Turner v. Enzler

236 F.Supp.3d 121

Betty Jean TURNER, Plaintiff,

v.John ENZLER et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14–1093 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed February 21, 2017

Betty Jean Turner, College Park, MD, pro se.

Samir Alfonso Aguirre, Tina M. Maiolo, Melissa E. Hoppmeyer, Carr Maloney PC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

What remains of this civil action are Plaintiff Betty Jean Turner's claims of age and race discrimination against her former employer, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington ("Catholic Charities").¹ The claims arose from Plaintiff's termination in May 2014. The parties have completed discovery, and Defendant has moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, ECF No. 54. Plaintiff has opposed the motion, ECF No. 64, and Defendant has replied, ECF No. 66. The Court finds from the summary judgment record that Defendant has established legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination, which Plaintiff has not sufficiently rebutted. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendant for the reasons explained below.

II. BACKGROUND

On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff, an African American woman over the age of 40, was hired as a Community Support Specialist ("CSS") with the Catholic Charities' Community Companions Program at the Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy Institute. Def.s' Statement of Material Facts Not Genuinely in Dispute ("Def.'s Facts") ¶ 1, ECF No. 54 pp. 5–7; Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. at 2. As a CSS, Plaintiff was responsible for the supervision and care of special needs children. Def.'s Facts ¶ 4. Plaintiff's employment was at-will and contingent upon her completion of a 90–day probationary period, id . ¶ 3, which "was scheduled to end on or about April 15, 2014." Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts in Genuine Dispute ("Pl.'s Facts") ¶ 1, ECF No. 64.

On April 8, 2014, two teenagers—a 16-year-old-boy and a 15-year-old girl—were in Plaintiff's care. Def.'s Facts ¶ 5; Pl.'s Facts ¶ 3.² Plaintiff left the girl in a classroom while she escorted the boy to the bathroom. Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 5–6. The parties disagree on whether the girl was left alone. See Def.'s Facts ¶ 7 ("The female child for which Ms. Turner had sole responsibility was left alone.") (citing incident reports); cf. Pl.'s Facts ¶ 3 ("Plaintiff advised and asked the other Community Support Specialists in the room if she may leave the female student ... in her care, with them, so that she may properly supervise a bathroom trip. Each ... responded with ok, sure ... before she left the female student in their care."). Regardless, Administrative Coordinator Brenda Smallwood and CSS Kim Jorden "found the female child asleep on the classroom floor." Def.'s Facts ¶ 10. Smallwood "immediately called" Plaintiff's team leader, Jenna Craig, who with Smallwood, reported the incident to Plaintiff's supervisor, Senior Program Manager Daniel Hammond. Def.'s Facts ¶ 10; see Pl.'s Facts, Ex. 1 (job offer letter identifying Hammond as the individual to whom Plaintiff was to report).

Because leaving a child alone violated the Program's Policy on Abuse and Neglect, see Def.'s Ex. J, ECF No. 54–10, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave pending the outcome of a neglect investigation by the Quality Assurance Department, which began on April 9, 2014. Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 9, 11–12; see Apr. 15, 2014 Memorandum ("Tasker Memo"), Def.'s Ex. I, ECF No. 54–9. Following her investigation of the incident, Deputy Director Sequaya Tasker concluded:

Based on the facts provided through face to face interviews, email statements, documents collected, and written statements[,] the allegation of neglect is substantiated in regard to Betty Jean Turner. The evidence supports that Ms. Turner left K.S. in classroom B unattended. K.S. is a 15 year old ... diagnosed with Severe MR and Autism. K.S. is non-verbal and communicates by pulling staff toward objects she desires.

Tasker Memo at 5. Tasker referred Plaintiff "to administration for disposition." Id . In an e-mail to Tasker during the investigation of Plaintiff, Program Manager Hammond conveyed "more information regarding the incitement of alleged abuse of K.S. by Ms. Betty Turner." Apr. 11, 2014 e-mail, Def.'s Ex. M, ECF No. 54–13. Hammond wrote:

On 4/10/2014, I was contacted by [an individual] of Hebron Associates, K.S.'s house manager at her home. She informed me that the staff from Hebron reported on more than one occasion K.S. appeared unclean when they arrived at 6:00 p.m. to pick her up from the program. On one specific occasion, her evening staff member ... noticed that K.S. had not been changed and had a soiled diaper. When she spoke to Ms. Turner, who was assigned to K.S. that day, Ms. Turner stated that she did not notice, and asked the Hebron staff member to change her.

Id . Hammond wrote further that he had informed the individuals that "Hebron staff should not be directed to care for one of our participants" and that "K.S. will be under the care of another staff member moving forward." Id .

On May 8, 2014, following an e-mail discussion between Human Resources staff and the Executive Director of the Kennedy Institute, see Def.'s Ex. K, ECF No. 54–11, Defendant issued a "Notice of Final Decision" over Hammond's signature, immediately terminating Plaintiff's employment "for failure to comply with the Agency's policy and procedure on Abuse and Neglect." Def.'s Ex. O, ECF No. 54–15. The Notice cited the neglect finding from the April 8, 2014 incident and concluded that alone provided "sufficient evidence to warrant the termination of [Plaintiff's] employment." Id . According to Hammond, "Human resources" makes the ultimate decision to terminate an employee. Hammond Dep. at 49–50, ECF No. 54–14.

In a letter to Human Resources Director Michele Sparks dated May 14, 2014, "RE: Unfair Discriminatory Termination," Plaintiff stated that the allegation of neglect was false, and she requested "to review the determination report again" and to be reinstated. Pl.'s May 14 Letter at 1, Def.'s Ex. P, ECF No. 54–16. Plaintiff purported to lodge charges of "discriminatory action by the Kennedy Institute" and "ask[ed] if the following considerations were made prior to the determination of the Quality Assurance team upholding the allegation and subsequent termination." Id . at 1. Plaintiff enumerated six "considerations," which consisted of her denials that K.S. was left lying in an unsafe position and that K.S. was left alone in the classroom. Plaintiff posited that "the staff and co-workers" had "ulterior motives" and had singled her out because: (1) she "felt obligated to report an abuse allegation [concerning a current employee] witnessed several months earlier which [she] found was not kept totally confidential and anonymous as [she] had asked"; (2) she had applied for several positions, "one being a Teacher, Group Leader, and a Director position at the Kennedy Institute"; and (3) "[t]he staff['s] motives ... seem more causal for the allegation and termination than the incident itself." Pl.'s May 14 Letter at 3. Plaintiff concluded: "This appears to be nothing more than malicious intent, discriminatory, and punitive in nature, prima facie." Id .

In a letter dated May 23, 2014, Senior Human Resources Manager Chris Waterman, acting in Sparks' absence due to a scheduled leave, replied to Plaintiff as follows: "After reading the letters addressed to Ms. Vanessa Stewart on May 8, 2014, and Dr. Michele Sparks on May 14, 2014, at your request, I thoroughly reviewed the findings completed by the Quality Assurance Department resulting from an incident occurring on April 8, 2014. After careful consideration, Catholic Charities will not be reinstating your employment." Def.'s Ex. Q, ECF No. 54–17.

Plaintiff filed this civil action on June 27, 2014, claiming that she was fired after receiving a false allegation of neglect, but she had alleged no facts to support a discrimination claim. See Jun. 11, 2015 Mem. Op. at 1, ECF No. 16. The Court subsequently construed Plaintiff's pro se filings liberally, deemed her motion containing allegations of race and age discrimination to be an amended complaint, and denied Defendant's motion to dismiss "premised solely on the factually deficient initial complaint."³ Id . at 2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material" fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The inquiry under Rule 56 is essentially "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The principal purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue that is suitable for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials but must...