U.S. Bank Tr. v. Healey

315 A.3d 1112

224 Conn.App. 867

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A.

v.Gregg P. HEALEY et al.

(AC 45761)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 8, 2024

Officially Released April 23, 2024

Gregg P. Healey, self-represented, with whom, on the brief, were Bridgette G. Healey, self-represented, and Claire A. Healey, self-represented, the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Vincent J. Averaimo, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Elgo, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

SEELEY, J.

₈₆₈The defendants Gregg P. Healey, Bridgette G. Healey, and Claire A. Healey appeal, challenging the trial court’s denial of their motion to open and dismiss the judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust.¹ On appeal, the ₈₆₉defendants claim that the judgment of possession, although valid when originally rendered, is no longer valid as a result of the fact that Connor Healey (Connor),² the son of Gregg P. Healey and Bridgette G. Healey, who also resides at the premises, has since turned eighteen years old and was never served with a notice to quit. As a result, the defendants claim that the court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the judgment of possession and that the judgment, therefore, should have been dismissed. We conclude that the defendants are not aggrieved by the denial of their motion to open and dismiss and, accordingly, dismiss their appeal.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendants’ appeal. This case has a lengthy procedural history, largely due to the numerous motions and appeals filed by the defendants. This case originated in 2010 as a foreclosure action against Gregg P. Healey and Bridgette G. Healey after they defaulted on a note secured by a mortgage on real property located at 61 East Meadow Road in Wilton.³ After several years ₈₇₀of litigation, a judgment of strict foreclosure was rendered in 2016. The defendants appealed from that judgment, which was affirmed by this court in 2017. The litigation between the parties continued over the course of two more years, during which time the defendants filed several more motions and requests that were denied by the court, along with two more appeals that were dismissed as frivolous.

[1] After the dismissal of the last of the defendants’ appeals in 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to reset the law day. On January 14, 2019, the court granted the motion and rendered a new judgment of strict foreclosure. The court also set a new law day for February 5, 2019. After the passing of the law day, title to the subject property became absolute in the plaintiff on February 7, 2019.⁴ The plaintiff subsequently commenced the present summary process action against the defendants in August, 2019, seeking a judgment of possession of the subject premises. A notice to quit possession was served on Gregg P. Healey; Bridgette G. Healey; Claire A. Healey, also known as Jane Doe 1; John Doe 1; John Doe 2; Jane Doe 2; and Jane Doe 3.⁵ The original complaint listed the wrong address for the subject property. The plaintiff subsequently requested leave to amend the complaint, which was granted, and the complaint was amended to reflect the correct address. The defendants ₈₇₁filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint along with a special defense, in which they asserted that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action "because the original summons and complaint are defective and cannot be amended …."

Following a hearing, the court rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff on October 31, 2019, from which the defendants timely appealed to this court. On October 19, 2021, this court affirmed the judgment of possession. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 208 Conn. App. 903, 259 A.3d 723 (2021), cert. denied, 341 Conn. 902, 269 A.3d 789 (2022). On February 28, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to open and dismiss the judgment of possession for mootness and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In that motion, they claimed that the judgment became invalid because Connor,⁶ who had not been served with the notice to quit as he was a minor at the time, turned eighteen years old after the judgment of possession had been rendered, but before it was executed. On April 5, 2022, the court, Baio, J., heard arguments on the motion to open and dismiss. On July 8, 2022, the court rendered judgment denying the motion, finding that the notice to quit had been properly served on all the adult occupants and that the fact that a minor residing in the property had reached the age of majority after the judgment had been rendered did not cause the notice to quit to become defective.

On August 1, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to reargue the denial of their motion to open and dismiss the judgment, which the court denied. This appeal fol- lowed. Thereafter, the parties submitted their appellate briefs. We subsequently ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs concerning the issue of whether the defendants "had standing to file the February 28, 2022 ₈₇₂motion to open the judgment of possession on behalf of a nonparty, [Connor] Healey; see St. Paul’s Flax Hill [Co-operative] v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728, 738 n.8 [6 A.3d 1168] (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906 [12 A.3d 1002] (2011); and whether they are aggrieved by the trial court’s July 8, 2022 order denying that motion. See M.U.N. Capital, LLC v. National Hall Properties, LLC, 163 Conn. App. 372 [136 A.3d 665], cert. denied, 321 Conn. 902 [136 A.3d 1272] (2016)."⁷

In their supplemental brief, the defendants assert, inter alia, that they are aggrieved by the denial of their motion to open and dismiss. First, they assert that they are statutorily aggrieved due to "the fact that the plaintiff no longer complies with the summary process statutes." This claim is premised on the fact that Connor had never been served with a notice to quit and the defendants’ assertion that the judgment of possession became invalid when Connor, a minor residing at the property, reached the age of majority after the judgment of possession had been rendered but before it was executed. Second, the defendants argue that they are classically aggrieved, as they have "a personal interest in occupying their long-time residence," and "they could be unlawfully disposed of their residence … [which] would unfairly deprive the defendants’ rights of possession." The plaintiff counters in its supplemental brief that the defendants are not aggrieved because "the motion to open is solely directed at purported issues of service as to [Connor] and not to any of the defendants."

[2–4] We begin with the relevant legal principles. "A threshold inquiry of this court upon every appeal presented ₈₇₃to it is the question of appellate jurisdiction. … It is well established that the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Court … is governed by [General Statutes] § 52-263,⁸ which provides that an aggrieved party may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court. … [O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented … and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case. … If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the appeal must be dismissed." (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) M.U.N. Capital, LLC v. National Hall Properties, LLC, supra, 163 Conn. App. at 374, 136 A.3d 665.

[5–9] "The terms aggrievement and standing have been used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut jurisprudence. We previously have stated that [t]he question of aggrievement is essentially one of standing …. Although these two legal concepts are similar, they are not, however, identical. Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest … has been adversely affected." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gladysz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 249, 255, 773 A.2d 300 (2001). "Aggrievement, in essence, is appellate standing." Marine Midland Bank v. Ahern, 51 Conn. App. 790, 797, 724 A.2d 537 (1999), appeal dismissed, 252 Conn. 151, 745 A.2d 189 (2000). "It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of jurisdiction.₈₇₄ There are two general types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; either type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features. … The test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest shared by the community as a whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 554-55, 248 A.3d 675 (2020).

[10] "Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 487, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

[11] The defendants’ argument that they are classically aggrieved, as they have "a personal interest in occupying their long-time residence" and "they could be unlawfully disposed of their residence … [which] would unfairly deprive the defendants’ rights of possession" is unavailing. The defendants’ motion to open and dismiss is premised on a claim that Connor, an...