United States v. Arce-Ayala

91 F.4th 28

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Samuel ARCE-AYALA, a/k/a Brócoli, a/k/a Broco, aka Vegetal, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 21-1511

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit

January 17, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant.

Ricardo A. Imbert-Fernández, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

Before Barron, Chief Judge, Lipez and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellant Samuel Arce-Ayala pled guilty to federal charges related to drug trafficking and possession of a firearm. Arce-Ayala says he understood that this plea agreement guaranteed his federal sentence would reflect "credit" for the prison time he served for related non-federal criminal convictions. Statements from his lawyer and the district court reinforced his belief. Yet, after entering a guilty plea, Arce-Ayala discovered such credit could not reduce his sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. He then moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, but the district court denied the motion and sentenced him to the mandatory minimum prison terms for his charged offenses.

On appeal, Arce-Ayala argues the district court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea because, not understanding the consequences of his plea, it was unknowing. Agreeing with his position, we vacate Arce-Ayala's criminal judgment of conviction.

I.

A. Federal Indictment and Prior Commonwealth Criminal Convictions

Arce-Ayala was a leader, drug point owner, and enforcer for "Los Menores," a violent drug trafficking organization in Puerto Rico.¹ As a drug point owner, Arce-Ayala supervised the purchase, sale, and distribution of narcotics at certain public housing projects controlled by the organization. As an enforcer, Arce-Ayala would carry and use firearms to protect Los Menores' drug trafficking activities. In December 2017, a federal grand jury indicted Arce-Ayala along with 103 other individuals on charges related to their participation in Los Menores. Specifically, Arce-Ayala was charged with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l), 846, and 860 ("Count I"), and with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A) ("Count II").

Arce-Ayala was no stranger to the criminal justice system by the time he was charged federally. About five years before this federal indictment, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico convicted Arce-Ayala on two counts of attempted second-degree murder and three firearms offenses.² These Commonwealth convictions stemmed from an incident in June 2011, when Arce-Ayala shot two individuals to "further the drug trafficking activities of [Los Menores]." Both victims survived the attack.³ In September 2012, Arce-Ayala was sentenced to eight years in prison for these Commonwealth convictions.

While still serving his Commonwealth sentence, Arce-Ayala was charged with the federal offenses at issue here. He ultimately served sixty-four months in Commonwealth custody before being transferred to a federal facility due to the present charges.

B. The Plea Agreement and Change-of-Plea Hearing

Although Arce-Ayala initially pled not guilty to his federal charges, he entered a plea agreement with the government on June 5, 2020. Under the agreement, Arce-Ayala would plead guilty to both Count I and Count II of the indictment. Several provisions in the agreement governed the sentence the parties would recommend to the district court.

To start, the parties noted the applicable minimum and maximum penalties for each offense. The statutory minimum term of imprisonment for Count I, the drug trafficking conspiracy charge, was 120 months, while the maximum prison sentence was life in prison. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b)(l)(A), 860. The statutory minimum prison sentence for Count II, the firearms charge, was sixty months, while the maximum was a life term. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A).

The agreement then set out the applicable sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Starting with Count I, the parties agreed Arce-Ayala's Total Offense Level was thirty-one.⁴ Assuming a criminal history category of one, Arce-Ayala's Guidelines sentencing range for Count I was between 108 and 135 months.⁵ As to Count II, the agreement noted the guideline sentence is "the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute." See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b). The statute charged under Count II, as mentioned, carries a sixty-month mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A).

Next, the parties agreed to recommend certain sentences for each charge. As to Count I, they agreed to recommend the statutory minimum prison sentence of 120 months; as for Count II, they agreed to recommend the statutory minimum prison sentence of sixty months, which would be served consecutively to the sentence imposed from Count I.⁶

These recommendations were followed by the "relevant conduct" provision at issue in this appeal. The parties agreed Arce-Ayala's Commonwealth convictions for attempted murder (and the accompanying firearms offenses) involved "relevant conduct to the case of reference and that in the instant case, the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 and § 5K2.23."⁷

The parties appeared for a change-of-plea hearing on June 8, 2020, three days after Arce-Ayala signed the above-described agreement. There, the government summarized key provisions of the deal. During the government's description of the "relevant conduct" provision, the district court interjected to have the following colloquy with Arce-Ayala:

THE COURT: I want to ask Mr. Arce one question. Mr. Arce, you heard the Prosecutor say that some cases in which you were convicted in the State Court are relevant conduct to this case and that your sentence would be imposed pursuant to certain sections of the sentencing guidelines. Did you hear that?

ARCE-AYALA: Yes.

THE COURT: That means, Mr. Arce, that whatever time you spent in the State Court will be -- you will be given credit for that time when I sentence you in this case. Do you understand that?

ARCE-AYALA: Yes.

THE COURT: With that clarification, Mr. Arce, do you agree with the summary stated by the Prosecutor of your plea agreement?

ARCE-AYALA: Yes.

The district court then asked a variety of questions to determine whether Arce-Ayala had entered a knowing and voluntary plea agreement. During this exchange, the district court explained it could impose a sentence that was "either more severe or even less severe than the sentence [Arce-Ayala] may anticipate, or even the sentence being recommended in the plea agreement." Separately, the district court stated, "even after [Arce-Ayala's] sentencing guideline range has been determined, [the court would] have the authority to depart from those guidelines and impose a sentence on [him] that is either more severe or less severe than the sentence called for by the guidelines."

The court ultimately found Arce-Ayala competent to enter an informed plea and that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. After accepting Arce-Ayala's plea, the court scheduled his sentencing for October 6, 2020.

C. Defense Counsel's Mistake of Law

Problems arose between the parties in the months following Arce-Ayala's guilty plea. In September 2020, Arce-Ayala's trial counsel, Ián Terón-Molina, learned the "relevant conduct" provision in the plea agreement could not provide Arce-Ayala with credit for his time served in Commonwealth custody. In sharing his mistake with Arce-Ayala, Terón-Molina explained that if he were to receive credit for his Commonwealth sentence, his federal sentence would fall below the statutory mandatory minimum. And, contrary to their earlier assumptions, neither U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) nor U.S.S.G. § 5K2.23 permitted the district court to sentence Arce-Ayala below the mandatory minimum.

Terón-Molina's belated understanding of the law was correct. Generally, "sentencing guidelines cannot be employed to impose a sentence below an applicable statutory mandatory minimum." United States v. Ramirez, 252 F.3d 516, 518-19 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126-27, 116 S.Ct. 2057, 135 L.Ed.2d 427 (1996)). After all, "mandatory minimums are imposed by Congress," so "only Congress -- through the enactment of another statute -- can authorize downward departures from them." United States v. Moore, 918 F.3d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 2019). With that in mind, our court has so far found only two ways for a district court to sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. "First, if a defendant provides substantial assistance the government may move for a below-minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). Second, the court may sentence below a mandatory minimum if a defendant has been convicted of a qualifying drug trafficking offense and meets the requirements of the 'safety valve' provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)." United States v. Candelario-Ramos, 45 F.4th 521, 525 (1st Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

Here, Arce-Ayala neither provided substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) nor qualified for the "safety valve" provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Rather, Arce-Ayala believed the provisions cited in his plea agreement, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5K2.23, would provide him "credit" for his time served in Commonwealth custody on related charges. But U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) applies only "when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing."...