United States v. Benton

656 F.Supp.3d 1

UNITED STATES of America, v. Jesse R. BENTON, Defendant.

Case No. 1:21-cr-00569 (TNM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

Signed January 27, 2023

Michelle Parikh, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-CRM, Washington, DC, Michelle Wasserman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Washington, DC, Rebecca G. Ross, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Public Integrity Section, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Brian W. Stolarz, Stephanie Metherall, Norton Rose Fulbright U.S. LLP, Washington, DC, David Alan Warrington, Alexandria, VA, Michael Andrew Columbo, Dhillon Law Group, Inc., San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, United States District Judge

A federal jury convicted Jesse Benton of six counts related to campaign contributions he made to various political action committees before the 2016 election. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 61. Before the Court is his motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. See Mot. for Judgment of Acquittal or Mot. for New Trial, ECF No. 64 (Mot.). Because Benton neither shows that this Court's pretrial rulings were error nor that his trial was deficient, the Court denies his motion.

I.

In September 2021, a grand jury indicted Jesse Benton and Roy Douglas Wead in connection with campaign contributions made before the 2016 election. See Indictment, ECF No. 1. The indictment charged one count each of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (electoral contributions by foreign nationals); 52 U.S.C. § 30122 (electoral contributions in the name of another); and three counts each of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (causing false records). See id. The charges stemmed from an alleged conspiracy between Benton and Wead to solicit $100,000 from Russian oligarch Roman Vasilenko and to use those funds to donate to political action committees supporting Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. See id. Wead died of natural causes before trial. See Mot. to Dismiss Case, ECF No. 23.

Benton's case proceeded to trial. At the close of the Government's evidence, Benton moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). See Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 130-34. This Court denied that motion after argument. See id. at 140-43. The jury ultimately found Benton guilty of willfully soliciting or causing foreign national contributions to a political committee aggregating more than $25,000 in a year; willfully permitting his name to be used to effect contributions of a foreign national to a political committee aggregating more than $25,000 in a year; and three counts of knowingly causing the Federal Election Commission to create false records. See Verdict Form. The jury also found him guilty of conspiracy to commit all these offenses. See id. Benton now moves for judgment of acquittal or a new trial.

II.

Rule 29 permits a defendant to move for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal if the evidence presented at trial cannot sustain a conviction. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). But the Court must affirm the jury verdict if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, it finds that "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2002). And the Court must presume that the jury properly discharged its duty to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, find facts, and draw justifiable inferences. See United States v. Campbell, 702 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "[A] judgment of acquittal is appropriate only when there is no evidence upon which a reasonable juror might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Rule 33 allows courts, at a defendant's request, to "vacate [a] judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Motions under Rule 33 are disfavored and "viewed with great caution." United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 21-cr-37, 628 F.Supp.3d 320, 326 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2022). Granting a new trial "is warranted only in those limited circumstances where a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred." United States v. Wheeler, 753 F.3d 200, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). In other words, courts grant such motions in "extraordinary circumstances where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict," United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and when any error affects a defendant's substantial rights, see United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The party seeking a new trial bears the burden of proving that it is justified. See United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), the Court reviews objections not raised at trial for plain error. See United States v. Williams, 825 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2011). To be plain, any error "must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute." Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). And it must be prejudicial, meaning it "affect[s] substantial rights" or the outcome of the proceeding. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (cleaned up).

III.

The Court first addresses Benton's arguments for acquittal under Rule 29 and then moves to his arguments for a new trial under Rule 33.

A.

First up is Benton's Rule 29(c) motion. Benton primarily argues that the Government did not sufficiently prove a critical element of the offenses in this case—that Vasilenko's contribution was intended to influence a federal election. See Mot. at 2-5. Benton raised the same issue in his Rule 29(a) motion at the close of the Government's evidence. See Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 130-34.¹

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) makes it unlawful for a "person to solicit . . . a contribution" from a foreign national "in connection with a Federal, State, or local election." 52 U.S.C. § 30121. And it criminalizes "knowingly permit[ting] [one's] name to be used to effect" a contribution in the name of another. Id. § 30122. The statute elsewhere defines "contribution" as "anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office[.]" Id. § 30101(8)(A)(i).²

Some factual background is warranted. The core of Benton's argument throughout the case has been that "intent to influence an election" in FECA means that someone contributed money to gain some benefit from a politician—perhaps special favor or financial support. See, e.g., Mot. at 2-3; see also Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 PM, 118-19 (defense cross-examination of FBI witness eliciting that the witness found no evidence that Vasilenko sought anything from Trump or asked for foreign policy assistance after meeting him).

Benton's theory of the case at trial was that Vasilenko—a prominent businessman—merely sought a photo with an American celebrity to enhance his public image. See, e.g., Mot. at 3; Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 131-33. On Benton's telling, Vasilenko would have met any number of celebrities, and indeed he first considered meeting other celebrities from entertainment, sports, and politics. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 AM, 9-13. Trump was a fallback option. Vasilenko's intent, therefore, was purely to raise his public profile back home, not to influence the American presidential election. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 131-33.

The Government countered that Vasilenko could have mixed motives, and that one of his purposes was to influence the presidential election by contributing money. See, e.g., Gov't Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Acquittal or for a New Trial (Gov't Opp'n) at 6-7, ECF No. 65; Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 135-39. The Government's primary argument was that Vasilenko contributed to Trump's campaign because a photo taken with a President-elect—rather than a failed candidate or other celebrity—would better bolster the Russian's image and influence. See, e.g., Gov't Opp'n at 6-7; Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 135-39.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the Court finds that a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375. A person's intent is difficult to prove, especially where, as here, he did not testify and the Government relies on third-parties' statements as proof. But enough evidence existed of Vasilenko's intent to make it a jury issue. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 141 (explaining that a jury could draw justifiable inferences based on the Government's evidence, especially given the need "to get inside someone's head"). As relevant here, the following evidence was introduced at trial:

• Vasilenko was running for Russian office and is an influencer who runs his own business. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 AM, 102, 106; Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 PM, 88; Trial Tr. 11/14/2022 AM, 23.

• He donated $100,000 to get a photo with Trump. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 PM, 6-10, 25-36.

• Vasilenko attended a campaign event for Trump in Philadelphia in September 2016 and sat at a private roundtable with Trump and other contributing attendees. See id. at 48-49.

• The Russian would have understood that this event was a political fundraiser for a presidential candidate. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 AM, 47.

• After the event, he was very interested in obtaining the photo he took with Trump. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 PM, 58-62 (summarizing persistent communications from the Russian's translator about obtaining the picture with Trump).

• Soon after receiving his photo with Trump, Vasilenko posted it to his Instagram account. See id. at 116-17.

• After Trump won the election, the Russian again posted his picture with Trump on Instagram, now adding the wording "Two Presidents" and "Donald Trump v. Roman Vasilenko," alongside his company's logo. Trial Tr. 11/10/2022 PM, 117-18. This

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