Turpin v. McGinley, 1:17-cv-02226

TERRELL TURPIN, Plaintiff v. THOMAS McGINLEY, et al., Defendants

No. 1:17-cv-02226

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 27, 2018

(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Terrell Turpin ("Turpin")'s complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), and motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Turpin's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, deny his motion to appoint counsel without prejudice, and dismiss the complaint in part and permit Turpin leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 5, 2017, Turpin, an inmate presently confined at the Somerset State Correctional Institution in Somerset, Pennsylvania, initiated a pro se civil action against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 5, 2017. (Doc. No. 1.) Named as Defendants are several employees from the State Correctional Institution at Coal Township ("SCI-Coal"): Superintendent McGinley ("McGinley"), correctional officers Kelly, Henning, Stout, and Corrections Health Care Administrator Marritt-Scully ("Marritt-Scully"). (Id.) The allegations contained in the complaint stem from alleged incidents that occurred while Turpin was housed at SCI-Coal. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that while he was handcuffed behind the back, Kelly pushed him down the steps in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") of SCI-Coal. (Id.) From a grievance attached to Plaintiff's complaint, it appears that this incident allegedly took place on July 28, 2017. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff alleges that this conduct was "willfully, religiously [and] sudisticly (sic) done," and that it constitutes retaliation. (Id. at 2-3.) Next, Plaintiff alleges that Stout witnessed Kelly push Plaintiff down the steps and that Stout "had prior knowledge that [] Kelly was [going to] push [Plaintiff] down the steps" because he was retaliating against Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also avers that Henning witnessed Kelly push him down the steps, and that Henning "conspired with the assault that [] Kelly carried out." (Id. at 6.)

With regard to Marritt-Scully, Plaintiff alleges that she failed to provide him with proper medical treatment and denied him copies of his sick calls, which he had requested. (Id. at 3.) While the complaint is silent as to what medical treatment Plaintiff was allegedly denied, a review of the grievances attached to the complaint indicates that Plaintiff asserts that on one occasion, he did not receive Tylenol when he requested it. (Id. at 21-23.) Plaintiff also vaguely alleges that other medical staff denied him proper medical attention but fails to elaborate on this allegation. (Id. at 3.)

Finally, as to McGinley, Plaintiff claims that McGinley "failed to take action [and] rectify [his] complaints." (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he wrote "multiple request slips" informing McGinley that he was being retaliated against, but that McGinley took no action. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff also alleges that McGinley retaliated against him when McGinley replied to one of Plaintiff's requests concerning the step incident and stated that the video surveillance footage demonstrates that Plaintiff purposefully fell down the steps. (Id. at 7.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Screening and Dismissal of Prisoner Complaints

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal district courts must "review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of agovernmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must dismiss the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). District courts have a similar screening obligation with respect to actions filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis and prisoners challenging prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) ("[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) ("The Court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.").

In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and 1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, Civ. No. 15-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) ("The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, "a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that its claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do notpermit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the court accepts as true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the court must not accept legal conclusions as true, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

Based on this standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court must take when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). In addition, in the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district court must be mindful that a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Standard

Plaintiff has asserted claims against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) In order to state a viable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that saidconduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990); Richardson v. Min Sec Cos., Civ. No. 08-1312, 2008 WL 5412866, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2008).

Moreover, in order for a § 1983 claim to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the defendant was personally involved in the act or acts that the plaintiff claims violated his rights. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Solan v. Ranck, 326 F. App'x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2009). Therefore, supervisors cannot be liable under § 1983 under the traditional standard of respondeat superior. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 128. Instead, there are two theories of supervisory liability that are applicable to § 1983 claims: (1) "a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations"; and (2) policymakers may also be liable under § 1983 "if it is shown that such defendants, 'with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.'" A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims are Barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff has brought suit against all named Defendants in their official capacities. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) A state official sued in his or her official capacity is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983 when a plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as the Supreme Court has not construed § 1983 as an abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of StatePolice, 491 U.S. 58, 63-71 (1989). Will precludes actions for damages against state officials acting in their official capacities. Id. at 63-71. However, the state's immunity is not shared by state officers to the extent that the suit seeks...