U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Mattress Firm, Inc.

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. MATTRESS FIRM, INC., Defendant.

Case No.: 2:13-cv-01745-GMN-VCF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

September 27, 2016

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 81), filed by Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Defendant Mattress Firm, Inc. ("Mattress Firm") filed a Response, (ECF No. 87), and the EEOC filed a Reply, (ECF No. 93).¹

Also pending before the Court is Mattress Firm's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 82). The EEOC filed a Response,² (ECF No. 86), and Mattress Firm filed a Reply, (ECFNo. 97). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Mattress Firm's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES as moot the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

The EEOC brought this lawsuit against Mattress Firm for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") on behalf of John Gillespie ("Gillespie"), Hooshang Seisan ("Seisan"), Jackie Donahue ("Donahue"), Kathy Thanos ("Thanos"), Stuart Katz ("Katz"), Faron Hansen ("Hansen"), William James ("James"), Frank MacLean ("MacLean"), and Robert Schnair ("Schnair") (collectively "Represented Parties"). (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12, ECF No. 1). In particular, the EEOC asserts that, as a result of age discrimination, Gillespie, Seisan, Donahue, Thanos, Katz, Hansen, James, and MacLean (collectively "Resigning Employees") were constructively discharged and Schnair was terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 29).

The Represented Parties are former employees of Bedtime Mattress Company ("Bedtime"), a Las Vegas area retail store. (Def.'s MSJ 13:18-24, ECF No. 82); (Pl.'s Resp. 10:10-11, ECF No. 86). Most of Bedtime's sales force were over age forty. (Pl.'s Resp. 12:2-3). In March of 2007, Mattress Firm acquired Bedtime and its sales employees. (Id. 10:10-11); (Def.'s MSJ 11:21-12:4). When Mattress Firm President and CEO Gary Fazio ("Fazoio") announced the buyout to the Bedtime employees, he stated that "nothing would change" after the acquisition. (Pl.'s Resp. 12:21-22). Despite this assurance, Mattress Firm required the former Bedtime employees to perform new tasks in professional business attire including unloading and moving mattresses, hanging banners, and cleaning the store. (Id. 14:19-21); (Def.'s MSJ 11:2-19).

Following acquisition of Bedtime, Mattress Firm staffed former Bedtime stores with former Bedtime employees as well as generally younger Mattress Firm Ambassadors ("Ambassadors"). (Pl.'s Resp. 15:22-25); (Def.'s MSJ 12:2-4, 12:24-13:3). Ambassadors areMattress Firm sales associates from stores across the country who apply to Mattress Firm's Ambassador Program and, if accepted, are temporarily assigned to work as sales associates at new Mattress Firm stores. (Id. 13:4-7). Mattress Firm compensates Ambassadors with a guaranteed salary during their assignment at an acquired store. (Id. 13:8-10).

On September 23, 2013, the EEOC filed its Complaint alleging that Mattress Firm disparately treated the Represented Parties as compared to the Ambassadors due to age-related discrimination resulting in their constructive discharge or termination. (See generally Compl.). Mattress Firm's instant Motion seeks summary judgment on the EEOC's claims with respect to all of the Represented Parties. (See Def.'s MSJ). Because the factual background is lengthy, the Court will discuss the facts as they pertain to each particular Represented Party in the discussion section, infra.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. "Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

At summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249-50.

III. DISCUSSION

The EEOC claims that Defendants violated the ADEA by engaging in age discrimination under a theory that specific individuals were subjected to disparate treatment based upon their age. Under the ADEA, employers may not "fail or refuse to hire or . . . discharge any individual [who is at least forty years old] or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In order to establish a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must produce evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, either through direct evidence of discriminatory intent or through the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003); Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207.

Direct evidence is "evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption." Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998). In the context of an ADEA claim, direct evidence "is defined as evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision." Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004). When a plaintiff opposing summary judgment presents direct evidence of a discriminatory motive, analysis of the direct evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework isinappropriate. France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended on reh'g (Oct. 14, 2015).

Where no direct evidence exists, courts must proceed under the McDonnell Douglas framework. "Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must carry the initial burden to establish a prima facie case that creates an inference of discrimination." Id. "The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous." See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002). On summary judgment, the degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case "is minimal and does not even rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence." See Schechner v. KPIX-TV, 686 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012). If the employee establishes a prima facie case, an inference of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the employer to produce a...