United States v. Arrington

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DERREK K. ARRINGTON, Defendant.

No. 00-cr-159-RCL

United States District Court, District of Columbia

February 5, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is defendant Derrek K. Arrington's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mr Arrington served a twenty-year sentence after a jury convicted him of assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) and (b), and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). J., ECF No. 75. This Court denied Mr Arrington's motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). United States v. Arrington, No 00-cr-159 (RCL), 2019 WL 4644381, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Sept. 24 2019), rev'd, 4 F.4th 162 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded to this Court for further proceedings. Arrington, 4 F.4th at 171. Upon consideration of the record, the applicable law, and the parties' briefing, the Court will GRANT Mr. Arrington's § 2255 motion, vacate his sentence, and resentence him at a later date.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Arrington's convictions stem from a traffic stop that escalated into a high-speed chase and ended after he shot a police officer in the face. On April 13, 2000, United States Park Police officers pulled over Mr. Arrington and observed suspected drugs inside his vehicle. Gov't Opp'n 3, ECF No. 183. Officers demanded that Mr. Arrington exit his car, but he refused. Id. Mr. Arrington instead shifted his vehicle into gear. Id. Two officers attempted to stop him. Id. Officer Daniels, who was standing on the driver's side of the vehicle, reached inside and grabbed Mr. Arrington. Id. Another officer, who was standing on the passenger's side, tried to remove his keys from the ignition. Id. The officers were unable to stop Mr. Arrington, and he sped away, dragging Officer Daniels through an intersection. Id. Mr. Arrington led police on a high-speed chase but ultimately abandoned his vehicle and fled on foot. Id. Officer Daniels, who had resumed his pursuit of Mr. Arrington, caught up with him as he attempted to scale a fence. Id. At that moment, Mr. Arrington produced a handgun, aimed it at Officer Daniels, and shot him once in the face. Id. Other officers were able to subdue Mr. Arrington, but the damage to Officer Daniels was already done. Id. The gunshot wound severed one of the nerves in his face, causing facial paralysis and requiring nerve surgery to restore movement. Id. at 3-4.

Mr. Arrington was indicted for several felony offenses and proceeded to trial before Judge James Robertson. On September 18, 2000, a jury convicted Mr. Arrington of assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) and (b), and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). Verdict Form, ECF No. 35. The jury hung on the remaining charges. Because Mr. Arrington had already been convicted of two armed robbery offenses, he faced a heightened “210- to 262-month sentencing range, which became 210 to 240 months because of the 10-year statutory maximum” on each of his counts. Arrington, 4 F.4th at 164. The sentencing range was heightened because the Court found that Mr. Arrington's previous armed robbery convictions qualified as “crimes of violence” under the Guidelines, which triggered certain enhancements. Id. The heightened range was mandatory because, at the time, the sentencing guidelines were “mandatory and binding on all judges.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). The Court sentenced Mr. Arrington to 240 months-the top of the Guidelines range as limited by the statutory maxima. Arrington, 4 F.4th at 164.

As the Circuit explained in its opinion reversing and remanding this Court, “[Mr.] Arrington faced a heightened sentencing range because of two Guidelines provisions.” Id. The first provision, § 2K2.1(a), “required an increased base offense level of 24 for a defendant,” Def.'s Suppl. Mot. 1, ECF No. 177, who “had at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) (Nov. 2000). The second provision, § 4B1.1, classified a defendant as “a career offender” and applied a sentencing enhancement if the following three conditions were met: “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (Nov. 2000). At issue during sentencing was whether his prior convictions constituted predicate crimes of violence such that these provisions applied to Mr. Arrington.

The Guidelines' definition of “crime of violence” appeared at § 4B1.2(a) and contained three clauses. The first, known as the “elements clause,” defined a crime of violence as any felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (Nov. 2000). The second, known as the “enumerated clause,” defined a crime of violence as any felony that “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion” or “involves use of explosives.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2000). The third, known as the “residual clause,” defined a crime of violence as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id.

Judge Robertson found that Mr. Arrington's unlawful possession of a firearm count qualified for an enhanced base offense level under § 2K2.1(a)(2) and his assault on a federal officer count qualified him as a career offender under § 4B1.1 “because he ha[d] at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Sentencing Tr. 7, ECF No. 177-2; see also Arrington, 4 F.4th at 164. The sentencing judge did not specify which Guidelines' definition of “crime of violence” he relied upon in determining that Mr. Arrington was a career offender. See Sentencing Tr. 7. Based on these “somewhat complicated” Guidelines calculations, Mr. Arrington was sentenced to twenty years in prison, followed by six years of supervised release. Sentencing Tr. 4, 19-20. He was also ordered to pay a $200 special assessment and $700 in restitution. Sentencing Tr. 20-21.

The Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1241 (2003). Mr. Arrington then filed his first § 2255 motion, which Judge Robertson denied. Arrington v. United States, No. 00-cr-159 (JR), 2007 WL 1238740, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2007).^[2]Mr. Arrington appealed, Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 115, and the Court denied a certificate of appealability, Order, ECF No. 119. The Circuit then dismissed Mr. Arrington's appeal for lack of a certificate. United States v. Arrington, No. 08-3005 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2008) (per curiam order).^[3]

B. Johnson and Its Progeny

Several important legal developments occurred in the following years.

In January 2005, the Supreme Court “severed and excised” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)-the provision requiring sentencing courts to “impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range” set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines-thereby rendering the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.

Then, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States and held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which contained language identical to the Sentencing Guidelines' residual clause, unconstitutionally vague. 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015). The Johnson Court explained that “[t]wo features of [ACCA's] residual clause conspire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 597. First, the residual clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it “tie[d] the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case' of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements.” Id. Second, the residual clause left “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify [under the clause].” Id. at 598. A year later, the Supreme Court held that “Johnson announced a substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.” Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 135 (2016).

Shortly after Welch, the D.C. Circuit decided United States v. Sheffield, which extended Johnson to the Sentencing Guidelines and invalidated § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 312-13 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United States the following year rejected an unconstitutional vagueness challenge to the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines' residual clause and effectively overruled Sheffield Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256, 259 (2017). The Supreme Court declined to extend Johnson to the now-advisory Guidelines because unlike ACCA's residual clause, the advisory Guidelines “do not fix the permissible range of sentences” and “merely guide the exercise of a court's discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range.” Id. at 263. For this reason, the advisory Guidelines are entirely exempted from “vagueness challenge[s] under the Due Process Clause.” Id. However, as Justice Sotomayor noted in concurrence, “[t]he Court's adherence to the formalistic...