Turner v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs

RAUSHI TEAREZ TURNER, an individual, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;OKLAHOMA COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, an Oklahoma governmental agency;SHERIFF JOHN WHETSEL, an individual; STEPHEN SCOTT, an individual, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 19-6092

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

March 2, 2020

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00036-SLP)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT^*

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

The district court dismissed Raushi Turner's complaint, which alleged constitutional deprivations when he was a pretrial detainee at the Oklahoma CountyDetention Center ("OCDC"). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

"In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party . . . ." Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. I.B. v. Woodard, 139 S. Ct. 2616 (2019).

In his third amended complaint, Mr. Turner alleged the following:

On October 28, 2015, he argued and fought with detainee Demetrius Stamps. Housing Monitor ("HM") Stephen Scott was supervising the detainees from a bubble station. He watched the altercation but did not intervene until the two detainees struck each other. Then HM Scott banged on the window. Mr. Turner approached the window and said Mr. Stamps was threatening to kill him. Mr. Turner walked away from Mr. Stamps, who yelled that he was going to kill Mr. Turner. Mr. Stamps went back to his cell, locked the door, and made a knife.

About 30 minutes later, a nurse unlocked Mr. Stamps's cell, releasing him back into the general population. He tried to corner Mr. Turner, shouting that he was going to stab him. HM Scott noticed Mr. Stamps cornering Mr. Turner, and called for an officer. The officer arrived and ordered Mr. Stamps to submit to being handcuffed, but he refused. Mr. Stamps chased Mr. Turner and stabbed him in the back and leg.

B. Procedural History

Mr. Turner filed suit in Oklahoma state court against HM Scott and then-Sheriff Whetsel in their individual capacities. He sued them for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. He also named the OCDC and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Oklahoma ("Board"). The Board removed the action to federal court.

Mr. Turner alleged HM Scott failed to protect him from Mr. Stamps's attack by not addressing his threats to stab Mr. Turner and not alerting other OCDC staff of the first altercation.

As to Sheriff Whetsel, Mr. Turner relied on (1) a 2008 Department of Justice ("DOJ") report finding that OCDC conditions permitted inmate-on-inmate violence, and (2) a 2009 Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") in which Sheriff Whetsel and others "agree[d] to improve the safety of the jail including increased supervision to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence and adequate training of jail staff." R. Vol. II, at 209 n.5. The MOU expired before the October 2015 incident alleged here. Mr. Turner asserted Sheriff Whetsel failed to protect him and failed to train OCDC staff for effective surveillance.

The defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds. The federal district court dismissed (1) the Board on statute-of-limitation grounds; (2) the OCDC as not amenable to suit; (3) the failure-to-protect claim against HM Scott for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and qualified immunity; (4) the supervisory liability claimsagainst Sheriff Whetsel for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and qualified immunity; and (5) the state-law claims as untimely.

Mr. Turner appeals pro se, arguing that the district court erred in holding that he (1) failed to state a failure-to-protect claim against HM Scott, (2) failed to state supervisory liability claims of failure to protect and failure to train against former Sheriff Whetsel, and (3) was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations on his state law claim. He has not challenged the district court's dismissal of the OCDC, and he does not contest dismissal of the Board on statute of limitations grounds.¹

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) due to qualified immunity. At the motion to dismiss stage, it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for objective legal reasonableness." Doe, 912 F.3d at 1288 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

"Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, this court has repeatedlyinsisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Deliberate Indifference

"A prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Because Mr. Turner's claims arose when he was a pretrial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs. See Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 991 (10th Cir. 2019). "In evaluating such Fourteenth Amendment claims, we apply an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The "[d]eliberate indifference [standard] has objective and subjective components." Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). "The objective component of deliberate indifference is met if the harm suffered rises to a level sufficiently serious to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause." Burke, 935 F.3d at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the subjective component, the plaintiff must "show the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from harm, including harm caused by other prisoners. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). "To prevail on a failure to protect claim, an inmate must show (1) that the conditions of his incarceration present an objective substantial risk of serious harm and (2) prison officials hadsubjective knowledge of the risk of harm, in other words, an official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).

C. Qualified Immunity

"Individual defendants named in a § 1983 action may raise a defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law." Burke, 935 F.3d at 1001-02 (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity also applies to supervisory liability in § 1983 cases. See Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant was entitled to qualified immunity for claims based on his supervisory conduct). "Accordingly, when a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must dismiss the action unless the plaintiff shows that (1) the defendant violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." A.N. ex rel. Ponder v. Syling, 928 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). "We may decide which of these two prongs to address first, and need not address both." Estate of Redd ex. rel Redd v. Love, 848 F.3d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 2017). We resolve the qualified immunity issue here by addressing only the first prong—whether either HM Scott or Sheriff Whetsel violated Mr. Turner's constitutional rights.

D. Analysis

1. Housing Monitor Scott

Mr. Turner suggests two ways that HM Scott failed to protect him: (1) he did not adequately assess Mr. Turner's report or Mr. Stamps's yelling that Mr. Stamps was threatening to kill him, and (2) he did not report the threats to other OCDC guards. Mr. Turner's allegations do not establish a violation under the subjective element of deliberate indifference.

"The unfortunate reality is that threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm." Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). "[S]ubjective awareness of only some risk of harm to a prisoner is insufficient for a deliberate-indifference claim." Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1238. Rather, "officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a strong likelihood of injury, not a mere possibility." Id. at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to the initial altercation, Mr. Turner did not allege HM Scott knew Mr. Stamps presented a substantial risk of harm or that he informed HM Scott as to how or why Mr. Stamps would kill him. See Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating court should consider "background information that might inform prison officials of obvious risks to [detainee]" (internal quotation marks omitted)). He did not allege facts to support an inference that HM Scott knew Mr. Stamps could obtain a weapon. Hedid not claim that he asked to be separated from Mr. Stamps. Rather, he asserted that he "walked away from Stamps," R. Vol. I, at 303, who went to his locked cell.

Mr. Turner contends that HM Scott's banging on the window showed that he knew Mr. Turner was at a substantial risk of...