Turner v. Long

TIMOTHY M. TURNER, Plaintiff, v. HELEN R. LONG, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-P813-CHB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

May 24, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION*** *** *** ***

Plaintiff Timothy M. Turner filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, proceeding in forma pauperis. The complaint is now before the Court for initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will allow some of Plaintiff's claims to proceed and dismiss other claims.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff was an inmate at the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex (LLCC) at the time pertinent to the complaint. [R. 1, p. 1] He sues the following Defendants in their individual and official capacities: LLCC Unit Administrators Helen R. Long and Benjamin Harlan; Internal Affairs Lt. Berton Bare; and Warden Scott Jordan. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff states that on June 29, 2020, he was housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) where he was required to wear paper boxer shorts. Id. at 5. After four days in the same boxers, the boxers "had a foul odor and smelling [sic] of urine and were stained as well as falling apart." Id. Plaintiff informed Defendants Long and Harlan about the boxers, and they told him that boxers in his size, XXX-large, were on back order. Id. He states Defendant Long repeatedly told him that he could wear a pair of size large boxers. Id. Plaintiff states that he weighed 350 pounds and could not wear a size large and that he "asked respectfully and repeatedly throughout the month . . . that he be allowed to wear his personal boxer's [sic]." Id. He reports that as of July 15, 2020, he had spent twenty-two days "begging and pleading daily for relief" and that "the boxer's [sic] now had mold [in] them, urine and feces stains, an awful foul odor and falling [sic] apart beyond wearing." Id.

Plaintiff asserts that on July 15, 2020, he was told that wearing the size large boxers was his only option. Id. He reports that he attempted to follow the request so that he would not be given a write-up for failing to obey an order. Id. He states that he "could not pull them up all the way for fear of them busting apart." Id. He states that a general inspector was present and told Plaintiff that he had asked if he could give Plaintiff a pair of his boxers from his property but he "was told no by the captain's office." Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff asserts that he walked down the hall to his room while other inmates heckled him and made sexually explicit comments. Id. He states that when her returned to his cell the boxers came apart at the seam. Id. at 5-6. He states, "The plaintiff was made to wear them through the night with his buttocks showing naked, with a cellmate and also the cell had a camera in it for others to view!" Id. at 6. According to the complaint, the next morning Plaintiff informed Defendant Harlan that his boxers were ripped and pleaded with him to allow him to wear a pair of his own boxers until the paper boxers in his size arrived. Id. He states, "Again plaintiff is told 'No' and the only comment that followed from U/A Harlan's mouth were 'Nice.'" Id. (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff also reports that on July 16, 2020, he was allowed to go to Recreation for one hour. Id. He states that "for the most part he kept on a suicide smock as that is what they make all 'RHU' inmates wear" but that he was "hot and sweaty at REC" and took his suicide smock off so that he could exercise. Id. He reports that Defendant Bare was present and witnessedPlaintiff "again getting heckled and made fun of with comments of a sexual nature." Id. He states that he asked Defendant Bare if he could help him by filing a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) complaint and told him that "he shouldn't be made to wear . . . large paper boxers that don't fit and show pure nudity of plaintiff's body including his bare buttocks and genitals." Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bare responded that it was "not a PREA and 'looks like your ass [is] out luck!'" Id. Plaintiff states, "When Lt. Bare made this comment, several of the inmates laughed and began saying obscene statements and comments." Id. He reports that "[d]ue to the noise level" a non-defendant female staff member arrived. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges that he explained the situation to her and asked her "to please help and take him back to his cell." Id. at 7. He further states that "[t]hrough tear's [sic] he begged [her] to please fix all this." Id. The staff member then left the recreation area and returned within fifteen minutes to give Plaintiff a pair of his personal boxers from Plaintiff's property. Id.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff states that Defendant Long, Harlan, and Bare, "acting alone or in conspiracy with each other," violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 8.

Plaintiff also states that Defendants Long, Harlan, and Jordan, "acting alone or in complicity," violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they made him wear "a suicide smock, paper boxer's [sic], eat with a paper spoon, and suicide tray." Id. He states that a person is "placed in the suicide attire for usually 72 hours or 3 days" to determine if he is no longer a harm to himself or others and then moved to "regular seg[regation] or RHU" where the inmate is allowed "1 pair of boxer's [sic] 'cloth,' 1 pair of RHU socks, 1 pair RHU top and bottom to be reinstated." Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims that he was kept in RHU for the entirety of his stay at LLCC, but he did not need these precautions because "Plaintiff never attempted suicide, talkedabout suicide nor did the plaintiff act homicidal, attempt homicide or speak of harming another person." Id. He further states,

By making one live as a person who is contemplating suicide or homicide making that individual wear outfit suicide smock, not for 72 hours but for entirety of his or her stay in RHU takes a toll on a normal persons [sic] emotions and mindset. Plaintiff is still currently housed in RHU pending transfer.¹

Id. He states that this treatment has caused him "to become severely depressed, feeling hopeless and sad" and led to an "increase of psych medications and counseling needed where as such were not needed before." Id.

Plaintiff also states that Defendant Bare violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when he

made statements to Michael Carper in front of several inmates that the plaintiff was a confidential informant; thus placing plaintiffs [sic] life in population at risk for serious bodily harm or death; and by doing so has caused plaintiff to be severely depressed, fear of his life and without property.

Id. at 10. He asserts that Defendant Bare's actions "caused plaintiff to be severly [sic] depressed, [and] fear for his life," and that he "in fact was assaulted, and then was so scared he in fact had to request protective custody, therefore being deprived of his normal property due to [Defendant] Bare's actions." Id. Plaintiff also states that Defendant Bare violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he denied Plaintiff a PREA investigation. Id.

Plaintiff also alleges violations of Kentucky Constitution Section 17 and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) §§ 71.020, 71.040, 71.060, and 441.025. Id. at 10-13.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 14.

II. STANDARD

When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). "But the district court need not accept a 'bare assertion of legal conclusions.'" Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Further, while this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe,951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), "[o]ur duty to be 'less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations." McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Official-capacity claims

"[O]fficial-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New...