United States v. Brownlee

ORDER

DEBRA M. BROWN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Following their indictment for conspiracy to distribute certain controlled substances, Bobby Earl Brownlee, Jamie Logan, and Steven Posley filed various motions seeking to quash the indictment and to suppress or limit the evidence that may be offered at trial. Because the Court finds the indictment sufficient and that these defendants' conclusory arguments do not support the evidentiary relief they seek, the motions will be denied.

I Background and Procedural History

On October 8, 2020, a grand jury charged Bobby Earl Brownlee, Jamie Logan, Steven Posley (“Moving Defendants”), and eleven other individuals in a four-count indictment arising from a marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine drug trafficking organization. Doc. #1. Count One charges Brownlee and five others with conspiracy “to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute marijuana, ” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846. Id. at 1-4. Count Two charges Brownlee, Logan, Posley, and six others with conspiracy “to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute methamphetamine (actual) and cocaine hydrochloride (power cocaine), ” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and § 846.^[1] Id. at 4-7. On May 7, 2021, Brownlee,

Logan, and Posley were charged with the same crimes in a superseding indictment naming them and twelve others.^[2] Doc. #192 at 1-2, 4.

On September 28, 2021, Posley filed three separate motions: (1) a “Motion to Suppress, ” Doc. #355; (2) a “Motion to Quash Indictment, ” Doc. #358; and (3) a “Motion in in [sic] Limine to Prohibit Evidence of Other Alleged Crimes, and/or Alleged Bad Character, ” Doc. #361. The same day, Brownlee and Logan^[3] filed identical motions.^[4] See Docs. #354, #356, #359 (Brownlee motions); Docs. #353, #357, #360 (Logan motions). The government filed a consolidated response to the motions to quash on October 8, 2021. Doc. #375. The same day, it also filed “Government's Motion for a More Definitive Statement (Docs #353-355 & 359-361)” asking that the motions to suppress and motions in limine be denied or, alternatively, for an order “requir[ing] the defendants to submit legal arguments and more specific factual allegations with their motions.” Doc. #374. Brownlee, Logan, and Posley each filed a reply in support of their respective motions to quash. Docs. #376, #377, #378. They also filed a joint response to the government's motion for more definitive statement. Doc. #383.

II Analysis

A. Motions to Quash

Without citation to authority or factual evidence, the Moving Defendants seek to quash the indictment^[5] on grounds that it is vague and ambiguous; it fails to contain sufficient allegations of the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense; the “method of presentation of

evidence to the Grand Jury violated [their] rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution;” and it is based upon “unconstitutional statues [sic] and or Federal regulations, or in the alternative, said statues [sic] and or Federal regulations are unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case.” Doc. #358 at 1-2; Doc. #357 at 1-2; Doc. #356 at 1-2.

The government responds that under Fifth Circuit precedent, the indictment need not provide precise dates, “identify specific criminal acts constituting the alleged conspiracy, ” or “provide evidentiary details of the case in order to comply with rules governing particularity of indictments.” Doc. #375 at PageID 1118-19. The government further submits that “[t]he language of the indictment in this case is nearly identical to indictments previously approved.” Id. at PageID 1118.

In reply, Brownlee clarifies:

The indictment fails to inform the Defendant of the offenses charged in that it fails to state whether the Defendant being [sic] charged with one or two counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana. Also, under Count Two of the indictment marijuana is misclassified as a Schedule II substance when it is actually a Schedule I substance. Third, Counts I and II contain different alleged co-conspirators. Due to these errors, the indictment fails to inform the Defendant of the charges against which he must defend.

Doc. #376 at 2. Logan and Posley each reply that the indictment “fails to state whether the Defendant is also being charged with possession of marijuana” and misclassifies marijuana as a Schedule II substance. Doc. #377 at 1-2; Doc. #378 at 1-2.

Because neither in their initial motions nor their replies do the Moving Defendants present any specific facts or authority to support their conclusory constitutional challenges to the grand jury proceedings or the statutes under which they are charged, such challenges cannot serve as bases to quash the indictment and are summarily rejected. See United States v. Chagra, 638 F.Supp. 1389, 1392 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (denying motion to dismiss indictment based upon

“speculative claim, unsubstantiated by any evidence”); see also United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d 121, 141 (5th Cir. 2017) (“As a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendant.”) (cleaned up); United States v. Anderton, 901 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Courts must indulge a presumption of constitutionality and carefully examine a statute before finding it unconstitutional.”). Accordingly, the Court will only address the sufficiency of the indictment based on the elaborations in the Moving Defendants' replies.

“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that the indictment be ‘a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.'” United States v. Suarez, 966 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)). “To be sufficient, an indictment must 1) enumerate each prima facie element of the charged offense, 2) notify the defendant of the charges filed against him, and 3) provide the defendant with a double jeopardy defense against future prosecutions.” Id. (cleaned up).

The elements of a drug conspiracy are “(1) an agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws; (2) knowledge of the agreement; and (3) voluntary participation in the agreement.” United States v. Escajeda, 8 F.4th 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2021).

Here, Count One, which charges conspiracy “to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute marijuana” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846, alleges that from January 2019 until August 2020, Brownlee (and five others) “would correspond with each other and with other drug traffickers to arrange the purchase and shipment of marijuana from other places, such as the State of California, into the Northern District of Mississippi” and would count, store, transport, and transfer “currency derived from the sale of controlled substances from the Northern District of Mississippi … in order to purchase more illegal drugs.” Doc. #1 at 1-3. Count Two,

which charges conspiracy “to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute methamphetamine (actual) and cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine)” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846, alleges that Brownlee, Logan, and Posley (and six others) “would correspond with each other and with other drug traffickers to arrange the purchase and shipment of methamphetamine and cocaine from other places, into the Northern District of Mississippi, and elsewhere;” the co-conspirators “prepared, packaged, and stored” methamphetamine and cocaine in “stash houses” prior to distribution; and they transported the controlled substances and currency derived from the sale of controlled substances within and out of Mississippi. Id. at 4-7.

Brownlee's argument that the indictment “fails to state whether [he is] being charged with one or two counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, ”^[6] and the arguments of Logan and Posley that the indictment “fails to state whether [they are] also being charged with possession of marijuana, ”^[7] are all without merit. Count One and Count Two are both based on violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846. Doc. #1 at 1. Section 846 subjects “[a]ny person who … conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter [including § 841(a)(1)] … to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the … conspiracy.” Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful to “distribute, … or possess with intent to … distribute, … a controlled substance.” The language of these statutes in conjunction with the language of the indictment make clear that the Moving Defendants are each charged with conspiracy to commit specified acts prohibited by § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Masha, 990 F.3d 436, 443 (5th Cir. 2021) (indictment that tracks the language of the relevant statute is sufficient if those words “fully, directly, and expressly … set forth all the elements

...