Uldrych v. Vill. of Merrionette Park

MELISSA ULDRYCH, Plaintiff, v. THE VILLAGE OF MERRIONETTE PARK, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-06580

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

December 29, 2020

Judge John F. Kness

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action arises from a longstanding feud between neighbors that culminated in Plaintiff's arrest for trespassing. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 39-45, 67-77.) It is before the Court on a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants AAA Freight, Inc., AAA Truck Center, Properties by Keljevic, Antonije Keljevic, and Predrag Igic. (Dkt. 12.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

As alleged in the Complaint (Dkt. 1), Plaintiff is a police detective whose Chicago residence abuts a Merrionette Park, Illinois commercial property owned by Defendant AAA Freight, Inc. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 20.) AAA Freight is itself owned by Defendants Antoine Keljevic and Pedrag Igic, who operate a truck repair shop, AAA Truck Center, and another concern, Properties by Keljevic, both of which are included as defendants in this action. (Id. (these Defendants are referred to collectively as the "AAA Defendants")).¹

For years, Plaintiff and her neighbors have objected to the "dust, fumes, pollution, and noise" that emanate from the AAA Defendants' property. (Id. ¶ 22.) In 2017, Plaintiff complained to numerous public officials and agencies, including Merrionette Park municipal officials, her representatives in the state legislature, the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Attorney General, and the local Water Reclamation District Board. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 33.) In response, the village of Merrionette Park—acting through its mayor, building commissioner, police chief, and two individual police officers (hereinafter the "Merrionette Defendants")—retaliated against her by conspiring with the AAA Defendants to falsely arrest her for criminal trespassing. (Id. ¶ 35.)

According to Plaintiff, the false arrest occurred as follows: on March 21, 2019, Plaintiff was walking her dog on a pathway near, but not on, the AAA Defendants'property when she saw trees on their property being cut down. (Id. ¶¶ 37-41.) Plaintiff saw Defendant Igic and asked him why the trees were being cut down, but he refused to answer. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 44.) Defendant Igic then called Merrionette Park police to report a trespass, providing them a cell phone video of the incident as evidence. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 48.) Plaintiff says this video shows Plaintiff stayed behind a "No Trespassing" sign on the AAA Defendants' property. (Id. ¶ 48.) Despite this, the Merrionette Park police initiated a criminal trespassing case against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 51.)

While the criminal charges were pending, the AAA Defendants informed Plaintiff that they would drop the charges so long as she agreed to stop complaining about them to the Merrionette Defendants. (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff obliged, and in turn the AAA Defendants told the Merrionette Park police on March 26, 2018 that they no longer wished to prosecute the trespassing case. (Id. ¶ 57.)

This détente was short-lived. On October 26, 2018, the state of Illinois served the AAA Defendants with a summons to a civil action. (Id. ¶¶ 62-63.) According to Plaintiff, the AAA Defendants blamed Plaintiff for the suit, so they changed course and informed the Merrionette Park police that they wished to pursue the trespassing charges against Plaintiff after all. (Id. ¶ 64.) As a result, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with criminal trespass on October 31, 2018. (Id. ¶ 67.) Because of the arrest, the Chicago Police Department stripped Plaintiff of her police powers the next day. (Id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiff was reinstated eight days later, and the trespassing charges against her were dismissed on January 4, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 76.)

On October 3, 2019, Plaintiff brought this action, alleging the defendants conspired to falsely arrest her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various Illinoisstate statutes and common law doctrines. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 81-127.) The AAA Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against them. (Dkt. 12.) Being fully briefed (the AAA Defendants waived their opportunity to file a reply brief), the motion to dismiss is now before the Court for resolution.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal punctuation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, the Court, in evaluatinga motion to dismiss, must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011); see also Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS

The AAA Defendants move to dismiss all four counts of the Complaint that apply to them: (1) false arrest (Count II); (2) conspiracy (Count V); (3) malicious prosecution (Count VI); and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII). (Dkt. 12.) Because the Court's reasoning as to the false arrest claim applies with equal force to the malicious prosecution claim, the Court will address those claims together and then turn to the other claims.

A. False Arrest (Count II) and Malicious Prosecution (Count VI)

Under Illinois law, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are: "(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff." Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 131 N.E.3d 488, 495 (Ill. 2019) (internal marks omitted). Conversely, the elements of a false arrest claim are: "(1) the plaintiff was restrained or arrested by the defendant; and (2) the defendant acted without having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was committed by the plaintiff." Duffy v. Haberkorn, 2012 IL App (1st) 110841-U, ¶ 17 (citing Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., (Ill. 1990)).

The AAA Defendants contend the malicious prosecution case fails at the outset because, as private citizens and entities, they "cannot institute and prosecute acriminal case." (Dkt. 12 at 9.) Similarly, they argue that they are not liable for false arrest because they only made a report to the police and did not themselves arrest Plaintiff. (Id. at 8.)

As Plaintiff argues, the AAA Defendants misapprehend the governing legal standard. For the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim, a private citizen "commences a criminal proceeding when he or she knowingly gives false information to a police officer, who then swears out a complaint." Lau v. Sear, 2019 IL App (1st) 180956-U, ¶ 40 (internal marks omitted); see also Beamen, 131 N.E.3d at 499-500 (the general "presumption of prosecutorial independence" may "be overcome by showing that the defendant improperly exerted pressure on the prosecution, knowingly provided misinformation to him or her, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad-faith conduct").² Similarly, with respect to the tort of false arrest, a private individual "can be liable for false arrest if she directs orprocures" an arrest by providing the arresting officer with false information. Squires-Cannon v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cty., No. 15 C 6876, 2016 WL 561917, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2016) (applying Illinois law).

Applying the correct legal standard to the allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff alleges she was not on the AAA Defendants' property at the time of the incident. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 39, 41) (alleging she was "on [a] dirt pathway to the east of" the AAA Defendants' property and that she was later "standing prior to [sic] a 'No Trespassing' sign posted on a tree" on the AAA Defendants' property).) She further alleges that the AAA Defendants knew she was not on the property because Defendant Igic filmed a video that showed she was not on the property. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.) Despite this, the AAA Defendants falsely reported to the police that she was trespassing, which resulted in her arrest and the commencement of criminal proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 49, 64, 67.) Because Plaintiff alleges the AAA Defendants knew Plaintiff had not trespassed but "directed or procured" by her arrest anyway, she has stated a plausible false arrest claim. Squires-Cannon, 2016 WL 561917, at *7.

Plaintiff has similarly stated a plausible malicious prosecution claim. The AAA Defendants challenge only the first element: namely, whether they initiated a criminal proceeding. (Dkt. 12 at 9.) For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the AAA...