Turner v. Johnson

JUAN IBN-DON MUMIT TURNER, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 17-541 (PGS) (TJB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

October 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Juan Ibn-Don Mumit Turner ("Plaintiff" or "Turner") is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the New Jersey State Prison ("NJSP") in Trenton, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently pending before this Court is Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint. (See ECF 91). Also pending before this Court is Defendants Gerard Doran and Steven Johnson's (collectively the "Moving Defendants") motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (See ECF 92). Furthermore, Plaintiff has filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Moving Defendants. (See ECF 93).

For the following reasons, the second amended complaint will be permitted to proceed in part. Moving Defendants motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied without prejudice.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in January, 2017. (See ECF 1). The original complaint asserted an access to courts claim against the Moving Defendants which was permitted to proceed past screening.¹ At the time, this Court noted "[t]he allegations of the Complaint center around Plaintiff's assertions that the prison's delay in delivering his legal mail, which included an order denying his federal habeas petition, resulted in his loss of opportunity to appeal the habeas denial." (See id. at 2).

On December 31, 2017, Moving Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. (See ECF 28). Plaintiff then filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss as well as a cross-motion to amend his complaint. (See ECF 31). In the cross-motion to amend, Plaintiff asserted claims against more defendants as well as a claim for retaliation. This Court heard argument on these two motions on April 30, 2018. (See ECF 39 & 40). Ultimately, this Court denied Moving Defendants motion to dismiss, granted Plaintiff's cross-motion to amend, but only permitted Plaintiff's access to courts claim to proceed against the Moving Defendants. (See ECF 45). Thus, only the Moving Defendants remained as Defendants in this case at that time.

On July 3, 2018, Moving Defendants answered the amended complaint. (See ECF 52). The matter than moved into discovery before Magistrate Judge Bongiovanni. On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his amended complaint. (See ECF 74). The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Bongiovanni who granted the motion, giving Plaintiff additional time to file a second amended complaint. (See ECF 82).

On February 18, 2020, this Court received Plaintiff's second amended complaint. (See ECF 91). In addition to naming the Moving Defendants, the second amended complaint names several other corrections officials as defendants. In addition to asserting an access to court claim, the second amended complaint raises claims of retaliation, confiscation of property, openinglegal mail and equal protection. Additionally, the second amended complaint appears to assert state law claims related to violations of the New Jersey Administrative Code.

Moving Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint that Plaintiff opposes. (See ECF 92 & 95). Additionally, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his claim that Moving Defendants are liable to him on his access to courts claim that Moving Defendants oppose. (See ECF 93 & 96).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Screening Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Dismiss

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed.² See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.

If the moving party meets its threshold burden, the opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth types of evidence on which nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion that genuine issues of material fact exist). "[U]nsupported allegations ... and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment." Schoch v. First Fid.Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006) ("To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party needs to show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.").

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Screening Second Amended Complaint

Prior to analyzing the two pending motions, this Court must first screen the second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

i. Violation of New Jersey Administrative Code Title 10A

Plaintiff alludes to violations of New Jersey's Administrative Code Title 10A in his second amended complaint against numerous defendants. Nevertheless, as this Court noted in screening Plaintiff's previous amended complaint:

The portions of the administrative code cited by Plaintiff do not explicitly provide for a private cause of action. When a statute does not expressly provide a private right of action, New Jersey courts "have been

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