United States v. Anderson

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. TROY EUGENE ANDERSON

No. 1:22-cr-9

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

July 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Defendant Troy Eugene Anderson (“Anderson”) has been indicted in this criminal case on charges of receiving possessing, and accessing with intent to view material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor. Pending before the Court are Anderson's Motion to Preserve Law Enforcement's Rough Notes (ECF No. 60), Motion for Release of Brady Materials (ECF No. 61), Motion to Provide Notice of Evidence that the Government Intends to Use Under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(B) and 609 (ECF No. 62), Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 63), and Motion to Suppress Evidence (ECF No. 64). This Memorandum Opinion addresses the first four motions. Anderson's fifth motion (to suppress evidence) will be addressed in a separate ruling.

I. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Governmental disclosure of evidence in criminal cases is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that discovery in criminal cases is limited to those areas delineated in Rule 16(a)(1), “with some additional material being discoverable in accordance with statutory pronouncements and the due process clause of the Constitution.” United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1994).

As a general matter, these other areas are limited to the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500) and materials available pursuant to the “Brady doctrine.” Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). In United States v. Coles, the district court aptly summarized the interplay of Rule 16, the Jencks Act, and the Brady doctrine, as follows:

Most of the government's pretrial disclosure obligations stem from Rule 16(a). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a). The rule establishes six categories of information that the government must produce to an individual defendant “[u]pon ... request.” See Id. Rules 16(a)(1)(A) and (B) task the government to disclose a defendant's oral, written, and recorded statements, and Rule 16(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of a defendant's prior record. . . . Rule 16(a)(1)(E) is the broadest provision, requiring the government to allow a defendant “to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings[,] or places,” if the item is in the possession, custody, or control of the government and is “material to preparing the defense,” is intended to be used in the government's case-in-chief at trial, or “was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.” .... Rule 16(a)(1)(F) requires the same for the results or reports of any physical or mental examinations or scientific tests or experiments that are in the possession, custody, or control of the government; are known to exist (or reasonably should be known to exist) by the attorney for the government; and either are material to preparing the defense or intended to be used in the government's case-in-chief.. .. Under Rule 16(a)(1)(G), the government must provide defendants with a written summary of any expert testimony it intends to use in its case-in-chief....

Rule 16 includes important caveats. Except as authorized under Rule 16(a)(1)(A) through (D), (F), and (G), the rule exempts government work product from discovery and inspection. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). Government work product includes “reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.” See id. The rule also exempts from discovery and inspection the statements of prospective government witnesses, except as provided in the Jencks Act. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500).

The Jencks Act protects from disclosure statements or reports made by prospective government witnesses until after they testify on direct examination at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). After the witness testifies, the Act entitles the defendant to a copy of “any statement ... of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” Id. § 3500(b). . . The Act is intended to ensure that a defendant has “an opportunity to review the witness's statements for any possible inconsistencies that he might use to impeach the witness.” . . . ***

Finally, under Brady v. Maryland,.. . the government is obligated to disclose to a criminal defendant any evidence in the government's possession that is “favorable to an accused” and “material either to guilt or to punishment.”.... The government must also disclose any “evidence that goes to the credibility of crucial prosecution witnesses.” . . . Known as Giglio material, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 .. . (1972), “this evidence is a subset of Brady material insofar as it addresses situations in which certain evidence about a witness's credibility or motivation to testify exists.”... Failure to disclose either type of material violates the defendant's due-process rights.. . . Admissibility is relevant but not a prerequisite to disclosure under Brady, since “inadmissible evidence may be material if it could ... [lead] to the discovery of admissible evidence.”....

511 F.Supp.3d 566, 574-76 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). With the foregoing principles in mind, the Court makes the following rulings relative to Anderson's various discovery requests.

II. MOTION TO PRESERVE LAW ENFORCEMENT'S ROUGH NOTES (ECF NO. 60)

Anderson seeks an order from this Court requiring all Government agents and investigators in this case to “retain and preserve all rough notes and writings which are arguably producible to the defense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2, and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); or which may be used by the defense for impeachment purposes (including materials to assist in cross-examination pursuant to Federal

Rule of Evidence 806); or which notes and writings were made during the investigation, whether or not the contents of the notes or writings are incorporated in official records, reports, and/or memoranda.” ECF No. 60, ¶l 1. Anderson further asks that the Government be directed to “identify any such rough notes and writings that are unable to be found, or were, in fact, destroyed since the inception of the investigation of this case, or any related investigation.” Id.

“[U]nder Third Circuit precedent, ‘the government must retain and, upon motion, make available to the district court both the rough notes and the drafts of reports of its agents to facilitate the district court's determination whether they should be produced.'” United States v. Graham, No. CR 21-645, 2022 WL 4132488, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2022) (quoting United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 259 (3d Cir. 1983)). “However, such materials are only subject to production ‘to the extent that they either contain Brady material or constitute statements falling under the Jencks Act.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Santos, No. 18-585, 2020 WL 134578, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2020) and citing United States v. Vella, 562 F.2d 275, 276 (3d Cir. 1977) (“rough interview notes of F.B.I. agents should be kept and produced so that the trial court can determine whether the notes should be made available to the appellant under the rule of Brady [ ], or the Jencks Act.”)); see also Ramos, 27 F.3d at 68 (restating the holdings of Vella and Ammar).

In its response to Anderson's motion, the Government states it is aware of its obligation to retain these materials pursuant to the rulings in Ramos, Ammar, and Vella. To that end, the United States represents that it has directed law enforcement agents to retain all their notes relative to the underlying investigation of Anderson's alleged criminal activity.

In light of the Government's representation, the Court will dismiss Anderson's request for a preservation order as moot. The Court will grant Anderson's motion insofar as the Government is directed to promptly notify the defense of any law enforcement notes related to this matter that are missing or that were destroyed, whether inadvertently or intentionally.

III. MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF EXCULAPTORY AND IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE (ECF NO. 61)

Anderson seeks an order instructing the Government to produce forthwith all Brady and Giglio evidence that may exist in this case. His request includes exculpatory statements the Government might possess from witnesses or confidential informants, evidence that may be relevant to Anderson's suppression motion, and information that may be useful in impeaching the prosecution's prospective witnesses.

Pursuant to Brady, the prosecution has an ongoing duty to turn over “evidence favorable to an accused ... where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment[.]” 373 U.S. at 87. The Brady doctrine is generally understood as imposing a duty of minimum fairness on prosecutors, based on a defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. United States v Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1983). Under Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, the prosecution's disclosure obligation extends to evidence which may be used to impeach the testimony of a government witness when the credibility of the witness may have an effect on the jury's determination of guilt or innocence. See Ramos, 27 F.3d at 68 (Brady material includes those that “go to the heart of the defendant's guilt or innocence” as well as “materials that might affect the jury's judgment of the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness”) (quoting United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1992)). Ultimately, Brady and its progeny “establish a prosecutorial...