Tyson v. Dist. of Columbia

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING DEFENDANT MYRICK'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DENIAL OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Christopher Tyson, has brought suit against Defendants the District of Columbia (“the District”) and Jeannette Myrick^[1] based on his alleged overdetention in the D.C. Jail. This Court previously granted the District's motion to dismiss Tyson's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but granted him leave to file an amended complaint. Tyson v. District of Columbia, No. 20-cv-1450, at 16 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2021) (“Mem. Op.”) (ECF No. 27). That decision also denied Defendant Myrick's motion to dismiss the common law tort claims of false imprisonment and negligence against her. Id. at 5, 7. Tyson subsequently filed an amended complaint. 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 29. The District now moves to dismiss Tyson's claim for municipal liability under § 1983 for failure to state a claim, and Defendant Myrick again moves to dismiss the common law claims against her as well as alternatively moving for reconsideration

of the previous denial of her motion to dismiss. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.' Mot.”), ECF No. 30. The Court finds that Tyson has plausibly alleged sufficient facts to state a claim of false imprisonment (Count 1), negligence (Count 2), and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 3); and will therefore deny Defendants' Motion in its entirety.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[2]

On March 22, 2019, Tyson was sentenced by Judge Demeo of the D.C. Superior Court to serve six months of incarceration with credit for time served. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20-22; see also Ex. 1 of Defs.' Mot. (copy of sentencing order). Judge Demeo's sentencing order directed that at the conclusion of his sentence of incarceration, Tyson should be transferred to the custody of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) for inpatient treatment at the Reentry and Sanctions Center (RSC). 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-24.

The RSC is a residential treatment facility that “provides interventions for defendants with mental health and substance abuse disorders” and has capacity for just over 100 individuals at any given time. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Tyson's Second Amended Complaint alleges that D.C. Superior Court Judges often include inpatient treatment at the RSC as a condition of probation or pre-trial release, but that the RSC's limited capacity has resulted in a backlog of defendants in the D.C. Jail who are awaiting that treatment. Id. ¶¶ 13-17. The thrust of Tyson's complaint is that the District has chosen to respond to this alleged bottleneck by unconstitutionally extending the time that individuals, including himself, remain detained in the District's custody while awaiting a spot in RSC. Id. ¶ 18.

Tyson's own sentence of incarceration was supposed to end on or about April 29, 2019. Id. ¶ 21. The District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”) reached out to CSOSA

on April 24, 2019 to schedule Tyson's pickup and transfer to RSC, letting CSOSA know that Tyson's sentence would expire on April 30, 2019. Id. ¶ 25. DOC reached out to CSOSA a second time to schedule Tyson's transfer on April 26, 2019 and a third time on May 1, 2019, with the final email advising that Tyson's sentence had expired. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. CSOSA responded on May 6, 2019, in a Memo addressed to Defendant Myrick, scheduling Tyson's pickup for May 15. Id. ¶ 29. Two days later, CSOSA rescheduled Tyson's pick up for May 23 in another memo addressed to Myrick. Id. ¶ 30. Tyson was finally released to CSOSA on May 23, 2019, twenty-four days after the expiration of his sentence of incarceration. Id. ¶¶ 32, 35.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards

1. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Brewer v. District of Columbia, 891 F.Supp.2d 126, 130 (D.D.C. 2012). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court should presume that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construe them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). Nevertheless, the complaint must also “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. A

court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, id., nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

2. Motion for Reconsideration

A court may reconsider any interlocutory order under Rule 54(b) “as justice requires.” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted), but “[i]n this District, that abstract phrase is interpreted narrowly.” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 20-mc-00008, 2021 WL 1909777, at *5 (D.D.C. May 12, 2021) (internal quotations omitted). Reconsideration may be appropriate “when a court has ‘patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to consider controlling decisions or data, or where a controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.'” Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Washington, 309 F.R.D. 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 893 F.Supp.2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2012)). The court's discretion under Rule 54(b) is constrained by the principle that “where litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F.Supp.2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted). The burden is on the moving party “to show that reconsideration is appropriate and that harm or injustice would result if reconsideration were denied.” Westrick, 893 F.Supp.2d at 268.

B. Common Law Tort Claims Against Myrick

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendant Myrick appears to be requesting anew that the common law tort claims against her be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as requesting in the alternative that this Court reconsider its prior decision. See Defs.' Mot. at 1 (“Defendants District of Columbia… and Jeanette Myrick move this Court, under Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6),

for dismissal of all claims asserted against them.”) (emphasis added). The sufficiency of the common law claims against Myrick was fully briefed and decided in this Court's prior opinion and the substance of those allegations has not significantly changed since then. Thus, Myrick is barred from raising them in a subsequent Rule 12(b) motion under the consolidation principles of Rule 12(g)(2).^[3] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2); Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass'n, 804 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The procedural bar of Rule 12(g)(2)… covers all motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, regardless of the grounds asserted.”). Any additional arguments Myrick raises were available to her when she filed her first motion. See Candido v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 151, 161 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing a second 12(b)(6) motion where the new argument was not available at the time of the first motion).

Given that Myrick's instant motion principally rehashes the same unmeritorious arguments as her first, this is not one of the exceptional situations in which a discretionary exception to the waiver requirement of 12(g)(2) is warranted. See Campbell-El v. District of Columbia, 881 F.Supp. 42, 43 (D.D.C. 1995) (entertaining a second 12(b)(6) motion because “[t]his is not a case where the Defendants are repeating arguments on which the Court has already substantively ruled”); Sierra v. Hayden, No. CV 16-1804, 2019 WL 3802937, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (noting that while the “plain text” of Rule 12 seemed to bar Plaintiff's complaint, second preliminary motions under 12(b)(6) have been permitted where delay is not a

concern and “the Court has not already ruled on this issue”).^[4] The Court therefore addresses Myrick's motion on the common law claims solely as a motion to reconsider.

1. False Imprisonment

Tyson has, in both complaints, pleaded sufficient facts alleging the two elements of a false imprisonment claim: “(1) the detention or restraint of one against his will, within boundaries fixed by the defendant[s], and (2) the unlawfulness of the restraint.” Jones v. District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-2405, 2019 WL 5690341, at *6 (D.D.C. June 13, 2019) (quoting Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 404 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 1979)); Mem. Op. at 6.

Myrick again disputes this second prong, arguing that the restraint was in fact lawful, but this time attempts to buttress that claim with additional reasoning.^[5] “[M]otions for reconsideration are not vehicles for either reasserting arguments previously raised and rejected by the court or presenting arguments that should have been raised previously with the court.” Lovely-Coley v. District of Columbia, 255 F.Supp.3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2017). Myrick's assertion that she had no authority to release Tyson before CSOSA...