Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.

310 P.3d 1204

738 Utah Adv. Rep. 73

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Petitioner,

v.UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; Utah Public Service Commission; Anderson Geneva Development, Inc., and Town of Vineyard, Respondents.

No. 20110326.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 9, 2013.

Reha Kamas, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Att'y Gen., for respondent UDOT.

Troy L. Booher, Christopher L. Stout, Salt Lake City, Dennis M. Astill, Sandy, for respondent Anderson Geneva Development, Inc.

David L. Church, Salt Lake City, for respondent Town of Vineyard.

Original Proceeding in this Court.

Justice LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 This case arises out of the classification of a public railroad crossing by the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). The classification was upheld on review by the Public Service Commission. We affirm, upholding the Commission's determination that UDOT correctly classified the crossing as public in the absence of any formal abandonment or evidence indicating that the crossing is a new road that never became public.

I

¶ 2 In 2008, the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) announced construction of a high-speed commuter rail line that would run from Provo to downtown Salt Lake City. As announced, this line was to operate in a portion of a rail corridor occupied by Union Pacific Railroad and would increase train traffic from eight to twenty trains per day to over sixty trains per day. Because construction of the new commuter rail line could potentially alter certain crossings of Union Pacific's line, representatives from UTA and UDOT evaluated each identified crossing to “ensure that final design meets all applicable safety requirements.” As a result of this evaluation, UTA and UDOT decided to eliminate a crossing at “Geneva Road, 4000 North” in the town of Vineyard.

¶ 3 It soon became clear, however, that the reference to “Geneva Road, 4000 North” was incorrect and that UTA and UDOT actually intended to close a crossing that involves 400 North and Vineyard Road. Once the Town of Vineyard and the owner of land adjacent to the crossing (Anderson Geneva) realized this, they petitioned the Commission to review UDOT's initial determination to close the crossing. As part of this petition, Anderson Geneva and Vineyard provided documents and information to UDOT about the crossing. UDOT had previously determined that the crossing was private because applicable engineering standards indicated that a public crossing is one that is approached from both directions by public roads and because 400 North was not passable eastward by the public due to a closed and locked gate. UDOT, however, reversed that determination based on the new information from Anderson Geneva and Vineyard and classified the crossing as public. Apparently satisfied with this result, Anderson Geneva asked the Commission to dismiss its petition. In a subsequent letter, however, UDOT reiterated the crossing's public classification but ordered the crossing's temporary closure for safety reasons.

¶ 4 The parties were unhappy with UDOT's letter for different reasons. Anderson Geneva agreed with the public determination but objected to the temporary closure of the crossing. Union Pacific, on the other hand, agreed that the crossing should be closed but believed that it should be classified as private. Accordingly, Union Pacific filed a petition with the Commission challenging UDOT's public classification. Anderson Geneva, after successfully moving to intervene,¹ opposed Union Pacific's petition and cross-petitioned to challenge UDOT's decision to temporarily close the crossing.

¶ 5 The history of the crossing and the land surrounding it was the central focus of the hearing before the Commission on these petitions. Its early history is undisputed. Union Pacific's predecessor acquired by deed a right of way for a rail corridor in 1881. At some point before 1942, a road (400 North) was established crossing that right of way. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that this road and its crossing were public by 1942. Then, in 1942, Utah County passed a resolution quit claiming all the land located within a 1,500–acre area for the construction of a steel plant, eventually known as Geneva Steel and now owned by Anderson Geneva. As part of this resolution, the County vacated its claim to the portions of 400 North that were contained within the boundaries of the proposed steel plant. The Commission found, on the testimony of four witnesses, that the resolution did not vacate the portions of 400 North west of the track or the crossing of the track itself. Based on this evidence, the Commission determined that the 400 North crossing remained public after the 1942 resolution. Neither party contests that determination.

¶ 6 The Commission further determined that nothing occurred in the decades following the 1942 resolution that changed the public character of the crossing. None of the parties disputed the fact that no formal vacatur or abandonment proceeding occurred after 1942. And though the Commission found that “at least a portion of the crossing ... presently lie[s] over the land vacated by the 1942 Resolution” it determined that the crossing remained public despite a possible shift in the road's location. In so finding, the Commission identified evidence supporting two possible explanations for the road's alleged shift.

¶ 7 First, evidence suggested that the crossing could have been reconfigured in the early 1970s for safety reasons. Specifically, the original crossing angle could have been altered from something less than a 90–degree angle “to something closer to a 90–degree angle to the tracks.” But the Commission lacked conclusive evidence of which entities—Union Pacific, Utah County, Geneva Steel, and/or UDOT—were involved in possible discussions about the reconfiguration and of “whether the County was involved in the reconfiguration or whether it was solely reconfigured by the steel plant and [Union Pacific].”

¶ 8 Second, the Commission postulated that any change in the road's location could have been the result of “the actual shifting of the road” over time. Witnesses testified that “it would not be uncommon for the road to have shifted over 80 years or so.” But the Commission noted that it “lack[ed] evidence showing precisely where the road actually was at the time of the 1942 Resolution.”

¶ 9 The possible relocation of the crossing notwithstanding, the lack of any formal attempt to abandon or vacate the crossing convinced the Commission that the crossing remained public. The presence of a locked gate and the absence of actual public use or maintenance were, according to the Commission, thus irrelevant. Further, the Commission determined that the engineering standards that supported UDOT's earlier private classification were no barrier to UDOT's new public classification. Though these standards suggest that a crossing like the 400 North crossing is not public because only one approach to it is public, these standards also recognize exceptions to this general rule.

¶ 10 Accordingly, because the crossing had never been formally abandoned, because UDOT's own guidelines allow this kind of road to be classified as public, and because numerous public entities and databases had considered and listed the crossing as public for nearly four decades, the Commission found that there was “substantial evidence the crossing is public.”

¶ 11 After losing on its petition before the Commission, Union Pacific filed a request for rehearing, which included a new argument: “UDOT does not have jurisdiction over the crossing ... because 400 North Street in Vineyard, Utah, is not a public road at the point where it crosses Union Pacific's tracks.” This request was denied, however, and Union Pacific sought review in this court of the Commission's decision upholding UDOT's public classification.

II

¶ 12 Before we consider the merits of this case, we first address the applicable standard of review. The parties ² offer competing formulations of the governing standard. Union Pacific frames the issue as a jurisdictional question of law. It identifies the question before us as “whether a crossing is private and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of UDOT,” and argues that the Commission's determination “that the public right of way moved with the road onto Union Pacific's private right of way” was a “conclusion of law [that] should be” reviewed for correctness. Anderson Geneva, on the other hand, frames the issue as “[w]hether the Commission acted unreasonably in affirming UDOT's classification of the crossing as public” and asserts that this is a mixed question involving the application of law to facts—a question on which the Commission's determination merits deference.

¶ 13 We see the matter Anderson Geneva's way. As a body “created by and deriv[ing] its powers and duties from statute,” UDOT has not only the regulatory powers expressly granted to it, but also those “which are clearly implied as necessary to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it.” Basin Flying Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1975). Under its governing statute, UDOT has “the power to determine and prescribe the manner ... and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection ... of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or street railroad ... and to alter or abolish any such crossing, [and] to restrict the use of such crossings.” Utah Code § 54–4–15(2). Implicit in this grant of authority over public railroad crossings is the authority to decide which crossings are public. In that sense, UDOT has the statutory authority to decide, at least initially, its own jurisdiction; it undoubtedly has the jurisdiction to determine whether it possesses jurisdiction.

¶ 14 Neither side disputes this. Union Pacific, for instance, never challenged UDOT's jurisdiction by, for example, claiming that it lacked authority to...