United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago

588 F. Supp. 132

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.

No. 80 C 5124.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

June 8, 1984.

As Amended July 17, 1984.

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William Bradford Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alexander C. Ross, Civil Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Margaret C. Gordon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Robert C. Howard, Robert M. Weissbourd, Hartunian, Futterman & Howard, Chtd., C. Richard Johnson, Reynaldo P. Glover, Hugh R. McCombs, David Narefsky, Isham, Lincoln & Bealee, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

SHADUR, District Judge.

JUNE 8, 1984 OPINION — TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                        Pages
BACKGROUND                                                              138-140
I. FINDINGS OF FACT ("Findings")                         Findings
Adoption and Approval of the Desegregation
Plan (the "Plan"), and the Nature
of the Plan                                              101-61          140-157
Consent Decree Negotiations                              101-11          140-144
Development of Part I of the Plan, the
Educational Components                                   112-17          144-146
Statements of the United States and
this Court Relating to the Educational
Components                                               118-28          146-150
Overview of the Student Assignment
Plan                                                     129-44          150-152
Demographics of the City of Chicago
and the Chicago Public Schools                           145-61          153-157
Propriety and Cost of Programs Proposed
for Adequate Implementation of
the Plan                                                 201-72          158-180
Board's Financial Affairs and Condition
and the Financial Aspects of School Desegregation        301-76          180-196
1983-84 Incremental Desegregation
Expenditures                                             301-12          180-186
1983-84 Ancillary Desegregation Expenditures             313-17           186
1983-84 School Budget — Board Resources
and Expenditures                                         318-29          186-188
1979-80 Financial Crisis                                 330              188
Relationship to School Finance Authority                 331-32          188-190
Projected Deficits for Future Years                      333-41          190-191
Board Efforts To Find Resources                          342-49          191-192
Federal and State Funds Received by
Board                                                    350-68          192-196
Board's Good Faith Efforts                               369-76          196-197
Addendum A to Findings                                   301-76          197-200
Availability of Federal Funds to Implement
the Chicago Desegregation Plan                           401-67          200-208
Presently Available Funds                                401-38          200-205
Actions by the United States Affecting
the Availability of Funds                                439-67          205-208
Actions with Respect to the Yates Bill
and Weicker Amendment                                    501-18          208-211
The United States' Non-Compliance With
Section 15.1                                             601-09          211-212
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ("Conclusions")
                                                      Conclusions   Pages
Law of the Case                                            1-9           212-214
Standards for Determining the
Amount of Funding "Adequate for
Implementation of the Plan"                               10-16          214-217
Standards for Determining the Share
the United States Is Obligated To
Attempt To Provide of the Amount
"Adequate for Implementation of the
Plan"                                                     17-21          217-218
Consideration of Funding Contentions
of the United States                                      22-35          218-220
Propriety of the Programs Proposed
by Board for Implementation of the
Plan, and Summary as to the Amount
of United States' Obligation                              36-38          220-221
Verification of the Current Availability
of Funds                                                  39-79          221-229
Meaning and Effect of the Yates Bill                      80-88          229-231
Meaning and Effect of the Weicker
Amendment                                                 89-119         231-237
Additional United States Violations of
Section 15.1 and Subsequent Court
Orders, and Consequent Remedial Obligations               120-30         237-240
Present Obligations of the United
States                                                    131-43         240-243
Separation of Powers: Judicial Consideration
of Legislative Activities                                 144-57         244-245
Means of Enforcement                                      158-62         245-246

This case has tended to be sidetracked by a "false conflict"¹ created by the United States: By creating an artificial limitation on funds otherwise available or potentially available to satisfy the extensive Desegregation Plan needs of Chicago's Board of Education (let alone the varying needs of other claimants of funds), the United States has sought to place the Board (and this Court) into a position as though the Board (and this Court) were choking off deserving educational programs.² That is simply not true. It is the United States itself that has created and is perpetuating that regrettable situation.

This Court has held,³ and our Court of Appeals has confirmed,⁴ that the United States has broken its word by refusing to keep the promise it made on the day this lawsuit was filed, Consent Decree § 15.1, ("Section 15.1"):⁵

Each party is obligated to make every good faith effort to find and provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the implementation of the desegregation plan.

In a sense the United States is not like other litigants — because the concerns created by considerations such as separation of powers and sovereign immunity tend to prevent its promises from being fully enforced in precisely the same way as promises of (say) IBM or other private defendants. For that reason this Court has previously been compelled to impose a "freeze" order to avoid the risk its ability to order relief will arguably be frustrated. Because the United States has deliberately violated its original agreement to fund the Chicago Desegregation Plan, this Court has reluctantly found it necessary to prevent the distribution to other possible grantees of United States educational funds, in order to preserve access to all the dollars that would be potentially available to fund the honoring of the United States' freely-undertaken (and then freely-broken) obligation to the Board.

But as this Court has said during the course of hearings on this issue, the United States "has the key to its cell in its own pocket."⁶ It could have, in the exercise of its "every good faith effort," assured that all the needed funds would be potentially available to the Board by (1) shifting available dollars to the Board to the fullest extent possible without congressional approval or (2) going to Congress with a request to allow the shifting of dollars that were already available to the Department of Education, but that required reallocation because they were not in fact going to be used for the purposes that had been the subject of the original allocation.⁷ It could have done both those things if necessary. Instead the United States has chosen to pit deserving applicants for funds one against the other, and to put the issue before Congress as though the Board and this Court — rather than the United States as the breaker of its own voluntary promise — were the malefactors.

One other related point should be emphasized at the outset. Section 15.1 is part of a consent decree. Like every consent decree, it has a twofold aspect.⁸ It is of course a contract — and as a contract, it is enforceable to require the contracting parties to perform their voluntarily undertaken duties. Because unlike most contracts the parties have chosen to submit it for the stamp of court approval, it is also a court order — and as such, it is enforceable like any other court order, by contempt if need be.⁹

On the sorry record reflected by the matters detailed in this long opinion, a private litigant that did what the United States has done would unquestionably be held in contempt —with the potential for being subjected to a fine or imprisonment as well as to an order for civil compliance. But for the United States a contempt fine is meaningless —after all it is the public interest (and not the injured opposing party) that is vindicated by a fine, with the money going to the United States itself as surrogate for the public. Thus imposition of a fine against the United States would just transfer money from one federal pocket to the other. Similarly imprisonment of the United States as such is impossible, and any possible imprisonment of defiant ranking government officials would be unseemly at best. For those reasons voluntary adherence by the United States to its solemnly undertaken responsibilities becomes all the more important, and its deliberate flouting of those responsibilities becomes all the more unpardonable.

Now the legal rights of the litigants have to be evaluated. This opinion has not been drafted in response to the United States' conduct just referred to, but that conduct may have made the issues more clouded than would otherwise have been the case.

This Court now has before it the evidence developed in extensive hearings on remand from the Court of Appeals' decision ...