United States v. Burale

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. AHMED SALA ALI BURALE, Defendant.

No. CRIM. 2:11cr34-13

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division

May 6, 2022

OPINION

REBECCA BEACH SMITH SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's "Motion for a Reduction of Sentence Under the First Step Act Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)" ("Motion"). ECF No. 1182. For the reasons explained below Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 25, 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to Count One of a three (3) count Indictment. Count One charged Defendant with Piracy Under the Law of Nations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 3238, and 2. ECF No. 3 at 2-3. On October 7, 2011, United States District Judge Mark S. Davis of this court sentenced Defendant to the statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment, along with a five (5) year term of supervised release. ECF No. 343 at 1-3. Defendant never directly appealed his conviction or sentence, and never mounted a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, upon motion of the United States, ECF No. 948, the undersigned issued an Order on October 14, 2014, exercising the court's discretion and reducing Defendant's term of imprisonment from life to thirty-five (35) years. ECF No. 954.^[1]

Defendant, pro se, filed the instant Motion and associated Exhibits on December 14, 2021. ECF No. 1182. On February 2, 2022, the United States submitted a Response in Opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 1186, along with Defendant's Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") medical records, which were filed under seal, ECF No. 1188 ("Medical Records"). On February 4, 2022, the court received an additional submission from Defendant updating the court concerning the conditions at his facility. ECF No. 1189. Defendant replied to the United States' Response on March 1, 2022. ECF No. 1193. Having been fully briefed, Defendant's Motion is now ripe for disposition.

II. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

Before the court may consider a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c) (1) (A) (i), the defendant must have "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf," or there must have been a "lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit recently explained that defendants may satisfy this exhaustion requirement by "wait[ing] 30 days from the date of their initial request to file a motion in the district court," even if the warden has already responded to their request. United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 131 (4th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases). The court further clarified that the exhaustion requirement "is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule," and therefore "may be waived or forfeited." Id. at 130.

Defendant submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden of his institution on July 16, 2021. ECF No. 1182-3 at 2. Because more than thirty (30) days have passed since Defendant made his request, he has satisfied the threshold exhaustion requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (1) (A).

III. MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION

For a court to reduce a defendant's sentence under § 3582 (c) (1) (A) (i), it must find that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" justify such a reduction. The defendant bears the burden of showing that this requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Noel, No. 3:08-cr-186-03, 2021 WL 1602402, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2021) (Payne, J.). Even if a defendant carries his burden, a court may only reduce his sentence "after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable." § 3582(c) (1) (A). Any such reduction must also be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id.; see United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 275-76 (4th Cir. 2020).

In McCoy, the Fourth Circuit held that, in the context of prisoner-filed § 3582 (c) (1) (A) motions, "there currently exists no 'applicable policy statement'" because the Commission has not issued a policy statement since the passage of the First Step Act. 981 F.3d at 281-82 (alteration omitted). Therefore, until the Sentencing Commission issues an updated policy statement, "district courts are 'empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.'" Id. at 284 (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020)); see United States v. Davis, No. 21-6960, 2022 WL 127900, at *1-2 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2022) (holding district court abused discretion in determining that certain claims "categorically" could never "establish a sufficient reason for release"). In particular, the Fourth Circuit held that courts "may consider, under the 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' inquiry, that defendants are serving sentences that Congress itself views as dramatically longer than necessary or fair." McCoy, 981 F.3d at 285-86.

Whatever a defendant argues, the overarching purpose of the compassionate release mechanism guides district courts:

When Congress authorized district courts, as a matter of discretion, to release an inmate from prison based on extraordinary and compelling reasons, it did so to introduce compassion as a factor in assessing ongoing terms of imprisonment, authorizing a district court to give greater weight to an inmate's personal circumstances - when sufficiently extraordinary and compelling - than to society's interests in the defendant's continued incarceration and the finality of judgments.

United States v. Hargrove, __F.4th__, 2022 WL 905436, at *6 (4th Cir. 2022). Ultimately, therefore, the court must "balance the severity of the inmate's personal circumstances, on the one hand, against the needs for incarceration, on the other." See id.

Although the policy statement in United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines") § 1B1.13 is no longer binding on this court in this case after the Fourth Circuit's decision in McCoy, the court finds that certain of its provisions remain "helpful guidance" in striking this balance. See McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 n.7. For example, the court will still consider "the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable," U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and whether "[t]he defendant is ... a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community," id. § 1B1.13(2), because these considerations remain highly relevant to whether a reduction in sentence is warranted in this case.

A. EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS

Defendant offers five (5) matters which he contends amount to "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a reduction in sentence pursuant to § 3582(c) (1) (A) (i):

(1) sentencing disparities between him and similarly situated defendants, see ECF No. 1182 at 5, 24, 30-31;

(2) the ongoing novel coronavirus ("COVID-19") pandemic, see id. at 8-21; ECF No. 1189; ECF No. 1193 at 5-8;

(3) his rehabilitation while incarcerated, see ECF No. 1182 at 19-23; ECF No. 1193 at 5-8;

(4) jurisdictional infirmities underlying his conviction and sentence, see ECF No. 1182 at 31-33; and

(5) his desire to be with his family, see id. at 33; id. Ex. 3 at 2.

For the reasons explained below, the court finds that none of these issues, individually or in combination, amount to an "extraordinary and compelling reason[]" for a reduction in sentence. See Davis, 2022 WL 127900, at *2 (vacating and remanding denial of compassionate release where there was "no indication that the district court considered [the defendant's] circumstances, as a whole").

1. Sentencing Disparities

Defendant argues that under current law, he "would have been sentenced even less than the 35-year sentence he is now serving." See ECF No. 1182 at 31; see also id. at 24, 28-32. According to him, his continued incarceration "would all be in disparity of sentences handed down today," and the time he has already served "exceeds, many times over, the sentence [Defendant] would have received had this same offense been prosecuted in State Court." Id. at 24. Defendant also submits that the court would have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment following the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). ECF No. 1182 at 31. These arguments are meritless.

Though Defendant references the Fair Sentencing and First Step Acts, those laws bear little relevance on how he would be sentenced today, as they did nothing to alter how his offense of conviction is prosecuted or his eligibility for a "safety valve" reduction. Defendant was convicted of Piracy Under the Law of Nations under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, which calls for a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment, just as it did when the court sentenced Defendant. Though Defendant contends that he now "would be entitled to a . . . downward departure and/or safety valve reduction," this is entirely inaccurate. ECF No. 1182 at 30. Defendant "possess[ed] a firearm ... in connection with [his] offense," making application of the safety valve inappropriate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Furthermore, the court also observes that this is a uniquely federal offense, lacking state-law analogues. Defendant provides no examples of similar prosecutions - under state or federal law - giving rise to the disparity he alleges.

His argument concerning intervening Supreme Court precedent likewise fails. Defendant contends that applying the holding of Alleyne to his circumstances would compel the court to impose a lesser sentence today. ECF No. 1182 at 31. Specifically, he cites Alleyne in support...