U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Cuesta

208 A.D.3d 821

172 N.Y.S.3d 638 (Mem)

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., appellant,

v.Emperatriz CUESTA, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.

2019–12467

Index No. 605641/16

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—May 26, 2022

August 24, 2022

Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, New York, NY (Brian S. McGrath of counsel), for appellant.

Charles Wallshein, Melville, NY, for respondents.

VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph C. Pastoressa, J.), dated August 21, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Emperatriz Cuesta and Humberto Aponza which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend their answer, and denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On August 10, 2005, the defendant Emperatriz Cuesta executed a note, and, along with the defendant Humberto Aponza (hereinafter together the defendants), a mortgage, both of which were subsequently assigned to the plaintiff. On April 11, 2016, the plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action, alleging that the defendants defaulted by failing to make the monthly payment due on December 1, 2008, and all subsequent payments thereafter. The defendants, pro se, answered the complaint, asserting, inter alia, affirmative defenses and counterclaims.

In September 2016, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants. The defendants, pro se, submitted an affidavit by Cuesta in opposition to the motion, asserting, among other things, that the subject premises was his and his family's primary residence and that the plaintiff failed to comply with CPLR 3408. Thereafter, the Supreme Court held conferences pursuant to CPLR 3408 in January and April 2017.

In April 2018, the defendants, through counsel, moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend their answer to assert additional affirmative defenses. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated August 21, 2019, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for leave to amend their answer to assert additional affirmative defenses, and denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

"A party may amend his or her pleading, or supplement it by setting forth additional or subsequent transactions or occurrences, at any time by leave of court or by stipulation of all parties" ( CPLR 3025[b] ). "A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court's broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed" ( Gitlin v. Chirinkin, 60 A.D.3d 901, 902, 875 N.Y.S.2d 585 ; see Thomson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Socy. of N.Y., Inc., 198 A.D.3d 996, 998, 156 N.Y.S.3d 382 ; Krigsman v. Cyngiel, 130 A.D.3d 786, 786, 14 N.Y.S.3d 94 ). "[L]eave to amend a pleading should be granted where the amendment is neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit, and the delay in seeking amendment does not prejudice or surprise the opposing party" ( DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. David, 147 A.D.3d 1024, 1025, 48 N.Y.S.3d 234 ; see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Dimura, 104 A.D.3d 796, 796–797, 962 N.Y.S.2d 304 ; Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d 220, 226–227, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 ).

Here, the plaintiff has not demonstrated a basis for us to disturb the Supreme Court's exercise of its discretion. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, "defenses waived under CPLR 3211(e) can nevertheless be interposed in an answer amended by leave of court pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) so long as the amendment does not cause the other party prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay" ( Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Konik Indus., Inc., 249 A.D.2d 744, 744, 671 N.Y.S.2d 557 ; see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Aquino, 131 A.D.3d 1186, 1187, 16 N.Y.S.3d 770 ; Onewest, F.S.B. v. Goddard, 131 A.D.3d 1028, 1028, 17 N.Y.S.3d 142 ).

The plaintiff's contention that the defendants' motion was supported by an inadequate affidavit of merit also fails. "No evidentiary showing of merit is required under CPLR 3025(b)" ( Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d at 229, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 ; see Derago v. Ko, 189 A.D.3d 1352, 1354, 134 N.Y.S.3d 801 ). "[A] court shall not examine the legal sufficiency or merits of a pleading unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt" ( United Fairness, Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 113 A.D.3d 754, 755, 979 N.Y.S.2d 365 ; see Derago v. Ko, 189 A.D.3d at 1354, 134 N.Y.S.3d 801 ). "In reviewing a motion for leave to amend a complaint, ‘[t]he court need only determine whether the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient to state a cause of action or defense, or is patently devoid of merit’ " ( Carter v. Nouveau Indus., Inc., 187 A.D.3d 702, 704–705, 131 N.Y.S.3d 687, quoting Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d at 229, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 ). Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants' proposed amended answer was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see Onewest Bank, FSB v. N & R Family Trust, 200...