United States v. Anderson

101 F.4th 586

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan Edward Charles ANDERSON, aka Johnathan Anderson, aka Johnathan Edward Anderson, aka Jonathan Charles Anderson, aka Jonathan Edward Anderson, aka Jonathan Edward Cha Anderson, aka Jonathon Edward Anderson, aka X Rage, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-50345

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Argued and Submitted En Banc September 21, 2023 San Francisco, California

Filed May 2, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 5:20-cr-00071-RGK-1

David R. Friedman (argued) and Elana S. Artson, Assistant United States Attorneys; Byron R. Tuyay, Assistant United States Attorney, Riverside Branch Office; Bram M. Alden, Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal Appeals Section Chief; Tracy L. Wilkison, Acting United States Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ashwini S. Mate (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender; Federal Public Defender's Office, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, John B. Owens, Daniel A. Bress, Danielle J. Forrest, Lawrence VanDyke, Gabriel P. Sanchez, Salvador Mendoza, Jr. and Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest;

Concurrence by Judge Mendoza, Jr.; Dissent by Judge Bress.

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge.

Law enforcement may conduct warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles. But the Supreme Court has instructed that inventory searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if they are motivated by administrative purposes, and not solely by investigatory purposes. The question here is whether an officer's failure to comply with governing administrative procedures is relevant in assessing the officer's motivation for conducting an inventory search. The answer is yes. An officer's compliance (or as is the case here, non-compliance) with department policy governing inventory searches is part of the totality of circumstances properly considered in determining whether a search satisfies the requirements of the inventory-search exception to the warrant requirement. And based on the circumstances presented here, we conclude that the deputies who searched Defendant Jonathan Anderson's truck acted solely for investigatory reasons. Therefore, we reverse the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

I. BACKGROUND

At two o'clock in the morning, a San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department (SBCSD) deputy noticed Anderson's truck traveling in a high-crime area with a partially obstructed license plate in violation of California Vehicle Code § 5201. The deputy turned on his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop, but Anderson accelerated and made a series of abrupt turns ending up on a dead-end street. The deputy called for backup, and Anderson ultimately pulled into a residential driveway and got out of his truck less than a minute into the encounter. Believing that Anderson was trying to flee, the deputy confronted him at gunpoint. Soon after, a second deputy arrived and handcuffed Anderson. Anderson said that he was parked in "a friend['s]" driveway and that his driver's license was expired. Dispatch confirmed that Anderson's license was expired and informed the deputies that Anderson was a career criminal. The deputies remarked that Anderson had a lot of money in his wallet and questioned why he had gloves and why his truck was wet.

Anderson repeatedly told the deputies that they could not search his truck. But the deputies responded that they had to tow and inventory his truck because he did not have a valid license. The parties agree on appeal that the owner of the home where Anderson parked did not know Anderson and wanted the truck removed. They dispute, however, whether the deputies knew this before they searched Anderson's truck. According to Anderson, the first deputy began searching within seconds of learning Anderson's criminal history and then spoke with the homeowner after the search. The deputies claim they confirmed that the homeowner did not know Anderson before the search began. The parties agree that the deputies refused Anderson's request to have a friend come retrieve his truck.

During the purported inventory search, a loaded handgun under Anderson's driver's seat was found, and the deputies arrested Anderson for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The record indicates that between three and seven minutes elapsed from when the first deputy initiated the stop to when the gun was found.

The SBCSD has a standard procedure governing impounding and inventorying vehicles. The SBCSD Manual directs that deputies "shall[] [c]omplete two (2) CHP 180 forms ..., including an inventory of any personal property contained within the vehicle." (Emphasis added.) The form requires deputies to record details about the ownership of the vehicle, the condition of the vehicle, and the towing company used. It also has a separate section entitled: "REMARKS (list property, tools, vehicle damage, arrests)."

The second deputy stayed at the scene to complete the CHP 180 Form after the first deputy transported Anderson to jail. The second deputy detailed the condition of the truck, including, for example, that it had front and rear seats, an ignition key, and a battery and that the tires were "worn." He also noted the registered owner and the towing company. But even though various items of personal property in addition to the gun was contained in the truck, the "REMARKS" section of the form stated only:

Veh pulled over for obstructed plate. Driver found to have expired CDL. Upon inventory search firearm located. Driver is convicted felon. Veh pulled into driveway to res. Owner of res. doesn't know driver[.] Veh has misc. scratches & dents 360°, damage to pass. door and tailgate.

(Emphasis added.) Nowhere did the deputy list Anderson's other personal property that included: (1) two pairs of Ray-Ban sunglasses, (2) an iPhone cord, (3) an Android phone charger, (4) a bottle of cologne, (5) a watch, (6) an audio speaker, and (7) tools. The deputy took photographs of the inside of the truck that showed some of Anderson's personal property, and the police report documented that a compact disc, gun, holster, and ammunition were found in the truck. But neither the photographs nor the police report was referenced or incorporated into the vehicle inventory form. And as the second deputy acknowledged, SBCSD's procedure does not allow personal property to be inventoried by photographs.

Anderson was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the firearm and ammunition, arguing that the inventory search was unconstitutional because (1) the deputies lacked a valid "community caretaking purpose" when they searched his truck, (2) the impoundment violated California law, and (3) the deputies violated SBCSD's inventory procedures and had an impermissible investigatory motive for conducting the search.

The district court heard testimony from the deputies and the homeowner and denied Anderson's motion. It found that Anderson did not have a valid driver's license and that the homeowner did not know Anderson or want Anderson's truck on his property. In assessing whether the deputies had a valid community caretaking purpose, the district court focused on "whether or not [the deputies] searched the car before or after they talked to the homeowner" and learned that he did not know Anderson. The district court noted that "there[] [were] a lot of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony," but based on "credibility and looking at what [was] speculative and what [was] the evidence," it found that the record established the deputies did "talk to the homeowner before they searched the car."¹ The district court concluded that the search was reasonable without addressing whether the deputies complied with California law or SBCSD's inventory procedure or whether they had an impermissible motive for the search.

Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal the suppression order, and the district court sentenced him to 77 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress de novo and its related factual findings for clear error. United States v. Fisher, 56 F.4th 673, 682 (9th Cir. 2022). We reverse a district court's factual findings that are "illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record." Ashker v. Newsom, 81 F.4th 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.W., 21 F.4th 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021)). Where, as here, the district court does not make specific findings on a "factual issue relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis, we 'uphold a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress if there was a reasonable view to support it.'" United States v. Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Gooch, 506 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007)).

III. INVENTORY-SEARCH EXCEPTION

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection was "crafted ... as a 'response to the reviled "general warrants" and "writs of assistance" of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.'" Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213, 201 L.Ed.2d 507 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014...