United States v. $219,970.00 in United States Currency

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. $219,970.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Defendant, KEVIN HARTLEY, Claimant-Appellant, YOLIMA A. HARTLEY, Claimant.

No. 23-13626

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

August 7, 2024

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01844-LMM

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kevin Hartley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the government in a civil forfeiture action, proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) for $219,970.00 seized during a traffic stop ("the Defendant Currency"). On appeal, Hartley first argues that the district court erred in determining that he did not dispute the legality of the traffic stop, because his statement in his deposition that he did not change lanes and did not receive a citation for failure to maintain his lane was sufficient to dispute Trooper Jordan Ennis's statements. Second, Hartley argues that the district court incorrectly found that several material facts were not in dispute pertaining to the facts supporting the forfeitability of the Defendant Currency, and therefore the government could not demonstrate that the Defendant Currency was linked to illegal activity. Finally Hartley challenges the district court's holding rejecting his argument that the record evidence showed that the government's actions with respect to the notice of forfeiture constituted bad faith or a disregard of his rights.

Because we write only for the parties who are already familiar with the facts, we set out only such facts as are necessary to understand this opinion.

I. The Traffic Stop and Inventory Search of the Car

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001). Although pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We "may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court." Hill v. Emp. Benefits Admin. Comm of Mueller Grp. LLC, 971 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A nonmoving party may dispute a material fact through a declaration, which "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).

Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990).

We will not reverse where an error was harmless. See Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 807 (11th Cir. 2017). A harmless error is one that does not affect a party's substantial rights, and thus is not a basis for vacating or modifying that judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. Accordingly, the appellant bears the burden to show an error was not harmless. See Ermini v. Scott, 937 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2019).

"Traffic stops qualify as seizures under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). "An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred, that is, "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law." Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57, 60 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). "[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does not depend] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. Only legally obtained evidence may be used to meet the government's burden under the civil forfeiture standard. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Com. of Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965).

Under Georgia law, "[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1).

The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant before the government can conduct a search of persons, houses, papers, and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-78 (1984). The Fourth Amendment affords motor vehicles somewhat less protection than other property. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 189, 193 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979).^[1] For example, law enforcement may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if the vehicle is readily mobile and law enforcement has probable cause to search it. United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).

Another exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is "an inventory search of an arrestee's personal property to itemize its contents pursuant to standard inventory procedures." United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889, 910 (11th Cir. 2020). "The government carries the burden to show that the requirements of this exception were met." Id. The subjective intent of the officer as to the inventory search is irrelevant, as "the mere expectation of uncovering evidence will not vitiate an otherwise valid inventory search." United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1982). Georgia Department of Public Safety policy provides an inventory search may be conducted "[w]henever a member arrests the driver/owner of a vehicle and the arrest involuntarily separates the driver/owner from their vehicle, unless the vehicle is released to the control of a custodian designated by the driver/owner at the time of the arrest." Georgia Department of Public Safety Policy Manual No. 17.06.4(G)(4).

An issue not raised on appeal will be deemed abandoned and will only be addressed in extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (addressing abandonment in a criminal matter), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 95 (2022). A party fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). Abandonment of a claim or issue can also occur when the passing references to it are made in the "statement of the case" or "summary of the argument" sections, or when only passing references appear in the argument section of an opening brief, particularly when the references are mere background to the appellant's main arguments or when they are buried within those arguments. Id. at 681-82.

Here the district court did not err in determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the legality of the traffic stop because Hartley did not dispute the facts supporting Ennis's decision to stop him, which demonstrated that Ennis had a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred when he executed the stop. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 57, 60.^[2] First, Hartley's argument that the government failed to provide video evidence of the traffic stop to him or to the court, and that the government was required to submit this evidence to the court, is, at least as to the production aspect, contradicted by the government's statement that it provided the relevant video footage to Hartley during discovery. The government corroborated this by providing the FedEx receipt of its mailing of a CD containing the photos and videos in its response to Hartley's motion to strike. Therefore, we reject Hartley's argument that he was not provided such evidence. As to the second aspect of Hartley's argument- that the government was required to submit this evidence to the court because Hartley challenged Ennis's testimony-as discussed in greater detail below,...