Turner v. Allstate Ins. Co., CIV. ACT. NO. 2:13-cv-685-ECM

491 F.Supp.3d 1190

Garnet TURNER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

John E. Klaas, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant.

CIV. ACT. NO. 2:13-cv-685-ECM

CIV. ACT. NO. 2:15-cv-406-ECM

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed September 30, 2020

Glenn Murdock, Attorney at Law, Christopher Boyce Hood, Taylor Christopher Bartlett, Jeanie Snipes Sleadd, William Lewis Garrison, Jr., Heninger Garrison Davis, L.L.C., Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff Garnet Turner.

Christopher Boyce Hood, Heninger Garrison Davis LLC, Jeanie Snipes Sleadd, Taylor Christopher Bartlett, William Lewis Garrison, Jr., Heninger Garrison Davis, L.L.C., Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs Suzanne Willingham, Donald Kerr, James Cartrette, Bill Huff, Kathy Shepherd, William Harbin, Vernon Bentley, Ted Spiewak, Herb Wofford, Alberta Nixon, Charlie Drake, Herbert Vidales, Fred Fichter, Richard Scholl.

Christopher Boyce Hood, Heninger Garrison Davis LLC, Jeanie Snipes Sleadd, Taylor Christopher Bartlett, William Lewis Garrison, Jr., Heninger Garrison Davis, L.L.C., Birmingham, AL, Yale T. Freeman, Yale T. Freeman PA, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff Judith Cuddington.

Christopher Boyce Hood, Heninger Garrison Davis LLC, Glenn Murdock, Kearney Dee Hutsler, III, Attorney at Law, Jeanie Snipes Sleadd, Taylor Christopher Bartlett, William Lewis Garrison, Jr., Heninger Garrison Davis, L.L.C., Birmingham, AL, Robert J. Pearl, the Pearl Law Firm PA, Naples, FL, for Plaintiff All Plaintiffs.

James Earnest Fleenor, Jr., Wilson F. Green, Fleenor & Green LLP, Tuscaloosa, AL, Kearney Dee Hutsler, III, Attorney at Law, Birmingham, AL, Michael W. Malarney, Pro Hac Vice, Robert J. Pearl, the Pearl Law Firm PA, Naples, FL, Yale T. Freeman, Yale T. Freeman PA, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiffs Terry G. Mountford, David R. Sangston, John E. Klaas, Frank M. Berardi.

Kearney Dee Hutsler, III, Attorney at Law, Birmingham, AL, Michael W. Malarney, Pro Hac Vice, Robert J. Pearl, the Pearl Law Firm PA, Naples, FL, Yale T. Freeman, Yale T. Freeman PA, Gainesville, FL, for Plaintiff Elmer H. Ceisel.

Albert Loring Vreeland, II, David James Middlebrooks, Lehr Middlebrooks & Vreeland, PC, Birmingham, AL, Amanda Moeller, Richard Lee Fenton, Pro Hac Vice, Dentons US LLP, Christopher Qualley King, Redgrave LLP, Chicago, IL, Meagan Dyer Self, Dentons US LLP, Dallas, TX, Samantha J. Wenger, Wade Carr, Dentons US LLP, Kansas City, MO, Uchenna Ekuma-Nkama, Dentons US LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This litigation is comprised of two consolidated cases arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA").¹ The central dispute in both cases involves Allstate Insurance Company's ("Allstate") 2013 decision to terminate a life insurance benefit for individuals who retired from the company between 1990 and 2013.

In the first case, Garnet Turner and other individually named Plaintiffs² (collectively "Turner Plaintiffs") filed a class action complaint against Allstate seeking to represent a class of retirees who contend that they received permanent, paid-up retiree life insurance policies from Allstate after retirement, but lost that benefit when Allstate decided to stop paying the premiums for said policies. The Turner Plaintiffs assert two causes of action against Allstate. They claim, under § 502(a)(1)(B), that Allstate's decision to end premium payments on retiree life insurance policies violated ERISA and the terms of the welfare benefit plan. (Doc. 44 at 31–2).³ Specifically, they seek a judgment declaring that they are entitled to permanent retiree life insurance benefits at no cost to them. The Turner Plaintiffs further allege that Allstate breached its fiduciary duty, pursuant to § 502(a)(3), when it failed "to provide Plaintiffs with complete and accurate information about their retiree life insurance benefits." (Doc. 44 at 37). Specifically, the Turner Plaintiffs assert, "Allstate remained silent, omitting relevant information concerning Allstate's reservation of its right to cancel the benefit, when it knew that Plaintiffs and the Class were relying upon Allstate's representations as to retiree life insurance benefits." (Id. ).

In the second case, John E. Klaas and several other named individuals (collectively "Klaas Plaintiffs") also filed a class action complaint against Allstate following the company's decision to cancel retiree life insurance benefits. "The Klaas Plaintiffs are former Allstate home office employees who allege that, as an incentive to retire in 1995, [Allstate] offered [them] a Special Retirement Opportunity ("SRO") that included a promise of permanent life insurance benefits that would be ‘paid up for life’ at no additional cost to them." (Doc. 122 at 5). Moreover, the Klaas Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of "Allstate retirees who accepted Allstate's Special Retirement Opportunity offer to eligible home office employees to take advantage of salary continuation, retiree medical and life insurance benefits, and an enhance d [sic] retirement benefit if they retired from Allstate on November 30, 1995." (Doc. 62 at 3, para. 10). The Klaas Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Allstate are substantially similar to the Turner Plaintiffs’ claims.

Allstate filed motions for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims.⁴ (Docs. 304 and 305). Regarding the Plaintiffs’ § 502(a)(1)(B) claims, "Allstate seeks summary judgment ... because Plaintiffs are not entitled to the vested retiree life insurance benefit they seek to enforce," and, "[u]nder the governing plan documents, Allstate unambiguously stated that the retiree life insurance benefit was not vested and, in fact, could be terminated at any time." (Doc. 304 at 2). Moreover, Allstate moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ § 502(a)(3) breach of fiduciary duty claims "because Plaintiffs’ ... claim[s] [are] barred by the statute of limitations." (Id. ). Alternatively, "Allstate seeks partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ requested equitable surcharge remedy for [their § 502(a)(3)] claim because Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence showing that their requested relief is causally connected to any fiduciary action by Allstate." (Id. at 2–3).

Additionally, Allstate moves for summary judgment against individually named Turner Plaintiffs Vernon Bentley, Donald Kerr, Alberta Nixon, Kathy Shepherd, Herbert Vidales, Suzanne Willingham, and Herb Wofford on their individual § 502(a)(3) breach of fiduciary duty claims. Allstate moves for summary judgment against individually named Klaas Plaintiff Terry Mountford on his individual § 502(a)(3) claim.

The Court has carefully reviewed the applicable law and considered the entire record. For the reasons that follow, Allstate's motions for summary judgment against both the Turner and Klaas Plaintiffs are due to be GRANTED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure , a reviewing court shall grant a motion for "summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence demonstrating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law." Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments , 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Non-movants must support their assertions "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).

In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale , 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient...