United States v. Bailey

27 F.4th 1210

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jesse Rondale BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-5384

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: July 28, 2021

Decided and Filed: March 8, 2022

ARGUED: Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Brian Samuelson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jennifer Niles Coffin, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Brian Samuelson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: GILMAN, McKEAGUE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GILMAN and McKEAGUE, JJ., joined. GILMAN, J. (pp. 1216–20), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge.

In 2008, Jesse Rondale Bailey received a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment as a career offender for the possession and distribution of crack cocaine and powder cocaine. After the passage of the First Step Act in 2018, he moved for a sentence reduction. The district court denied his motion, and Bailey appealed. Because the district court's denial of Bailey's motion was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I.

Bailey's status as a career offender dates back to convictions for cocaine possession and facilitating second-degree murder. Those offenses resulted in his incarceration until 2005. Shortly after he was released from prison, Bailey engaged in conduct resulting in five federal charges: (1) one count of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine and at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) ; (2) two counts of distributing at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) ; (3) one count of distributing at least 5 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) ; and (4) one count of distributing an unspecified quantity of powder cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). In 2008, Bailey was convicted on all five counts.

Before his sentencing, the Government filed a notice informing the district court that Bailey had a prior felony drug conviction and was, therefore, subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment for the (b)(1)(A) offenses. Bailey was also classified as a career offender because of his prior convictions. Those factors led to a Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment.

Bailey objected to his career-offender classification and asked for a sentence "ten years less than the actual guideline range would be if he was not a career offender." The district court overruled his objections after considering the relevant sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It noted Bailey's "extensive criminal history[,]" his "lack of respect for the law[,]" and its hope that Bailey would "further his education and get his GED while he was with the Bureau of Prisons." The court then imposed a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of Bailey's Guidelines range.

In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), to correct the unequal treatment of base and powder cocaine in the Federal Code by increasing the quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger certain statutory penalties. The Fair Sentencing Act, however, did not apply to persons already sentenced at the time of its enactment. That changed with the First Step Act of 2018, which "allows courts to apply § 2(a) of the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively." United States v. Smith , 958 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Beamus , 943 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2019) ); see also First Step Act of 2018, § 404(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (First Step Act). Under the First Step Act, a district court can reduce a defendant's sentence if that defendant was previously sentenced for an offense covered under the Fair Sentencing Act. First Step Act, § 404(b).

In January 2019, Bailey moved pro se for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. He argued that his sentence was excessive, "unjust and counterproductive," and "fail[ed] to serve an incapacitative [sic] goal[.]" He pointed to his efforts to "rehabilitate himself through a variety of education, vocational, and selfhelp programs" and his continuous employment during his period of incarceration. Assisted by counsel, he filed another motion for a reduced sentence, arguing that he deserved a sentence reduction because of his incident-free record in custody and his completion of the programs mentioned above. In response, the Government noted that it "ha[d] no specific information to present in opposition to a sentence reduction," but that "nothing in [§ 404] shall be construed to require a court to reduce a sentence[.]" The Government also noted that Bailey's Guidelines range was unchanged.

The district court, this time a different judge, denied Bailey's request, finding that "the First Step Act's provisions did not affect [Bailey's] guideline range as a career offender[.]" The court "commend[ed] [Bailey] for his incident/discipline-free history and completion of drug education classes," but it noted that his sentence was already at the bottom end of his Guidelines range. Bailey timely appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to modify his sentence.

II.

We review a district court's denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and the First Step Act for abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith , 959 F.3d 701, 702 (6th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Moore , 582 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court "relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, uses an erroneous legal standard, or improperly applies the law." United States v. Flowers , 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. White , 492 F.3d 380, 408 (6th Cir. 2007) ). A district court's decision will be vacated "only if we are ‘firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.’ " Smith , 959 F.3d at 702 (quoting Moore , 582 F.3d at 644 ).

We review sentences for procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Boulding , 960 F.3d 774, 783 (6th Cir. 2020). In examining the resentencing decision for procedural error, we look to whether the court has engaged in a "thorough renewed consideration of the § 3553(a) factors." Id . at 784. And we review whether the district court "adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing." Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ; Chavez-Meza v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 201 L.Ed.2d 359 (2018).

Procedural Reasonableness

Bailey argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to engage in an adequate review of his circumstances. We disagree. As the Supreme Court has held, "[t]he appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon [the] circumstances" at hand. Chavez-Meza , 138 S.Ct. at 1964 (quoting Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) ). As the concurrence explains, an interested reader could not be faulted for finding our precedent in First Step Act cases less than clear. But we have affirmed brief orders in First Step Act cases, such as this one, where the district court had retained a bottom-of-Guidelines sentence. See Smith , 958 F.3d at 501.

Bailey cites a pair of out-of-circuit cases to support his contention that the district court should have provided a more comprehensive explanation. However, those cases are not binding, nor do we find their reasoning persuasive. First, in the two cases Bailey cites, neither district court considered the respective defendant's admirable post-conviction conduct. See United States v. Shaw , 957 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir. 2020) ; see also United States v. Martin , 916 F.3d 389, 397–98 (4th Cir. 2019). The court here did just that, commending Bailey for "his incident/discipline-free history and completion of drug education classes[.]" Second, these cases conflict with this court's previous holdings that reconsiderations like the one the district court engaged in here were enough to satisfy the First Step Act. See, e.g. , Smith , 958 F.3d at 501 ; see also United States v. Michael , 836 F. App'x 408, 413 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a "fairly simple" explanation consisting of two sentences when granting a reduced sentence).

Although the district court's order was brief, it referred to multiple § 3553(a) factors and gave them "renewed" consideration. And the district court was correct to conclude that Bailey's status as a career offender meant that the First Step Act did not ultimately affect his Guidelines range, thus keeping his sentence the same after the "renewed" consideration. In sum, the district court had discretion under the First Step Act to reduce Bailey's sentence, but its refusal to do so cannot be considered an abuse of its discretion.

Substantive Unreasonableness

Bailey next argues that the district court abused its discretion by upholding a substantively unreasonable sentence. A sentence is substantively reasonable "if it is proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)." United States v. Moon , 808 F.3d 1085, 1090 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). "[W]e may presume that sentences within the Guidelines are reasonable[.]" United States v. Ushery , 785 F.3d 210, 223 (6th Cir. 2015).

A sentence may be substantively unreasonable...