United States v. Brown

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS D. BROWN, aka Travis Darnell Moore, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-3478

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

June 30, 2023

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Before: KETHLEDGE, STRANCH, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

MATHIS, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Travis Brown pleaded guilty to several firearm and drug offenses in connection with two traffic stops conducted within months of each other and received a sentence of 144 months' imprisonment. Brown now challenges his below-Guidelines sentence on procedural and substantive reasonableness grounds. Because the district court did not err in sentencing Brown, we affirm.

I.

On January 3, 2020, around 1:30 a.m., two officers with the Toledo Police Department conducted a traffic stop on a red GMC SUV owned and operated by Brown. During the stop, the officers conducted a warrant check on Brown and discovered that he had an outstanding arrest warrant. One of the officers went back to Brown's SUV and asked him to exit the vehicle. At the time, the officer was standing in the door well of the open driver's door with his hand on top of the open door while the second officer relocated from standing on the passenger's side of the vehicle to the rear, driver's side of the vehicle. Rather than exiting the vehicle, Brown quickly drove off to evade the officers, forcing other cars to stop to avoid hitting him. The officers ran back to their vehicle and pursued Brown. A car chase ensued.

During the chase, Brown drove onto sidewalks and across several front yards. At one point, he failed to stop at a stop sign, forcing oncoming cars to stop to avoid hitting him or the officers. Throughout the chase, both vehicles drove at speeds of around 30 to 40 miles per hour, although at some point the officers' vehicle reached speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour.

Brown eventually abandoned his SUV and the chase continued on foot. The officers caught up with Brown and arrested him. After securing Brown, the officers searched the SUV and recovered a firearm from the front driver-side floorboard. They also found a plastic bag inside a coat Brown left in the vehicle, which contained 105.26 grams of a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine, as well as .32 grams of crack cocaine.

Just five months later, on May 6, 2020, officers with the Toledo Police Department conducted another traffic stop of a vehicle operated by Brown. While speaking with Brown, the officers saw marijuana in the center console. They asked Brown to step out of the car, during which Brown told the officers that there was a pistol in the backseat. Upon searching the car, the officers found a pistol and a bag of oxycodone pills in the center console underneath the marijuana.

On June 11, 2020, a grand jury indicted Brown on several federal charges related to the January 3 and May 6 stops:

Count 1: possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, in connection with the January 3 stop;

Count 2: carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in connection with the January 3 stop; Count 3: felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), in connection with the January 3 stop; and

Count 4: felon in possession of a firearm in connection with the May 6 stop.

Brown pleaded guilty to all counts.

Brown's advisory Guidelines range was 152 to 175 months' imprisonment. This included a two-level reckless-endangerment enhancement for the January 3 fleeing incident. Brown objected to the application of the reckless-endangerment enhancement.

At sentencing, the district court overruled Brown's objection. And after hearing argument from Brown and the government, the district court sentenced Brown to 144 months' imprisonment-eight months below the low end of the advisory Guidelines range. Brown timely appealed.

II.

Brown challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We generally review the reasonableness of a sentence "under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 350 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022). "A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, when it improperly applies the law, or uses an erroneous legal standard." Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 218 (6th Cir. 2019).

We review questions of law de novo. Nunley, 29 F.4th at 830. We review findings of fact for clear error. Id. A district court's factual finding is "clearly erroneous when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction' that the district court made a mistake." United States v. Ellis, 938 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 352 F.3d 1067, 1070 (6th Cir. 2003)).

For procedural reasonableness, if a defendant failed to object below, we review only for plain error. Nunley, 29 F.4th at 830. Under plain-error review, a defendant must establish: (1) that there was an error, (2) that the error was "plain," (3) that the error affected "substantial rights," and (4) "that the error had a serious effect on 'the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090, 2096-97 (2021) (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1897, 1904-05 (2018)); see United States v. Ramirez-Figueredo, 33 F.4th 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2022).

III.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

"Procedural reasonableness mandates that a court 'properly calculate the [G]uidelines range, treat the [G]uidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any variance from the [G]uidelines range.'" United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1098 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2012)). "It further mandates that the court's sentence be based on a reasonable determination of the facts." Id. (quoting Morgan, 687 F.3d at 693).

Brown challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court erred in enhancing his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment in connection with the January 3 car chase. Second, he argues that the district court failed to consider national sentence disparities as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). We take each argument in turn.

1. Reckless-endangerment enhancement

The reckless-endangerment enhancement applies "[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. We use a five-part test to determine whether the enhancement applies. Under the test, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant:

(1) recklessly, (2) created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, (3) to another person, (4) in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (5) and that this conduct occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.

United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Dial, 524 F.3d 783, 786-87 (6th Cir. 2008)). Determining § 3C1.2's applicability is a highly fact-based inquiry. United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we give "significant deference to the district court" when a defendant challenges the application on appeal. Id.

Brown contests only whether the government has satisfied the first three elements of the enhancement.

The government introduced body cam and dashcam footage from the January 3 stop, which showed the car chase and subsequent pursuit on foot, to meet its burden. This was not a situation where the district court merely relied on the parties' versions of events. It saw what the officers saw and experienced. And what the officers saw and experienced was the exact encounter that supported the application of § 3C1.2. Based on our review, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Brown's objection to the reckless-endangerment enhancement.

As to recklessness, the Guidelines commentary defines "reckless" as "a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation." U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1; see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, cmt. n.2 (adopting § 2A1.4's definition of reckless). Brown argues that he did not act recklessly because his vehicle "did not exceed 50 miles per hour" and "the time of day and cold weather made clear that others were not likely to be nearby." D. 18 at p. 11. But § 3C1.2 does not require that the defendant cross some speed or population-density threshold for the enhancement to apply. We have found § 3C1.2's recklessness requirement satisfied when a defendant flees law enforcement in much the same way that Brown did. See United States v. Lash, 665 Fed.Appx. 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2016) (affirming § 3C1.2's application when the defendant "attempt[ed] to drive away while two officers and one passenger were close to (or partly inside) the vehicle"). We see no reason to find differently here.

As to the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to...