Twin Sisters Gun Club v. Emlen

TWIN SISTERS GUN CLUB, an Unincorporated Association, and THOMAS BOCK, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM F. EMLEN, MINH C. TRAN, COUNTY OF SOLANO, and DOES 1-10, Defendant.

No. 2:17-cv-01526-MCE-GGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 14, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Thomas Bock and Twin Sisters Gun Club brought this suit against Solano County, William F. Emlen, Solano County's Director of Resource Management, and Minh C. Tran, County Counsel for Napa County ("Defendants" when referred to collectively) alleging due process violations arising from Defendants' denial of Plaintiffs' application for a business license for the Twin Sisters Gun Club. Plaintiffs seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as peremptory writs of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085 and 1094.5. Plaintiffs' writ claims ask this Court to set aside adverse decisions regarding Plaintiffs' business license application and to reconsider their application in accordance with relevant sections of the Solano County Code.

/// Defendants now move to dismiss the suit on three grounds pursuant to both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).¹ First, they contend that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state mandamus claims. Second, Defendants argue Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1983. Finally, they argue that Defendants Tran and Emlen are entitled to either quasi-judicial or qualified immunity.²

BACKGROUND

The land at issue in this proceeding is a 160-acre parcel in a rural part of Solano County (the "Property"). Plaintiff Thomas Bock owns an interest in the Property, which has allegedly been used since at least 1951 for, among other things, target shooting. A portion of the Property has historically been referred to as Twin Sisters Park and Twin Sisters Gun Club, the latter of which is also a Plaintiff (the "Gun Club"). Although the Property is rural, population growth in the county has resulted in an increase in the number of individuals residing in relatively close proximity to the Property.

In or around 2011, Defendant Solano County (the "County") allegedly received noise complaints regarding the Property. After receiving additional noise-related complaints in 2015, County allegedly began a formal investigation of allegations that the Gun Club was operating without permits, and in October of 2015, concluded that the Gun Club was a legal non-conforming use.³ It is unclear who allegedly made this determination, but by noting that Defendant William Emlen, the County's Director of Resource Management, had power under Solano County Code § 28.118(a) to delegateauthority to make non-conforming use decisions and that Emlen delegated such authority to Planning Manager Michael Yankovich. Plaintiffs appear to suggest that if the determination was not in fact made by Emlen, it was made by Yankovich with Emlen's knowledge and approval. Pls.' Comp. at ¶¶ 18-19.

After this alleged initial non-conforming use determination, someone from the County Sheriff's Office allegedly instructed Plaintiff Bock to obtain a business license for the Gun Club, and in January 2016, Plaintiff Bock submitted an application. The basis for the application, according to Plaintiffs, was the alleged determination made by Defendant County in October of 2015 that the Gun Club was a legal non-conforming use.

On June 21, 2016, Plaintiff Bock received a letter from the County stating that he could not get a business license unless he provided evidence showing that the shooting range had been continuously operated since the non-conformity began. The letter also stated that a future determination of whether a non-conforming use existed would depend on whether the shooting range's scope of operations was currently the same as when it began. According to Plaintiffs, the Property first began operating as a shooting range in 1951 and the date the non-conformity began (i.e., the date a permit became required to operate the shooting range) was December 30, 1958.

Plaintiffs claim they disputed the County's position that the outcome of a non-conforming use determination turned on the scope of operations, but nonetheless stated they were open to working with the County to come to an agreement as to what the scope of operations should be going forward. Pls.' Comp. at ¶¶ 32-33. According to Plaintiffs, however, the Department of Resource Management chose not to work with Plaintiffs on determining what an appropriate scope for the operation would be and instead simply denied their business license application on August 26, 2016. Id. at 33. Defendant Emlen signed the denial. According to Plaintiffs, the reason the County gave for its denial was that Plaintiff Bock had failed to meet his evidentiary burden of proving the prior existence of a non-conforming use and that such use was still within the samescope as it had been when the non-conforming use began. The County then demanded that the Gun Club cease its operations. The Gun Club complied and has remained effectively closed ever since.

Although Solano County Code § 28.114(g) requires that a zoning clearance take place prior to issuance of a business license, Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not appear to dispute, that Defendant County never completed that clearance. Pls.' Comp. at ¶ 25; Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dism, ECF No. 9-1, 3:5-7.

Plaintiff Bock timely appealed the denial on September 12, 2016. Defendant Minh C. Tran, County Counsel of Napa, acted as a hearing officer and conducted the appeal hearing ("Hearing"). At the Hearing, Defendant County was represented by Deputy County Counsel Davina Smith. In her brief to Defendant Tran, Smith claimed that the Gun Club's non-conforming use status had been abandoned. During the Hearing, she also claimed that the earlier non-conforming use determination relied on by Plaintiffs was invalid because it had not been made by Defendant Emlen. Although it is not entirely clear from the record, Plaintiffs appear to suggest that to support her contention Smith introduced a declaration from Yankovich. Pls.' Comp. at ¶¶ 49-50. Plaintiffs note, however, that Yankovich was not available for examination at the Hearing. They also allege that his declaration does not address one way or the other whether Defendant Emlen was involved in the initial alleged non-conforming use determination, and Plaintiffs contend that Emlen was in fact involved. Smith also disputed whether a prior non-conforming use determination had been made at all. Ultimately, Defendant Tran issued a written order on April 24, 2017, upholding the denial of the business license applications. The order, according to Plaintiffs, did not address the evidence Plaintiffs had submitted concerning the alleged earlier non-conforming use determination made by Defendants in October 2015.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed their instant complaint on July 21, 2017, asserting three causes of action: (1) civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violations of California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5; and (3) violations of California Code of CivilProcedure § 1085. The first two causes of action named the County, Emlen, and Tran as defendants. Plaintiffs' last claim, however, was asserted only against the County and Emlen. Plaintiffs contend this Court has federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Defendants disagree, arguing that this Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims on grounds that federal courts either cannot assert jurisdiction over state law mandamus claims, or, at the very least, should, in their discretion, decline to assert jurisdiction over such claims. Accordingly, Defendants move to dismiss the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a § 1983 claim as to all three defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). Finally, as to both Emlen and Tran, Defendants contend they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, or, alternatively, qualified immunity. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Defendant Tran and DENIED as to Defendants County of Solano and Emlen.

STANDARD

A. Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at any point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua sponte.Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, "courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a facial attack, and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party's complaint, or may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal...