Underwood v. Camden Cnty. Office of the Sheriff

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KRYSTAL A. UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff, v. CAMDEN COUNTY OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-2268 (KMW-SAK)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

April 1, 2024

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THOMAS J. GOSSE, ESQ.

ANDREW S. BROWN, ESQ.

WILLIAM F. COOK, ESQ.

BROWN & CONNERY, LLP

JAMES PATRICK CLANCY, ESQ.

BROWN & CONNERY, LLP

CHRISTINE A. BARRIS, ESQ.

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLK, ESQ.

BLUMBERG & WOLK, LLC

STEVEN K. PARNESS, ESQ.

METHFESSEL & WERBEL

OPINION

WILLIAMS, DISTRICT JUDGE:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Krystal A. Underwood (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant Michael Higgins (“Defendant Higgins”); Defendants Camden County Office of the Sheriff (“CCSO”), Camden County Office of the Sheriff Emergency Response Team (“SERT”), Boehly, Kemner, Kolins, McNamee, Plews,, Souder, and Write (collectively “CCSO Defendants”); Defendants Camden County Prosecutor's Office, Austin, Bezich, Russomanno, Detective Miller (collectively “CCPO Defendants”); and the Cherry Hill Police Department (“CHPD”) and Detective Harman (collectively “CHPD Defendants”), alleging that each Defendant contributed to the violation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C, § 1983, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:61 et seq., violations of common law, and the emotional and psychological injuries Plaintiff sustained on February 28, 2020, when her apartment was entered by the SERT officers while they were executing a search warrant on the premises 308 Walnut Avenue, Gloucester City, New Jersey.

This matter comes before the Court on each of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 62, 63, 64, 65). Plaintiff opposes all motions, (ECF Nos. 68, 73, 74, 75), and Defendants replied. (ECF Nos. 76, 77, 78, 79). Separately, Defendant Higgins opposed Defendant CHPD's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No, 69), and Defendant CHPD did not reply. For the reasons that follow, Defendant Higgin's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62) is denied, CCSO Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63) is granted, CCPO Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 64) is granted, and CHPD Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 65) is granted.^[1]

II. BACKGROUND

In November of 2019, Plaintiff moved into the unit on the second floor of 308 Walnut Avenue, Gloucester City, N.J. 08030. Def. CCSO, Motion for S.J., SMF (“CCSO SMF”) ¶ 1. In February of 2020, Defendant CHPD and Defendant CCPO began investigating the distribution of marijuana, then a controlled dangerous substance. Def, CCPO, Motion for S.J. SMF (“CCPO SMF”) ¶¶ 14-15. Reports from an informant suggested that the suspect resided at 308 Walnut Avenue. Id. An undercover purchase was conducted at the property, as well as drive-by surveillance conducted by Defendant P lews of the SERT team, and Defendant Miller of the CCPO. CCPO SMF ¶¶ 17-19. Defendant Miller performed additional research on the property to prepare for an application for a search warrant and used a website called “NJParcels.com” to confirm details about the property, namely, whether it was a single or multifamily unit. CCPO SMF ¶ 20; CHPD SMF ¶ 44. The search warrant described 308 Walnut Avenue as a “single-family home with off-white color siding” with a single “white screen door” and a black mailbox to the right of this door. CCSO SMF ¶ 8. On February 27, 2020, the search warrant was signed and approved as a “no-knock” warrant and the SERT team executed the warrant at 308 Walnut Ave the following day. CCPO SMF ¶¶ 22-23.

At approximately 6:00 AM on February 28, 2020, the SERT team entered the property through the front door, cleared the first floor area, and did not find the suspect. CCPO SMF ¶¶ 25-26; Defendant CHPD, Motion for S.J. SMF (“CHPD SMF”) ¶ 21; CCSO SMF ¶ 20. The SERT team had information that led them to believe that the target was supposed to be at home, causing the team to expand their search for the suspect. CHPD SMF ¶ 18; CCSO SMF ¶¶ 21-24. A second locked door was found outside on the side of the building. CCSO SMF ¶ 24. The SERT team contacted Defendant Plews and Defendant Miller, the warrant affiant, to determine if the team could breach this door. CCSO SMF ¶¶ 26-27. It was confirmed by Defendant Plews that the warrant applied to the entire structure. Id.,', CHPD SMF ¶ 20. The SERT team breached Plaintiffs front door and discovered Plaintiff in bed in a state of partial undress, permitting her to put on a sweater before being placed in zip ties until they finished their search. CCPO SMF ¶¶ 34-35;

CHPD SMF ¶ 11; Plaintiffs Opposition to Def. CHPD Motion for S.J. Supplemental Statement of Fact (“Pl. Opp. CHPD SMF”) ¶¶ 147-151. Plaintiff notes that the testimony regarding how long the search was is inconsistent among the officers, noting that while some officers believe the search was quick, Detective Miller testified that the search of the two apartments took between thirty and forty five minutes. Plaintiffs Opposition to Def. CCSO Motion for S.J. Supplemental Statement of Fact (“Pl. Opp. CCSO SMF”) ¶ 86. Plaintiff further asserts that the officers behaved in an aggressive manner, intimidating her and causing her pain when she was restrained, and that the officers did not affirmatively release Plaintiff from the zip ties but had to be chased down after they left Plaintiffs unit. Pl. Opp. CCSO SMF ¶¶ 84-85, 87-88.

Defendants and Plaintiff dispute as to whether the physical attributes of the home, both observed on the day, through previous surveillance, and information from Defendant Miller's research, were sufficient to indicate to the officers involved that the home itself was not a single occupancy home, but in fact a duplex. Defendant Higgins Statement of Material Facts (“HIG SMF”) ¶¶ 4-8. Specifically, 308 Walnut Avenue was registered with the City of Gloucester Building Department as a duplex, there were two separate doors to each unit, painted different colors, with two separate mailboxes adjacent to each door, and two electrical meters outside of the home. Id. ¶¶ 4-8, 31.^[2] There is no internal staircase or passage to connect the two units. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. All parties agree that there was no signage to indicate that the residences were two separate units, i.e. labels “A” and “B” or “1” and “2” on the individual doors, nor were there any names or distinguishing symbols on the mailboxes.

Plaintiff asserts various constitutional violations as well as emotional and psychological injury due to the interactions she had with Defendants during the execution of the search warrant as well as alleged interactions with several Defendants occurring in the weeks following the search. CCPO SMF ¶ 64; Pl. Opp. CHPD SMF ¶¶ 147-161.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); see also M.S. by & through Hall v. Sitsquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2020) (“A fact is material if-taken as true-it would affect the outcome of the case under governing law.”). Moreover, “[a] dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine' if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Santini, 795 F,3d at 416 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The moving party bears the burden of identifying portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The burden then “shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. “A nonmoving party may not ‘rest upon mere allegations, general denials or. . . vague statements Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Michael Higgins

To prevail on a negligence claim, Plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to establish a (1) duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) actual damages. Estate of Allen v. Cumberland Cnty., No. 15-6273, 2020 WL 3468180 at *10 (D.N.J. 2020). In other words, it must be proved that one party was negligent, and that negligence caused the other's injury. Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996).

First “[w]hether a duty of care exists is a question of law that must be decided by the court., . In making that determination, the court must first consider the foreseeability of harm to a potential plaintiff.” Borough of Edgewater v. Waterside Constr., LLC, No. 14-5060, 2021 WL 3030280 at *6 (D.N.J. Jul. 19, 2021) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Foreseeability is a consideration relevant to both duty and proximate cause, but there are important differences when analyzing...