United States v. Battle, Criminal No. 16-017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ISSA BATTLE, Defendant.

Criminal No. 16-017

Civil No. 20-695

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 21, 2020

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE: MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 114)

Pending is Defendant Issa Battle's counseled Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2255 ("Section 2255 Motion"). (Doc. 114). In his Section 2255 Motion, Defendant contends that his felon in possession of a firearm conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ("Section 922(g)(1)") must be vacated.

Defendant's Section 2255 Motion is premised upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019) ("Rehaif"). In Rehaif, the Supreme Court "conclude[d] that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2200.

Defendant asserts, and the Government does not contest, that the Rehaif decision is retroactively applicable to Defendant's case. (Id. at 12). Defendant further claims that upon application of the Rehaif decision to his case, because the Indictment did not reference 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) ("Section 924(a)(2)"), and did not allege that Defendant knew of his status as a felon at the time he possessed the firearm on or about September 23, 2015, the indictment failed to charge a crime against Defendant, and violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 16-17). Defendant also claims that because Defendant "did not know of the true nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty, [he] did not admit that he knew he was a prohibited person[,] and [his] guilty plea to the felon in possession charge proceeded without any factual basis offered by the government so as to conclude that [he] possessed the firearm knowing that he was a prohibited person," Defendant's guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, and thus, the Court's Judgment against Defendant is unlawful because it was obtained in violation of Defendant's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. (Id. at 27-28).

I. Background

On February 2, 2016, Defendant was charged by Indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). (Doc. 1). Trial was set to commence on June 1, 2016, with a final pretrial conference scheduled for May 23, 2016.

On May 23, 2016, the Court was informed that Defendant wanted to plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Section 922(g)(1) only, and not in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) ("Section 924(e)"). (Doc. 89 at 4). Section 924(e) states in relevant part:

In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

The Court questioned whether Defendant could only plead guilty to Section 922(g)(1), and not Section 924(e), since both were charged in the Indictment. (Id. at 4-8). Counsel for both the Government and Defendant agreed that it was not necessary for Defendant to plead guilty to § 924(e), because the statutory section is a penalty provision, and thus, the Court would decide its applicability to Defendant at sentencing. (Id. at 5-8). The change of plea hearing, wherein Defendant only pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Section 922(g)(1), was then held on May 23, 2016. (Doc. 54).

On September 28, 2016, Defendant was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment for his violation of Section 922(g)(1). (Doc. 83). Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction. (Doc. 84). On August 15, 2017, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. (Doc. 98). Defendant did not file an application for re-argument with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, or file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Defendant's judgment of conviction, thus, became final on or about November 15, 2017.

On July 25, 2019, more than one year after Defendant's judgment of conviction was final, Defendant filed a Motion for appointment of counsel so to file a Section 2255 Motion premised upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif. (Doc. 103). Rehaif was decided on June 21, 2019.

On August 2, 2019, the Court denied Defendant's Motion for appointment of counsel, determining that Defendant's Section 2255 Motion would only be timely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) ("Section 2255(f)(3)"), and that, because "the Supreme Court did not make its decision [in Rehaif] retroactive to cases on collateral review." Section 2255(f)(3) would not applicable to Defendant's request for collateral review. (Doc. 104 at 3).

Defendant appealed this Court's denial of his Motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 105). On January 29, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the matter back to this Court, stating:

While only the Supreme Court can make a new rule retroactive for purposes of filing a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion under § 2255(h), see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001), § 2255(f)(3) "allows district courts and courts of appeals to make retroactivity decisions," United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we remand the matter for the District Court to decide in the first instance, in deciding whether counsel should be appointed, whether Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), applies retroactively on collateral review.

(Doc. 108).

In the meantime, on November 15, 2019, while this matter was on appeal, Chief Judge Hornak of this Court issued an Administrative Order, filed at Misc. No. 19-1195, whereby he ordered, "that the Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Pennsylvania is appointed to represent any defendant who was previously determined to be entitled to appointment of counsel, or who is now indigent, to determine whether that defendant may qualify for federal habeas relief under either 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in light of Rehaif, and to present any petitions, motions or applications relating thereto to the Court for disposition." Accordingly, consistent with Administrative Order Misc. No. 19-1195, on March 19, 2020, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 112).

Thereafter, on May 6, 2020, Defendant filed the pending Section 2255 Motion, seeking to have his conviction for violating Section 922(g)(1) vacated in light of Rehaif. (Doc. 114).

On July 13, 2020, the Government filed its response in opposition to Defendant's Section 2255 Motion. (Doc. 120).

On July 15, 2020, Defendant filed his reply to the Government's response. (Doc. 121).

The parties have fully briefed Defendant's Section 2255 Motion, including the applicability of Rehaif to Defendant's request for collateral review. Thus, Defendant's Section 2255 Motion is ripe for adjudication.

II. Discussion

A. Timeliness of Defendant's Section 2255 Motion

Claims for collateral review brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, such as Defendant's Section 2255 Motion, are governed by the statute of limitations period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Section 2255(f) provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Defendant asserts that his Section 2255 Motion "is timely pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)," because Rehaif was decided on June 21, 2019, and he filed his Section 2255 Motion less than one year thereafter. (Doc. 114 at 12)

As explained by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in its mandate remanding this case back to for further proceedings, "§ 2255(f)(3) allows district courts and courts of appeals to make retroactivity decisions." (Doc. 108). Thus, prior to addressing the merits of Defendant's Section 2255 Motion, it is necessary to determine whether Rehaif is applicable to cases on collateral review pursuant to an initial Section 2255 Motion.

While both Defendant and the Government agree that the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif, decided on June 21, 2019, is retroactively applicable to Defendant pursuant to Section 2255(f)(3), and thus, Defendant's Section 2255 Motion, filed on May 6, 2020, is timely filed, the Court does not so conclude.

As explained in United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 2003), Defendant "can take advantage of [Section 2255(f)(3)] only if [Rehaif] creates a "right [tha...