United States v. B.N.M.

107 F.4th 1152

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. B.N.M., (Male Juvenile), Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-9900

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

FILED July 10, 2024

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges.

HOLMES, Chief Judge.

B.N.M., a juvenile male, is accused of participating in the murder of his girlfriend's parents when he was fifteen years old. On the government's request, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma transferred B.N.M. to adult status—in other words, it permitted him to be prosecuted as an adult rather than as a juvenile. In this interlocutory appeal, B.N.M. challenges this transfer decision.

He first argues that the district court's order was infected with error because the magistrate judge erroneously attributed testimony to B.N.M.'s expert witness when, in fact, the relevant testimony had been given by the government's expert witness. He further argues that the district court abused its discretion and clearly erred when considering two of the factors relevant to the transfer analysis—viz., the nature of the offense and the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. Finally, he argues that because the only available punishments for first-degree murder would be unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile, it is unconstitutional to transfer him for adult prosecution.

We reject each of B.N.M.'s arguments and affirm the district court's order transferring him for adult prosecution. First, we begin by providing an overview of the statutory scheme underlying this matter, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Second, we lay out the factual and procedural history of the case. Third, we address our own jurisdiction and discuss our standard of review. Fourth, we individually address each of B.N.M.'s arguments and explain why we are unpersuaded that these arguments require vacatur.

I

A

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42, sets forth "special procedures for the prosecution of persons who are juveniles at the time a federal crime is committed." United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990). "Under this act, prosecution results in an adjudication of status—not a criminal conviction." Id. The purpose of this special system is "to remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation." Id. The act defines a "juvenile" as "a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday." 18 U.S.C. § 5031.

The maximum term of official detention that may be imposed for juvenile delinquency depends on the age of the juvenile and the nature of the offense. For juveniles less than eighteen years old, the term of juvenile detention may not extend "beyond the lesser of": (1) the date they turn twenty-one; (2) the maximum of the range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G.") "applicable to an otherwise similarly situated adult defendant," unless there is an aggravating factor warranting an upward departure; or (3) the maximum term of imprisonment "if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(A)-(C).¹

For juveniles between eighteen and twenty-one years old who are charged with a Class A, B, or C felony, the maximum term of juvenile detention is the lesser of (1) five years, or (2) the maximum of the Guidelines range applicable to a similarly situated adult defendant, unless there is an aggravating factor warranting an upward departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). And for juveniles between eighteen and twenty-one years old who are charged with other felonies, the maximum term of juvenile detention is the lesser of: (1) three years; (2) the maximum of the Guidelines range applicable to a similarly situated adult defendant, unless there is an aggravating factor warranting an upward departure; or (3) the maximum term of imprisonment "if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

B

Under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, juveniles over the age of fifteen may sometimes be transferred for adult prosecution.² See United States v. Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1997). But "children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing"—in particular, they are "less deserving of the most severe punishments" due to their "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." United States v. Doe, 58 F.4th 1148, 1156 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 144 S. Ct. 166, 217 L.Ed.2d 56 (2023). Consequently, trying a juvenile as an adult is the exception rather than the rule: "[j]uvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate," United States v. McQuade Q., 403 F.3d 717, 719 (10th Cir. 2005), and transfer to adult prosecution is appropriate only "when the government establishes that prosecution as an adult is 'in the interest of justice,' " Doe, 58 F.4th at 1156 (quoting Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589). When considering a motion to transfer a juvenile to adult prosecution, the district court must balance the "important interest[s]" represented by the federal juvenile delinquency system "against the need to protect the public from dangerous individuals." Id. (quoting McQuade Q., 403 F.3d at 719). "Because a transfer hearing results only in an adjudication of status, the government's burden of proof is merely a preponderance of the evidence." 9B Barbara Van Arsdale, et al., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 22:2510, Westlaw (updated June 2024) (footnote omitted) (collecting cases).

Title 18 U.S.C. § 5032 sets forth six statutory factors to guide district courts in determining whether a transfer to adult status would be in the "interest of justice." Specifically, these factors are:

(1) the age and social background of the juvenile;

(2) the nature of the alleged offense;

(3) the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record;

(4) the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity;

(5) the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; and

(6) the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.

Doe, 58 F.4th at 1156-57 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5032). The government is required to present evidence on each factor. See United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999). And the district court must consider each of these six factors, although it is not required to state whether each specific factor weighs in favor of or against transfer. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589.

District courts are given a great deal of discretion in weighing these factors. That is because "[t]he decision to transfer is a grave and often difficult one, and does not lend itself to simple mathematical formulas." Anthony Y., 172 F.3d at 1252. "Rather, the district court must balance the evidence before it, weighing each factor as it sees fit, to determine whether a transfer to adult status best serves 'the interest of justice.' " Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5032). As a result, the district court "is not required to give equal weight to each factor"; instead, it " 'may balance them as it deems appropriate.' " Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589 (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1995)). "The court need not even find a majority of factors weigh in favor of the prevailing party[ ] . . . ." Anthony Y., 172 F.3d at 1252. But, again, it is important to remember that "[j]uvenile adjudication is 'presumed appropriate' " unless the government demonstrates that the interest of justice warrants prosecuting the juvenile as an adult. Doe, 58 F.4th at 1156 (quoting United States v. David A., 436 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006)).

II

A

Because the nature of B.N.M.'s crimes is relevant to the transfer analysis (specifically, the second factor), we recount the factual circumstances in detail. The following facts—which are undisputed for purposes of this appeal—are drawn from the evidence presented at the hearing on the government's motion to transfer B.N.M. for adult prosecution. See Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d at 589-90 ("[I]n making the transfer decision, the court may assume the truth of the government's allegations regarding the defendant's commission of [the] charged crime.").

In December 2020, B.N.M. was fifteen years and four months old. He was in a romantic relationship with A.M., a seventeen-year-old juvenile female.³ A.M. falsely told B.N.M. that she was pregnant and that because her mother and father did not like B.N.M., the couple could not have a life together with their child as long as her parents were alive. A.M. also told B.N.M. that her parents had mistreated her in the past and that her father had molested her. A.M. asked B.N.M. to kill her parents. B.N.M. doubted that he could kill two grown adults by himself, so he suggested recruiting C.V., A.M.'s eighteen-year-old neighbor, to aid them with the scheme. B.N.M. successfully recruited C.V.

B.N.M., A.M., and C.V. together planned the deaths of A.M.'s parents. They planned to kill A.M.'s mother by hitting her with a baseball bat and using a Taser, and then burying her body. One possible plan that they floated for killing A.M.'s father was to blow up his camper. B.N.M. and A.M. would then escape across state lines.

On the night of December 22, 2020, B.N.M. and C.V. put the plan into action. Throughout the evening, A.M. sent text messages to a phone owned by C.V. about her parents' whereabouts and the specifics of the plan.⁴ And in preparation for the crimes, B.N.M. and C.V. dug a large grave for A.M.'s mother and father, although...