Twp. of Cranberry v. Spencer

1

Township of Cranberry v. Randy J. Spencer, Appellant

Nos. 568 C.D. 2022, 569 C.D. 2022, 570 C.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

August 30, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: April 28, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, JUDGE

In these consolidated cases, Randy J. Spencer (Spencer) appeals from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County (trial court) dated May 10, 2022, denying Spencer's post-trial motions following the trial court's imposition of the maximum statutorily authorized fines against Spencer for his longstanding violations of ordinances of the Township of Cranberry (Township). Upon review, we affirm the trial court's orders.

I. Background

Spencer owns several parcels of real property in the Township on which he stores a large number of junk vehicles. See Reproduced Record (RR) at 139a^[1](2016 bid proposal for removal of "117 cars, 11 box trailers ["(some with brakes frozen up & flat tires)"], 7 motorhomes, [and] 8 travel trailers . . .").^[2] The Township has been trying for over a quarter century to induce Spencer to remove the junk vehicles. See, e.g., id. at 135a (2016 letter from Spencer to the Township acknowledging the Township's expenditure of "large amounts of funds for legal fees, costs and expenses over the past 20 years" and asserting that "Spencer has likewise expended large amounts of funds for legal fees . . ."). Spencer paid a fine for violations in 2007. See id. at 143a-44a (2018 letter from Spencer to the Township proposing a resolution that would include reimbursement by the Township for the 2007 fine). However, the junk vehicles remained on the properties thereafter.

In 2019, the Township's zoning officer issued citations to Spencer for zoning violations in operating junkyards on six properties. Twp. of Cranberry v. Spencer, 249 A.3d 9, 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Spencer I). The citation notices informed Spencer that he must remove the junk vehicles or appeal the citations within 30 days. Id. at 12. Spencer did neither. Id.

Thereafter, the Township filed separate civil enforcement complaints regarding the six properties with a magisterial district judge (MDJ), who imposed fines and costs of $609.25 for each property. Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 12. Spencer appealed the MDJ's judgments to the trial court, where the Township filed de novo complaints requesting fines of $500 per day for ongoing violations, totaling $21,200 at that point, plus costs and legal fees. Id. After a joint evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Spencer was improperly using each of the six properties as a junkyard; however, the trial court treated certain contiguous tracts as single properties and thereby reduced the amounts of some of the fines imposed by the MDJ. Id. at 12-14. The trial court filed its order under each of the six case dockets. Id. at 14.

Notwithstanding the trial court's separate entry of judgment on each docket, Spencer filed a single notice of appeal listing all six trial court docket numbers, with a checkmark next to one of them. Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 15. This Court quashed the appeal as to the other five cases. Id. at 18. We cited the Official Note to Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires "separate notices of appeal" where one or more orders are entered resolving issues on more than one docket. Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.^[3] We also relied on our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), in which the Court held that in future cases, "when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. The failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal." Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 17 (quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 977) (additional quotation marks omitted). As we observed in Spencer I, the rule announced in Walker is a "bright-line mandatory instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal." Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 17 (quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77) (additional quotation marks omitted).

As for the sixth notice of appeal in Spencer I, this Court found that the single notice of appeal included an attachment that identified the appeal as relating to a specific docket concerning the tract designated as the Deep Hollow Property. 249 A.3d at 18. Therefore, while we were constrained to quash the other five appeals, we concluded that the appeal concerning the Deep Hollow Property had been properly preserved. Id. at 18-19.

On the merits, Spencer argued, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred in the amount of the fine it imposed, in the absence of evidence concerning the zoning violations. This Court rejected that argument, concluding that once the Township offered evidence of Spencer's failure to appeal the zoning officer's determination, "the trial court possessed discretion to determine the fines." Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 20. Observing that "Spencer has not cooperated with the Township" in resolving the violation and that the trial court had reduced the amount of the fine imposed by the MDJ, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination of the amount of the fine. Id. This Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's order regarding the Deep Hollow Property. Id. at 23.

Despite the finality of this Court's decision in Spencer I, Spencer persisted in failing or refusing to remove the junk vehicles from the properties at issue. Accordingly, in July 2021, the Township filed three new civil enforcement actions^[4] with the MDJ seeking to collect additional fines for the period after our Spencer I decision. Following a hearing in September 2021, the MDJ entered a judgment in the jurisdictional maximum of $12,000 plus costs, a total of $12,331.25, in each of the three cases. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1515(a)(3) (conferring jurisdiction on MDJs over civil actions where the maximum amount sought is $12,000 exclusive of interest and costs).

The violations themselves had been finally adjudicated in Spencer I, and Spencer still had not removed the junk vehicles. Thus, he had no substantive defense against the Township's enforcement complaints. Nonetheless, Spencer chose to appeal the MDJ's judgments to the trial court,^[5] thereby exposing himself to a potential maximum judgment of $500 per day, plus costs and legal fees, for each property, as statutorily authorized by Section 617.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),^[6] an amount far in excess of the MDJ's maximum jurisdiction. See 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a). After a de novo trial, the trial court imposed the maximum fine, which by that time had reached $92,500 in each of the three complaints, for a total of $277,500. The trial court also imposed ongoing daily fines in the maximum amount of $500 in each case.

Spencer filed motions for post-trial relief. The trial court modified its decision to eliminate the ongoing daily fines, but otherwise denied the post-trial motions. These consolidated appeals followed.

II. Issues

In its order dated October 18, 2022, consolidating Spencer's appeals, this Court also questioned the propriety of filing a post-trial motion in a summary appeal, citing Rule 720(D) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D), and observing that Spencer's appeal might be untimely. We directed the parties to address that issue in their briefs, along with the merits of the appeal. In response to this Court's directive to address the timeliness of his appeal, Spencer argues that, notwithstanding the trial court's inaccurate reference to this case as a summary appeal, the Rules of Criminal Procedure are inapplicable here because this is purely a civil proceeding. Hence, Spencer maintains that his appeal within 30 days after the trial court's order denying his post-trial motions was timely. The Township took no position on this issue.

On the merits, Spencer argues that the trial court abused its discretion,^[7]in that the trial judge showed ill will, bias, and hostility (designated collectively as bias hereafter) toward him in various ways, including imposing the maximum statutory fine and not considering Spencer's alleged efforts to mitigate his zoning violations.^[8]

III. Discussion

A. Timeliness of Spencer's Appeal

As described above, Spencer asserts that this case is a purely civil enforcement proceeding, not an appeal of a summary criminal fine. Accordingly, he contends that the post-trial proceedings are governed by civil rules, including the requirement for a post-trial motion and the determination of the applicable appeal deadline. We agree.

Section 617.2(a) of the MPC provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person . . . who . . . has violated . . . the provisions of any zoning ordinance enacted under this act or prior enabling laws shall, upon being found liable therefor in a civil enforcement proceeding commenced by a municipality, pay a judgment of not more than $500^[9] plus all court costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred by a municipality as a result thereof." Borough of Bradford Woods v. Platts, 799 A.2d 984, 989 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (quoting 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a)) (additional quotation marks omitted). The record indicates that this is an appeal in a civil enforcement matter and that the fines at issue were imposed under the authority of Section 617.2(a) of the MPC.

Pursuant to Rule 1007(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions and Proceedings Before Magisterial District Judges, Spencer's de novo appeal to the trial court from the MDJ's judgment was governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil...