United States v. Barnett

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. JIMMY BARNETT DEFENDANT

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1:19-CR-00049-GNS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY BOWLING GREEN DIVISION

April 7, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jimmy Barnett's Appeal of the Magistrate Judge's Decision (DN 2). Defendant's appeal is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the Magistrate Judge is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Under 36 C.F.R. § 2.16(c), federal law prohibits "[t]he use of horses . . . on a park road, except: (1) Where such travel is necessary to cross to or from designated trails, or areas, or privately owned property, and no alternative trails or routes have been designated; or (2) when the road has been closed to motor vehicles." On May 4, 2019, a park ranger patrolling within Mammoth Cave National Park observed Defendant Jimmy Barnett ("Barnett") riding a horse on Houchin's Ferry Road. (Appeal Magistrate Judge Decision Ex. 1 [hereinafter "Mem. Op. & Order"] 1-2, DN 2-1). Houchin's Ferry Road is a park road not designated for horseback use, and signs at both ends of the road near horse trailheads advise "no horses beyond this point." (Mem. Op. & Order 2). The park ranger cited Barnett for a violation of Section 2.16(c). (Appellant's Br. 4 n.5, DN 6; Appellee's Br. 3 n.3, DN 7).

Before the Magistrate Judge and before this Court, Barnett makes only one argument—that he cannot be prosecuted for a violation of Section 2.16(c) because of a limiting condition inthe order of condemnation and deed by which the United States obtained ownership of Houchin's Ferry Road in 1945 and which requires the road remain open for the "usual use by the public." (Mem. Op. & Order 2; Appellant's Br. 1-2). Barnett's argument can be summed up as follows:

Barnett . . . challenges his citation for riding a horse on Houchin Ferry Road in violation of the federal regulation. He does not dispute the federal government's power to regulate its property, nor the federal regulation's facial validity. Rather, he argues that the regulation cannot be applied to his conduct — riding a horse on Houchin Ferry Road — without violating the express limit on the government's ownership of the road (contained in the condemnation judgment and deed), because his conduct was a "usual use [by] the public."

(Appellant's Br. 1-2). In other words, Barnett's only argument here is that he possesses an unfettered right to travel by horseback on Houchin's Ferry Road, what Barnett argues is a "usual use" of that road at the time the road was conveyed to the United States, because the limiting condition in the order of condemnation and deed granting ownership of the road to the United States reserves that right to the public, notwithstanding application of Section 2.16(c).

After the filing of pleadings and exhibits and the parties' oral argument, the Magistrate Judge found Barnett guilty of violating Section 2.16(c) and fined Barnett $100. (Mem. Op. & Order 1, 10). The Magistrate Judge found that the phrase "usual use" in the judgment and deed "is directed to the purpose of travel and not the means whereby it is accomplished." (Mem. Op. & Order 8). In other words, the Magistrate Judge rejected Barnett's argument, finding that the limiting condition did not reserve a specific mode of travel but rather the general activity of travel on the road. Barnett has appealed the Magistrate Judge's judgment to this Court. (Notice Appeal 1, DN 2).

II. JURISDICTION

"In all cases of conviction by a United States magistrate judge an appeal of right shall lie from the judgment of the magistrate judge to a judge of the district court of the district in which the offense was committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3402.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A defendant may appeal a magistrate judge's judgment of conviction or sentence to a district judge . . . ." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(B). "The scope of the appeal is the same as an appeal to the court of appeals from a judgment entered by a district judge." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(D). On appeal from a magistrate judge's judgment entered after a bench trial, a district court reviews the magistrate judge's legal determinations de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Evans, 581 F.3d 333, 338 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009).

IV. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the United States challenges Barnett's ability to even assert that Section 2.16(c) is invalid as applied to Barnett. (Appellee's Br. 4-7). The United States points to the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017), for the proposition that if a criminal defendant seeks to establish a right-of-way defense to a criminal charge, he must establish that right through an action under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. (Appellee's Br. 5-6). "The purpose of the Quiet Title Act is 'to determine which named party has [a] superior claim to a certain piece of property.' Congress thus permitted challenges to the United States' claim of title to real property only to parties who themselves claim an interest in title." Friends of Panamint Valley v. Kempthorne, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (internal citation omitted) (citation omitted).

Importantly, "the right of an individual to use a public road is not a right or interest in property for purposes of the Quiet Title Act." Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159, 160 (10th Cir. 1978)). Barnett is not asserting a property right here that concerns the Quiet Title Act; Barnett is simply asserting a right to use Houchin's Ferry Road in a certain manner. Asserting the right to travel on a public road by horseback versus by automobile or by foot is not a property interest that concerns the Quiet Title Act. Additionally, as the Court in Wells recognized, there is a "constitutional question of whether Defendants' . . . due process rights would be violated if they are prevented from mounting a[] . . . defense to their criminal charges." Wells, 873 F.3d at 1262. The United States has not addressed the due process implications of its argument that Barnett must file suit under the Quiet Title Act before asserting the defense he does in this criminal case.

Regardless of the merit, or lack thereof, of the United States' Quiet Title Act argument, its second argument, which the Magistrate Judge accepted, is correct—Barnett's interpretation of the phrase "open for the usual use by the public" is flawed. (Mem. Op. & Order 7-10; Appellee's Br. 7-10). The Magistrate Judge appropriately analyzed that phrase according to the context in which it was created, i.e., in the condemnation proceeding filed by the United States.

Mammoth Cave National Park was established on July 1, 1941. (Mem. Op. & Order 2; Appellant's Br. 3; Appellee's Br. 1). On August 11, 1942, the United States filed a Petition in Condemnation in this Court, seeking to acquire various public roadways located in three Kentucky counties that were within the confines of Mammoth Cave National Park. (Mem. Op. & Order 2; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 27-35, DN 7-9). "Houchin Ferry-Mammoth Cave Road" was twice identified as one of the roads included in the condemnation action. (Mem. Op. & Order 2-3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 29). The petition specified that several of the roads, including Houchin'sFerry Road, were to remain "open for the usual use by the public." (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 34). The petition was amended four times during the litigation to adjust the roadways subject to condemnation, but Houchin's Ferry Road remained among the roads to remain "open for the usual use by the public." (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 45).

The Court appointed a commission in the case, which set compensation at the sum of $3,673.50 for the 39 roadways subject to condemnation. (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 84). The parties took exception to the award, and in February 1945, the Court conducted a jury trial to assess the damages to be awarded to the counties. (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 84). Following a jury verdict, the Court entered a Final and Deficiency Judgment in Condemnation on or about March 2, 1945, awarding each of the landowners, i.e., various counties in Kentucky and Kentucky itself, a nominal amount for their interests. (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 84-85, 94). The judgment vested ownership of the roads in the United States "subject, however, to and conditioned upon [certain roads, including Houchin's Ferry Road] . . . remaining open for the usual use by the public." (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 93). This same condition was reflected in the deed formally conveying ownership to the United States executed subsequent to the judgment on June 18, 1945. (Mem. Op. & Order 3; Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 52-55).

Based on the condemnation action, the Magistrate Judge interpreted the phrase "open for the usual use by the public" to be "directed to the purpose of travel and not the means whereby it is accomplished." (Mem. Op. & Order 8). In other words, the Magistrate Judge, after a detailed examination of the entirety of the condemnation action, concluded that the phrase more generally preserved a right of access to the roads acquired by the federal government, not the right to access the roads by a specific means of locomotion. It is clear, as determined by the Magistrate Judge,that the public does not possess an unfettered right to travel by horseback on Houchin's Ferry Road as Barnett espouses.

Completely undermining Barnett's position is the fact that a federal regulation existing in 1941 prohibited "horseback travel over automobile roads . . . except where such travel is necessary for ingress to and egress from privately owned property in the parks of monuments, or incidental to authorized trail trips."¹ (Appellee's Br. Ex. 9, at 7 (c...