U.S. Bank v. Doura

2022 NY Slip Op 02301

U.S. Bank National Association, etc., appellant-respondent, v. Ricot Doura, et al., respondents-appellants, et al., defendants.

No. 2019-08752 , Index No. 514437/17

Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

April 6, 2022

McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC, New York, NY (Harold L Kofman of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Solomon Rosengarten, Brooklyn, NY, for respondents-appellants.

ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P. REINALDO E. RIVERA PAUL WOOTEN DEBORAH A DOWLING, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals, and the defendants Ricot Doura and Appolo Pitton cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), dated May 23, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Ricot Doura and Appolo Pitton, to strike their answer and counterclaim, and for an order of reference, and granted that branch of those defendants' cross motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the action was time-barred. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, denied that branch of the cross motion of the defendants Ricot Doura and Appolo Pitton which was for summary judgment on their counterclaim to cancel and discharge of record the subject mortgage.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further, ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from, on the law, and that branch of the cross motion of the defendants Ricot Doura and Appolo Pitton which was for summary judgment on their counterclaim to cancel and discharge of record a mortgage is granted; and it is further, ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants Ricot Doura and Appolo Pitton.

On January 30, 2006, the defendant Ricot Doura (hereinafter the borrower) executed a note in the sum of $500, 000, which was secured by a mortgage on real property in Brooklyn (hereinafter the subject mortgage).

In or about May 2008, the plaintiff's predecessor in interest commenced an action to foreclose the subject mortgage against, among others, the borrower and the defendant Appolo Pitton (hereinafter together the defendants), alleging, inter alia, that the borrower had defaulted on the mortgage by failing to make the payment due November 1, 2007, and all payments due thereafter (hereinafter the prior action). In the complaint, the plaintiff's predecessor in interest elected "to declare immediately due and payable the entire unpaid balance of [the] principal." In an order dated March 2, 2017, the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the prior action without prejudice after the plaintiff's predecessor in interest failed to appear for a scheduled status conference.

In or about July 2017, the plaintiff commenced the instant action against, among others, the defendants to foreclose the subject mortgage, alleging, inter alia, that the borrower had defaulted on his mortgage by failing to make the payment due August 1, 2011, and all payments due thereafter. The defendants interposed an answer asserting, among other things, an affirmative defense that the action was time-barred and a counterclaim pursuant to RPAPL 1501(4) to cancel and discharge of record the subject mortgage.

The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants, to strike their answer and counterclaim, and for an order of reference. The defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion, and cross-moved, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the action was time-barred, and for summary judgment on their counterclaim to cancel and discharge of record the subject mortgage. The plaintiff opposed the cross motion.

In an order dated May 23, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the action was time-barred finding that the maturity date of the loan was accelerated when the prior action was commenced, and that the instant action was commenced more than six years after the prior action was commenced. The court denied that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment on their counterclaim. The plaintiff appeals, and the...