United States v. Ambriz-Villa

482 F.Supp.3d 777

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Raul AMBRIZ-VILLA, Jr., Defendant.

Case No. 19–CR–40095–JPG

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

Signed August 31, 2020

George A. Norwood, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Benton, Benton, IL, for Plaintiff.

David L. Brengle, Federal Public Defender, East St. Louis, IL, John D. Beckham, Joshua S. Reeves, Olson & Reeves, LLC, Mount Vernon, IL, Judith A. Kuenneke, Federal Public Defender's Office, Benton, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

J. PHIL GILBERT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Raul Ambriz-Villa, Jr.’s Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 44). The Government responded, (ECF No. 47); and the Court conducted a hearing on August 18, 2020, (ECF No. 51). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Ambriz-Villa's Motion to Suppress.

I. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL HISTORY

On October 30, 2019, Illinois State Trooper John Payton ("Trooper Payton") was parked in his law-enforcement vehicle on I-57 near Mt. Vernon, Illinois.¹ Trooper Payton is a member of the Criminal Patrol Team and is specially trained in interdiction: to stop and apprehend those traveling along interstate highways suspected of criminal activity. He has 11 years of experience, which includes over 70 successful contraband seizures since 2015 and the rescue of an abducted child. He stops three-to-four drivers per day. And although he is authorized to issue traffic tickets, his focus is on interdiction. Along with fieldwork, Trooper Payton conducts in-class instruction and ride-alongs to pass his experience on to rookies.

Ambriz-Villa drove past Trooper Payton while driving south on I-57. He was driving a 2009 Chevy Suburban with a Nebraska license plate. In Trooper Payton's experience, large vehicles (like Suburbans) are preferred by drug traffickers because they can haul more contraband. Trooper Payton also found the vehicle's dirty exterior and foreign plates as signs of long-distance interstate travel, consistent with trafficking.

Trooper Payton briefly followed Ambriz-Villa on I-57, during which time Ambriz-Villa's vehicle crossed the solid white line on the right-hand shoulder. Trooper Payton then conducted a traffic stop. He asked Ambriz-Villa for his license and registration. It took Ambriz-Villa near 90 seconds to produce his registration. That struck Trooper Payton as suspect—in his experience, drug traffickers often drive rentals and do not know where to find the vehicle's registration. Trooper Payton also noticed a "masking odor," like that of an air freshener or cologne, sometimes used to conceal the tracks of contraband; and two cell phones, sometimes used by traffickers as "dope phones." Trooper Payton then asked Ambriz-Villa if he would be willing to continue the inquiry from his law-enforcement vehicle.² Ambriz-Villa agreed.

When Ambriz-Villa sat down, Trooper Payton informed him that he was only receiving a warning ticket. In Trooper Payton's experience, innocent drivers relax when they learn that they are not receiving a moving violation. But Trooper Payton noticed that the news had little effect on Ambriz-Villa. The dash-cam recording showed Ambriz-Villa's eyes pacing out the window and through the mirrors; and Trooper Payton purportedly saw belly breathing and a prominent carotid artery, which sometimes conveys nervousness.

Several uneasy statements made by Ambriz-Villa also alerted Trooper Payton of the possibility of criminal activity. While processing Ambriz-Villa's license, Trooper Payton casually asked about his background and purpose for traveling.³ Ambriz-Villa stated that he owned a tire shop in Nebraska and was traveling to Georgia for his nephew's birthday. He said that his family was going to Georgia too, but they flew instead. Trooper Payton asked why he decided to drive alone, and Ambriz-Villa floundered nonresponsive.⁴ When asked again, he stated that he liked to drive. After further conversation, Trooper Payton concluded that Ambriz-Villa's evasiveness and excessive nervousness were signs of criminal activity.

By the time Trooper Payton printed the warning ticket, Ambriz-Villa was poised to leave. He took it and got halfway out the door when Trooper Payton interjected—"Do you mind if I ask you a few more questions?" Ambriz-Villa agreed. Trooper Payton then asked whether he was involved in any drug or criminal activity, which he denied. Finally, Trooper Payton asked Ambriz-Villa if he would consent to a search of his vehicle—he consented. Trooper Payton asked once again for clarification, and Ambriz-Villa confirmed his consent.

Two other troopers arrived moments earlier in a separate law-enforcement vehicle; Trooper Payton messaged them while processing Ambriz-Villa's license. Together, they searched Ambriz-Villa's Suburban. Hidden in the third row, beneath the tray and cupholder and above the rear driver-side tire, they found around 13 kilograms of methamphetamine.

On November 5, a grand jury in the Southern District of Illinois charged Ambriz-Villa with Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine. Ambriz-Villa then moved to suppress the drug evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The Government responded; and the Court conducted an in-person hearing, during which it heard testimony from Trooper Payton, examined the dash-cam recording, and heard oral arguments.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, then the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford , 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891). "Wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 10, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 360–61, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). So "[in] cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used ...." Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 156, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

"A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). And "[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." Id. That said, "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."

Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

If the Government violates the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search or seizure, then the exclusionary rule "compel[s] respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. "Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

But "[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, the [Supreme] Court recognized that an immediate intrusion" is not unreasonable "in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods." United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 806–807, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

An investigatory stop complies with the Fourth Amendment if the brief detention is based on reasonable suspicion that the detained individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. An officer initiating an investigatory stop must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that suggest criminality so that he is not basing his actions on a mere hunch.

United States v. Uribe , 709 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ).

"The government bears the burden of establishing reasonable suspicion by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 650. But reasonable suspicion itself "is a lower threshold than probable cause" and "considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Bullock , 632 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2011).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.

Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

It is now well established "that the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention." Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (citing Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.")). And the Supreme Court has "held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure." Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

Courts therefore evaluate reasonable suspicion by examining "the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, including the experience of the officer and the behavior and characteristics of the suspect." Bullock , 632...