United States v. Argueta-Mejia

166 F.Supp.3d 1216

United States of America, Plaintiff,

v.1. Ulises Argueta–Mejia, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 13–cr–0379–WJM

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed May 27, 2014

Geoffrey Rieman, Robert Mark Russel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Scott Thomas Varholak, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

William J. Martínez, United States District Judge

Defendant Ulises Argueta–Mejia is charged in a one-count Indictment with unlawful re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and is subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to § 1326(b)(2) because his prior deportation was subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony offense. (ECF No. 1.) On December 19, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements (“Motion”). (ECF No. 18.) The Court held an evidentiary hearing on April 18, 2014, and supplemental briefs were filed thereafter. (ECF Nos. 34, 36 & 39.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” However, “[t]he Amendment says nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of this command. That rule–the exclusionary rule–is a prudential doctrine created by th[e Supreme] Court to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, a defendant may move for suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

As will be more fully discussed below, it is undisputed that Denver Police Officer Martin Tritschler did not have a warrant when he initially stopped the Defendant. On a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless seizure, the Government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir.1993) (“As a general matter, if the search or seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the defendant has the burden of proof; but if the police acted without a warrant the burden of proof is on the prosecution.... [Thus,] when the defendant challenges a warrantless search or seizure the government carries the burden of justifying the agents' actions.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir.2006) ; United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 534 (10th Cir.1994) ; United States v. Finefrock, 668 F.2d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir.1982). Thus, the Government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the seizure in this case.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a traffic stop on September 4, 2013, following which the Defendant was identified as being in the United States unlawfully. (ECF No. 18.) At the suppression hearing, the following witnesses testified: (1) Denver Police Department Officer Martin Tritschler, (2) Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Agent Guadalupe Rodriguez, and (3) Defendant Ulises Argueta. In this section, the Court will summarize the testimony of these witnesses. The Court's findings regarding the witnesses' credibility will be set forth in the analysis section.

A. Officer Tritschler

Officer Martin Tritschler is a 20–year veteran of the Denver Police Department and is currently assigned to the gang unit. On September 4, 2013, he was on patrol in a marked police cruiser. Right around midnight, Officer Tritschler was driving eastbound on 38th Street and stopped at a red light at the intersection of 38th Street and Federal Boulevard. He was in the lane closest to the left turn lane.

As the light turned green for the left turn lane, Officer Tritschler noticed that one of the vehicles did not have its left turn signal activated, despite the law requiring the driver to do so. Officer Tritschler also observed that the same vehicle turned into the outside lane on Federal Boulevard, rather than the inside lane (as required by law). Based on these traffic infractions, Officer Tritschler initiated a traffic stop. He pulled his cruiser behind the vehicle and turned on his lights and sirens. The vehicle pulled to the side of the road, and Officer Tritschler ran the vehicle's license plates through his Mobile Data Terminal (MBT), which is essentially a laptop mounted in his police cruiser. The MBT did not return any warrants for the vehicle.

Officer Tritschler then approached the vehicle and obtained a driver's license, insurance, and registration from the driver. He confirmed that the individual on the license, Ulises Argueta, was the same person as the driver, and returned to his cruiser to run the license through the MBT.¹ Officer Tritschler received a “hit” on Mr. Argueta's license from the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database stating: “SUBJECT OF NIC/N420453406 IS A PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED FELON. CONTACT LESC AT (877) 999–5372 FOR IMMEDIATE HIT CONFIRMATION AND AVAILABILITY OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DETAINER.” (Gov't Ex. 3.) Officer Tritschler then went back to the Defendant's vehicle and asked for his social security number to ensure that the Defendant was the actual person named in the NCIC hit. The social security number provided by the Defendant matched the information in the hit.

Officer Tritschler then called the number listed in the hit to see if ICE wanted him to detain the Defendant. ICE asked Officer Tritschler to hold the Defendant, so Officer Tritschler placed the Defendant under arrest. Officer Tritschler testified that, per Denver Police Department's policy, officers are not permitted to arrest individuals if the only charge is an immigration violation. Therefore, the only reason Officer Tritschler arrested the Defendant was because of the NCIC hit and ICE's instruction that the Defendant should be detained. He testified that the traffic infractions that were the reason for his traffic stop were not severe enough to merit an arrest. Had there been no NCIC hit, or if ICE would not have wanted the Defendant detained, Officer Tritschler would have let the Defendant go with a warning.

Once the Defendant was arrested, Officer Tritschler transported him to the Denver Police Department substation at 47th and Pecos. Officer Tritschler testified that the substation was about a five minute drive from the site of the traffic stop, and that ICE officials arrived at the substation almost immediately after Officer Tritschler and the Defendant arrived. Officer Tritschler turned Defendant over to the ICE officials and went back out on patrol. He never issued a citation to the Defendant for failure to signal a turn or turning into the outside lane because he assumed the Defendant was going to face felony immigration charges so he did not see any point in issuing a traffic ticket. Officer Tritschler testified that, because he did not issue a citation or warning, the only record of this stop would have been in his log book, which is a log of what he does on patrol each day. Officer Tritschler did not bring his log sheet to the hearing, and it has never been produced to the Defendant.

On December 22, 2013, at the request of counsel for the Government, Officer Tritschler prepared a report regarding the traffic stop at issue here (the “Report”). (Def.'s Ex. B.) The Report states that the Defendant was stopped for changing lanes without signaling; there is no mention of a failure to use a turn signal during the left turn. (Id .) The Report also states that, after he contacted the Defendant and obtained his driver's license:

I returned to my cruiser and ran his information via the MDT and found he had a Felony Immigration Hold that was active in the system. The name, description and social security number provided on the warrant all matched up to what I observed of him, the warrant and his ID. At one point I recontacted him and verified his social security number. At that point I took him into custody without incident. I explained to him about the warrant and I believe he said something like, “Yeah, I know.” I didn't advise him of his Miranda rights and so didn't question him at all about that. We did have a conversation about the car as I needed to impound it with his arrest.

I took him to a nearby station—District 1–1131 W 46th Ave—and when the ICE agents arrived—turned him over to them. I didn't want to “stack” charges or something, so I just advised Argueta of the traffic violations on the scene and didn't write him a ticket for them.

(Id. )

B. Guadalupe Rodriguez

The second witness for the Government was Guadalupe Rodriguez, a deportation officer for ICE since 2007. She first testified generally about ICE's procedures for arresting an individual in the field. ICE procedures dictate that an agent interview the subject to obtain basic identification evidence. If the subject admits that he or she is an alien and does not have the proper documents to allow them to be in the United States, the subject is arrested and transported to the ICE office for processing. At the ICE office, the subject's personal items are removed and inventoried, and the agent starts the “booking process”. The booking process involves obtaining basic biographical information and inputting it into the ICE system. The subject is advised about free or low-cost attorneys, and provided a national detainee handbook.

The subject is then fingerprinted on a digital machine in the ICE office, and the fingerprints are run through two databases, one belonging to ICE and the other maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If there is a positive match, the ICE agent will receive the subject's criminal history, which includes the subject's immigration history, as well as his name, date...