United States v. Bellot

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LEMACK BELLOT, Defendant.

No. 19-cr-00073-VC-7

United States District Court, N.D. California

October 18, 2021

RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 201, 202

VINCE CHHABRIA, United States District Judge

This order summarizes the Court's rulings on the parties' motions in limine. As a reminder, a ruling on a motion in limine may be revised at trial. See City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017).

The Government's Motions in Limine

1. The motion to permit evidence of Bellot's three unsuccessful attempts to smuggle the confidential source's drugs through airports in the Bay Area is granted. The prior attempts are inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes and therefore necessary for the government to present a coherent narrative to the jury. The failed attempts provide context for the relationship between the confidential source and Bellot and for the nature of the plan for each of the successful runs. The attempts are also important to understand the coded terms used in the confidential source's subsequent conversations with Bellot.

2. The motion to admit Bellot's statements when offered by the government under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) is granted. But if the government seeks to play part of a conversation between the confidential source and Bellot and the defense shows that it would be misleading without playing another part, the Court will either exclude the portion the government seeks to play under Rule 403 or require the government to play both parts under Rule 106.

3. The motion to admit Special Agent Mateer's expert testimony is granted in part and denied in part. First, Special Agent Mateer has the requisite expertise to testify about the topics outlined in the expert disclosure. He has, among other things, worked for the DEA since 1999, attended the DEA's 16-week training academy, and participated in more than one hundred narcotics investigations. Through those experiences he developed expertise in the topics he will testify about. His proffered opinions are also the product of reliable methodology.

The special agent may testify generally about the distribution and transportation of controlled substances like cocaine including why it is pressed into “bricks” for transport, and the methods used by drug traffickers to avoid detection by law enforcement. That information is probative of the ultimate issues in the case and not unduly prejudicial.

Special Agent Mateer may also testify about the meaning of coded language generally used by drug traffickers. That information is not within the grasp of a layperson and therefore is the proper subject of expert testimony. See Fed. R Evid. 702(a). However, Special Agent Mateer may not testify about unique case-specific lingo or about how he “translates” particular conversations in this case. The probative value of that testimony is substantially outweighed by the fact that it is duplicative of the lay witnesses and presents a substantial risk of wasting the jury's time. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Special Agent Mateer may opine on the relative prices of drugs in Northern California and Atlanta in 2018, and the fact that smuggling fees are commonly related to those prices. The government has the burden of proving that Bellot intended to traffic cocaine, as opposed to any other drug, and the pricing information is probative of that issue and not unduly prejudicial.

4. The motion to prohibit references to punishment or nullification before the jury is granted as to both parties.

5. The motion to preclude the introduction of information not in evidence before the jury is granted as to both parties. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(d).

6. The motion to exclude evidence that has not been timely produced under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 is granted as to both parties. If a party wishes to introduce evidence that has not yet been produced, they must seek leave of the Court.

7. The motion to require Bellot to proffer a good-faith basis for any Henthorn-type inquiry of a law enforcement witness is granted.

8. The motion to permit the government to rebut Bellot's anticipated entrapment defense in its case-in-chief is denied. The government may rebut an anticipated entrapment defense in its case-in-chief only when it is “sufficiently clear” that the defendant will present such a defense. United States v. Gomez, 6 F.4th 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2021). Although Bellot previously requested a jury instruction on entrapment, he later notified the Court that he did not intend to rely on an entrapment defense.

9. The motion to require Bellot to make a pre-trial offer of proof to present a duress defense is granted. See United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994 998-99 (9th Cir. 1996)). Bellot has provided an offer of proof that the Court...