United States v. Arias

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. FULGENCIO ARIAS, JR., Defendant.

No. 3:11-cr-00494-HZ-1

United States District Court, D. Oregon

March 29, 2023

Natalie K. Wight United States Attorney, District of Oregon Kelly A. Zusman First Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff

Margaret Huntington O'Connor Weber, LLC Attorney for Defendant

OPINION & ORDER

MARCO A. HERNANDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Fulgencio Arias Jr. moves for a reduction of his sentence of incarceration to time served for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government opposes Defendant's motion. This matter is suitable for decision without oral argument. For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2016, Defendant was convicted of (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, specifically a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine weighing 500 grams or more; (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering (3) attempted distribution of methamphetamine, specifically a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine weighing 500 grams or more; and (4) distribution of methamphetamine, specifically a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine weighing 500 grams or more. Verdict, ECF 448. The Court sentenced Defendant to a 300-month term of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. Am. J. & Commitment, ECF 518. At the time the present motion was filed Defendant's projected release date was October 16, 2033. Def. Supp. Mem. 3, ECF 639. Defendant is currently serving his sentence at FCI Yazoo City. Id. at 2.

STANDARDS

A federal district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824-25 (2010). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Congress provided an exception, commonly known as compassionate release, to reduce a defendant's sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Under the original statute, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) could file a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for a sentence reduction on a defendant's behalf. United States v.Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021). But with the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5191 (2018), Congress amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a defendant, after first requesting that the BOP move for a reduction on his or her behalf, to directly move the district court for a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

[T]he court, . . . upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-

(i) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; [. . . ] and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The United States Sentencing Commission's policy statement identifies categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons, including the defendant's age, medical condition, and “family circumstances.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 app. n.1(A)-(C). The Sentencing Commission's policy statement, however, only applies to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by the BOP Director on behalf of a defendant. Arwda, 993 F.3d at 801. On a defendant's direct motion for compassionate release, the policy factors “may inform a district court's discretion . . ., but they are not binding.” Id. at 802 (citation omitted). As a result, the court may consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise. Id. This is broad in scope. The Supreme Court recently held that a district court may consider intervening changes of law or fact. Concepcion v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 2389, 2396 (2022). The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that a district court may consider non-retroactive changes to penalty provisions. UnitedStates v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2022). Where a defendant advances several bases in support of a motion for compassionate release, the district court should consider whether those reasons combined rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling even if no circumstance alone justifies compassionate release. Seeid. at 1101.

DISCUSSION

Defendant's motion is ripe for review. Defendant asserts that on July 30 2022, he requested release from the warden and received no response. Def. Mot. 3, ECF 624. The Government accepts that Defendant thereby exhausted his administrative remedies. Gov. Resp. 2, ECF 629. But Defendant has not shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances, and reducing his sentence would not be consistent with the statutory sentencing factors.

I. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

Defendant provides several bases for his motion. He challenges the length of his sentence as a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Def. Mem. 4-8, 21-23, ECF 624-1. Defendant also challenges evidence presented at trial and his treatment while incarcerated as violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 23-26. Next, Defendant argues that his state of health and conditions of confinement put him at risk of serious consequences from COVID-19. Id. at 30-35; Def. Supp. Mem. 7-23. Finally, Defendant argues that he has rehabilitated and is not a danger to the community. Def. Mem. 17-21. The Court considers each argument in turn and assesses whether these reasons, individually or cumulatively, are extraordinary and compelling.

A. Constitutional Arguments

Defendant's motion challenges the length of his sentence on constitutional grounds. Defendant argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Def. Traverse Motion in Rebuttal (“Def. Reply”) 7-8, ECF 633. He also argues that he was effectively penalized for going to trial. Def. Mem. 21-23. Finally, he argues that his base offense level was improperly increased. Id. at 4-5, 27. All of these arguments lack merit.

The Court first addresses Defendant's assertion that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. This argument should have been raised on appeal. SeeGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). Nevertheless, the Court will briefly consider it. Sentences are subject to review for procedural and substantive reasonableness. id. at 51. Substantive reasonableness review considers the totality of the circumstances. id. The Court's duty at sentencing is to consider the sentencing factors and make an individualized determination of the appropriate sentence for the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v. Simpson, 572 Fed.Appx. 523, 524 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court considered the statutory factors at Defendant's sentencing hearing. Sentencing Hearing Tr. 69-71, ECF 554. Defendant faced a ten-year statutory minimum sentence, with a maximum of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). His base offense level was 36. Tr. 52:9-13. With enhancements, Defendant's offense level was 46, adjusted to 43. Id. at 53:25-54:2. His criminal history category is III. Id. at 54:2. The guidelines recommended a life sentence. Id. at 54:4-5. The Court sentenced Defendant to 300 months, well below the guidelines' recommendation. The sentence is also below the average sentence imposed on defendants with the same final offense level and criminal history category, which is 360 months. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Judiciary Sentencing INformation (JSIN), available at https://jsin.ussc.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard (last accessed March 15, 2023) (data from the Sentencing Commission for the fiscal years 2017 through 2021).^[1] In imposing the sentence, the Court observed that Defendant was loved by his family but had engaged in dangerous conduct. Tr. 71:5-7. The sentence is substantively reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances.

Defendant argues that his sentence is a trial penalty because he could have received a lower sentence if he had entered a guilty plea rather than going to trial. Def. Mem. 22. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a jury trial. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020). On the other hand, “[t]here is no constitutional right to a plea bargain, and the decision whether to offer a plea bargain is a matter of prosecutorial discretion.” United Statesv. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 791 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and the defendant's attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement.”) (emphasis added).

Defendant chose to assert his innocence and exercise his right to a jury trial. Defendant states that he rejected the proffered plea deal because it required him to admit allegations that he believed to be untrue. Def. Reply 9. Defendant had the right to reject the plea offer and proceed to trial. He did not have the right to receive a plea offer. Defendant provides no evidence that he was improperly pressured or threatened during plea negotiations. He chose to go to trial and was convicted. He was sentenced based on his conviction and his other relevant characteristics, receiving a sentence that was lower than the recommended range and lower than average for similar defendants. There is no injustice for 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to remedy.

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