United States v. Alderson

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DARRYL ALDERSON

No. 3:21-cr-00068

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

August 12, 2022

MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is the "Motion of Defendant Darryl Alderson to Suppress the Fruits of the Successive Searches of 1212 Laurel Street, Apartment 1507, Nashville, Tennessee, on May 20 2020, Both Triggered by a Prior Unreasonable Suspicionless Traffic Stop Conducted on April 17. 2020." (Doc. No 43.) The United States (hereafter, "Government") has filed a Response in opposition to the motion (Doc. No 48), and the defendant filed a Reply (Doc. No. 54). The court held an evidentiary hearing on August 2, 2022, at which two officers with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department ("MNPD") and the defendant testified. In light of all of the evidence in the record and the governing law, as set forth herein, the defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, it will denied as to the firearm found on the defendant's person when he was arrested on May 20, 2020 but granted in all other respects.

I.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Criminal Complaint

A federal Criminal Complaint initiating this prosecution was filed on May 1, 2020 by Ryan Singleton, Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("BATF"), alleging that defendant Alderson had committed violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime). (Doc. No. 3, at 1.)

Agent Ryan submitted a sworn Statement in Support of Criminal Complaint, providing the factual background for the case. Ryan alleged that the defendant had been pulled over by MNPD Officer Willie Reaves on April 17, 2020 for a window tint violation and that a firearm had subsequently been found during a consensual search of the vehicle. (Id. at 2-3.) Alderson was detained at that point and allegedly claimed ownership of the firearm. A search of his person incident to the arrest turned up a bag containing controlled substances, including marijuana and a white powdery substance that field-tested positive for cocaine (and was apparently later determined to contain fentanyl). Ryan states that a review of Alderson's criminal history confirms prior felony convictions for sale of controlled substances and possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute. The charges enumerated in the federal Criminal Complaint are premised upon these allegations.

B. Original and Superseding Indictments

The original Indictment, issued over a year later on May 3, 2021, contains six counts. (Doc. No. 23.) The first three mirror those set forth in the Criminal Complaint relating to the April 17, 2020 traffic stop: possession with intent to distribute a mixture containing fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count I); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count II); and being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm, specifically a Glock GMBH, model 27, .40 caliber pistol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count III).

In addition, the Indictment further charges crimes premised upon evidence uncovered in the course of the execution of two arrest warrants and two separate search warrants on May 20, 2020, to wit: being a previously convicted felon in possession of two firearms, a Glock GMBH, model 43X, 9mm caliber pistol and a Glock GMBH, model 26, 9mm caliber pistol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count IV); knowing possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a substance containing cocaine and hydrocodone, Schedule II controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count V); and knowing possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count VI).

A Superseding Indictment was returned on September 27, 2021, which varies from the first only insofar as Count IV now charges possession with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);^[1] Count V charges possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (previously Count VI); and Count VI charges possession by a previously convicted felon of the same two Glock handguns identified in Count IV of the original Indictment. (Doc. No. 31.)

C. The Motion to Suppress and the Parties' Arguments

The defendant filed his Motion to Suppress on April 21, 2022. In the Memorandum in support thereof, he argues that the warrantless search of his vehicle on April 17, 2020 violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and that the firearm and drugs found after he was pulled over must be suppressed, because (1) Officer Reaves unnecessarily and unlawfully extended the duration and scope of the traffic stop by refusing to release Alderson after concluding that he was not going to charge or arrest him for the traffic violation; and (2) the police lacked probable cause to search Alderson's vehicle for incriminating evidence without a warrant.

The defendant further argues that the weapon found on him when he was arrested, as well as the evidence found during the execution of two separate search warrants at his residence on May 20, 2020, should be suppressed. First, he argues that the basis for the arrest and the search warrants was the evidence discovered during the illegal April 17, 2020 traffic stop and, therefore, that all of the evidence seized on May 20, 2020 must be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. (Doc. No. 44, at 13.) In addition, however, the defendant argues that the first warrant obtained for the search of the defendant's residence by MNPD Detective Bradley Hambrick (to which the defendant refers as the "document search warrant" and to which the court will refer as the "Ammunition Warrant"), was nothing but a subterfuge for a drug search and that the Government knew there was not a sufficient nexus between the defendant's residence and his suspected engagement in drug dealing to obtain a search warrant on that basis. The defendant argues that, on its face, the Ammunition Warrant does not provide a sufficient "nexus" between the place to be searched and possible criminal behavior. He then argues that, because the search conducted pursuant to the Ammunition Warrant was unconstitutional, the search conducted pursuant to the second Warrant (the "Narcotics Warrant"), which was premised entirely on evidence found during the execution of the Ammunition Warrant, must also be suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

The Government counters, in its Response, that the traffic stop was legal from its inception and did not extend beyond what was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the traffic stop and, further, that once the defendant stepped out of his car, the "unusual bulge" in his pants "immediately" gave Reaves "reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." (Doc. No. 48, at 8.) The Government also asserts that the defendant validly gave consent to the search of his vehicle, during which the firearm and unlawful controlled substances were discovered. The Government further contends that the Ammunition Warrant obtained by Detective Hambrick was supported by probable cause and properly obtained, as a result of which neither search of the defendant's residence was unconstitutional.

In his Reply (Doc. No. 54), the defendant reiterates his argument that police impermissibly extended both the duration and scope of the traffic stop the moment they asked Alderson to exit his vehicle, at which point the stop became an unconstitutional seizure. He also points out that the Government does not actually argue that Officer Reaves had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop once he had returned Alderson's documents to him. Instead, it points to the bulge in Alderson's pants that was only discovered after he was asked to get out of his car. The defendant further contends that the purported consent to the warrantless search of the car was not given freely and voluntarily and that both search warrants derived solely from the police officers' unlawful conduct.

II. THE TRAFFIC STOP

A. Legal Standard

The defendant's motion, first, seeks to exclude on Fourth Amendment grounds all evidence that law enforcement officers obtained in a search that took place during the course of the traffic stop that took place on April 17, 2020. "Stopping and detaining a motorist constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment, of course, does not prohibit all seizures-only unreasonable ones. In the Sixth Circuit, an officer is justified in stopping a car based on "mere 'reasonable suspicion' that a felony has occurred or that a misdemeanor is occurring." United States v. Brooks, 987 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2021). That standard requires officers to have a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

"Even if the police have reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop, they do not have unfettered authority to detain a person indefinitely." United States v Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 881 (11th...