Barry Callahan, the city's fire marshal, and Thaddeus Jankowski, the city's director of public safety, health, and welfare,¹ claiming that forming the new organizational structure of the six departments without the plaintiffs' consent violated their corporate, statutory, and constitutional rights. Following a trial, the trial court rejected all of these claims, and the plaintiffs appealed from the judgments.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that the charter amendments did not (1) unlawfully compel Long Ridge to forfeit its rights as a private corporation; (2) violate General Statutes § 7–301 ; and (3) violate the takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution.² We disagree with each of these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Long Ridge is a volunteer fire company that serves the city. It was incorporated in 1928 as a Connecticut nonstock corporation, and maintains a roster of thirty-seven members. In addition to owning and operating two fire stations, Long Ridge also owns firefighting vehicles and other firefighting equipment used in its operations. The company's operational expenses are funded by the city and supplemented by its own fundraising efforts. Teitelbaum is the company's current chief.

Prior to 2012, Long Ridge was one of five independent and autonomous volunteer fire departments that provided firefighting services to the city. The city maintained and operated the Fire and Rescue Department.

Each department was assigned its own fire service district, in which it exercised exclusive jurisdiction to provide firefighting services.

In 2012, the voters of the city approved several amendments to its charter that impacted firefighting operations within the city in two significant respects. First and foremost, the amendments abolished the Fire and Rescue Department and established a single fire department for the entire city. To oversee the department, the amendments created the new position of fire chief. They also created two positions, assistant chief for career service firefighters and assistant chief for volunteer service firefighters, who are to be appointed by the fire chief.

Second, the amendments provided that the volunteer fire departments—now referred to in the charter as companies³ —would become part of the Stamford Fire Department. In this respect, each would maintain its independent status as a nonstock corporation and control over its organization, status, and property, but be “subject to the provisions of [the] [c]harter.” Moreover, each of the companies' chiefs would retain “primary firefighting responsibilities in their Fire Service Districts and primary responsibilities over the personnel and equipment assigned to their Fire Service Districts, subject to the supervision and direction of the Assistant Chief [for] Volunteer Services and the Fire Chief.”

The plaintiffs subsequently commenced an action against the city and Jankowski challenging the charter amendments. In their complaint, they sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the amendments violated, inter alia, their corporate, statutory, and federal and state constitutional rights. Shortly thereafter, the defendants brought a separate action against the plaintiffs seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the charter amendments are lawful, valid, and constitutional.

Following a consolidated trial, the court, Hon. David R. Tobin, judge trial referee, issued a thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision disposing of the claims raised in both actions. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Specifically, it concluded, inter alia, that the charter amendments did not violate the plaintiffs' corporate, statutory, or federal or state constitutional rights. The plaintiffs subsequently appealed from the court's judgments denying their request for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment, and upholding the validity of the charter amendments.⁴ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly concluded that the charter amendments do not require Long Ridge to forfeit its rights as a private corporation. Specifically, they contend that without lawful authority, the amendments usurp Long Ridge's organization, status, and property by forcibly merging it with the Stamford Fire Department. They further claim that the charter amendments provide Long Ridge with no option to opt out of the city's “mandatory confiscation of its property, volunteer members, paid personnel, and ... privately raised [income]....” Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the city does not have the authority to make Long Ridge, a private corporation, a municipal agency without its consent. We are not persuaded by these claims because, among other things, the plaintiffs misapprehend the meaning, nature, and effect of the charter amendments.

As an initial matter, we note that the plaintiffs have identified no provision of our General Statutes or any case law that grants a private corporation such as Long Ridge a right to engage in municipal firefighting activities. Instead, they claim that Long Ridge's “state sanctioned incorporation and authorization to operate as a fire department, its almost 90 year history of operations within and on behalf of the Long Ridge section of Stamford, its continued recognition in the charter ... and its ongoing history of being funded by the city in consideration for its ongoing provision of professional services has established [its] legal right to operate as a stand-alone fire department.” We are unaware of any authority, however, suggesting that these factors, either individually or cumulatively, establish a private right to engage in fire protection services on behalf of a municipality. Tellingly, the plaintiffs provide us with none.

Indeed, it is generally well recognized that maintaining and operating a fire department is a traditionally public function that falls within a state's police power. See 16A Am.Jur.2d 240, Physical Welfare and Public Safety, Generally § 347 (2009) (“[f]ire control is a proper function of the state's police power”). In Connecticut, the legislature has delegated that function to local municipalities through General Statutes § 7–148(c)(4)(B). The scope of that delegation is especially broad. Section 7–148(c)(4)(B) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny municipality shall have the power to ... [p]rovide for fire protection, organize, maintain and regulate the persons providing fire protection, provide the necessary apparatus for extinguishing fires and do all other things necessary or desirable for the protection of the municipality from fire....”

We begin, therefore, our review of the plaintiffs' claim by setting forth the applicable standard of review and legal principles that will guide our analysis. The plaintiffs' claims require us to interpret the 2012 amendments to the city's charter. “As with any issue of statutory construction, the interpretation of a charter or municipal ordinance presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary.... In construing a city charter, the rules of statutory construction generally apply.... In arriving at the intention of the framers of the charter the whole and every part of the instrument must be taken and compared together. In other words, effect should be given, if possible, to every section, paragraph, sentence, clause and word in the instrument and related laws.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kiewlen v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 139, 149, 115 A.3d 1095 (2015).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the charter provisions challenged in this appeal. The plaintiffs take issue with § C5–40–3 (a) and (f) of the Stamford Charter (charter), as amended, which establish the Stamford Fire Department and define the role of the volunteer companies within it. Specifically, § C5–40–3 (a) of the charter provides in relevant part that “[t]here shall be a Fire Department for the City of Stamford....” Section C5–40–3 (f) provides that “[t]he volunteer fire companies of Stamford shall be part of the Stamford Fire Department and will be important components of the Stamford Fire Department. The perpetuation and strengthening of those volunteer companies through recruitment of volunteer firefighters shall be a priority of the Fire Chief and the Assistant Chief for Volunteer...